Since the unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine, we have been treated to analyzes that too often ignore the complex processes that followed the collapse of the Soviet regime. Hypotheses on Putin’s mental state, his “hate for democracy” or his alleged dream of reconquering territories lost with the breakup of the USSR cannot explain the mobilization of an army and the relative support of a part of the population.
The impact of the transition from a nationalized and planned economy to a capitalist economy is still very poorly understood. The “shock therapy” inflicted on the economy of this country has caused profound transformations, but far from the long-held dream of a country that would resemble Sweden or the United States. The 1990s were marked by a depression, a considerable drop in the standard of living and a decline in all indices of physical and mental health.
Economically, with the disappearance of the “socialist camp”, Russia’s place in the world has been reduced to that of supplier of raw materials and hydrocarbons. From an autonomous industrial power, Russia has transformed itself into a dependent periphery of the world economy. Its growth in the early 2000s owed much to the high price of oil and gas.
From the point of view of expectations, the transition to capitalism has generated disappointments, which largely explain the nostalgia of a large part of the population for the Soviet period. The planned economy always obtains the favor of the majority of the population; this situation reflects not only the failure of the transition, but also a social structure marked by numerical weakness and the social isolation of the propertied classes.
An unequal country
In our developed societies, big capital (high finance, industry, large commercial chains) has a cushion formed by the more modest fractions of owners, such as those of SMEs, small businesses, rental housing. Thus, the defenders of free enterprise can count on a vast constellation of owners, found in most of our neighborhoods, in the villages, in our families. The dominant ideas are those of the ruling class, to use Marx’s formulation.
This is not the case in Russia, one of the most unequal countries in the world, where a hundred billionaires own more than a third of the country’s wealth, not to mention some 6,000 people with a fortune exceeding 150 million. of dollars. This reality clashes with the egalitarian values of the majority of the Russian population, still furious at having paid the price for this fraudulent privatization of the 1990s.
This is where we get to the heart of the problem.
Faced with peripheralization and various other threats, including those undermining the country’s security, Vladimir Putin put an end to the too close proximity of these billionaires to political power. Basically, the hatred that the Russians have for them would not allow them any hope of electoral victory through a party openly intended to support them, as was the case in the middle of the 19th century.and century when big French capital, frightened by social movements, renounced the direct exercise of power through the intermediary of the Party of Order in favor of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte.
Boris Yeltsin had understood this, moreover, at the time when he imposed this Constitution concentrating most of the powers in the hands of the President. Putin has understood this too, by skilfully using nationalist rhetoric, by cultivating to his advantage – and only on a symbolic level – nostalgia for the former USSR and, of course, by reinforcing the authoritarian traits of the regime so as to prevent the emergence of any popular mobilization against the established order.
Security services
In sum, liberal democracy has proved too weak in the face of a potential threat to new class relations. This is how we can explain that political power in Russia includes a strong contingent of individuals from the security services, starting with Putin himself. The Russian bourgeoisie, if it can be called that, does not enjoy the necessary legitimacy with the majority of the population. No class is in a position to assure its domination.
In its relations with the propertied classes, the Russian state enjoys an autonomy reminiscent of that of the French state under the Bonapartes, the uncle and the nephew. He can thus wage war without their consent. From this point of view, it seems to me appropriate to qualify this regime as Bonapartist, which makes it possible to understand both the authoritarian traits of the regime, its ability to rally at the same time part of the working classes, its extreme mistrust of the with regard to protest movements at home and among neighbours, as well as his obsession with security issues, which take priority over everything else.
Before long, we will know if the invasion of the Ukraine will have consequences on Putinism analogous to the defeats of Waterloo and Sedan for the Bonapartes.