Twenty years separate the ill-considered decisions taken by George W. Bush in 2002 which will lead a few months later to the invasion of Iraq and those, judicious, taken in 2022 by Joe Biden which will push the United States to react vigorously to the invasion of Ukraine.
If the invasion of Iraq constitutes one of the most important and controversial blunders in the history of American foreign policy, the American response to Russian aggression represents one of its high points. and unifiers. If the consequences of the 2003 invasion greatly damaged the reputation of the United States, those of 2023 confirm the importance of American leadership.
How can such a contrast be explained and why, in comparison with the decisions taken concerning Ukraine, were those concerning Iraq so lamentable?
Three pre-invasion reasons account in 2002 for the inability and incompetence of the American government to confront the regime of Saddam Hussein.
An error in judgment
First, Bush is not Biden. He has no experience in international relations and knows nothing (or almost nothing) about the issues. In the context that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, he enjoys the broad support of the Americans and considers that he has full latitude to make the decisions which in his view will strengthen the country’s security. His advisers are greatly divided on the management of the Iraqi file and do not present him with firm and consensual opinions. Bush’s instinct will do him a disservice: he will believe too easily that he can get rid of the Iraqi dictator at little cost. The error is first and foremost his. He should have focused on the challenge of stabilizing Afghanistan and not that of destabilizing Iraq. By comparison, Biden’s handling of Ukraine is poles apart: competent, consensual, measured, and with sound presidential judgment.
Second, American intelligence failed in its task in 2002 while it was brilliant in 2022. Not only did the CIA falsely believe in the presumed presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the contrary opinions emanating from the Department of state were ignored, and some advisers (including the CIA director and the vice president) anticipated and concluded that this presence was for political purposes. Weapons of mass destruction were in fact a useful bogeyman for Saddam Hussein, whose threat the Americans exaggerated and exploited.
In fact, after the war, some components of these weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq, all manufactured before 1991 and far from constituting an arsenal threatening in a concrete and imminent way the security of the United States and the world.
If US intelligence erred in 2002, its credibility was restored 20 years later when it warned Ukraine and the world of the impending Russian invasion.
Third, the international context is not considered very easy for Biden today, because several countries (including China and India) do not support the American desire to help the Ukrainian government. But the context 20 years ago was in many respects even worse, as many of the US allies (including Canada and France) opposed the invasion of Iraq.
The ambition of the W. Bush administration was strongly contested and denounced as a completely outrageous manifestation of empire. It is this argument that is put forward today to characterize the invasion of Ukraine, a decision taken by Putin from another century. What’s more, the support of Washington’s allies in Kyiv is not waning (for the moment) and enjoys unquestionable legitimacy.
The decision to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein was thus ill-advised and the mistakes of the Bush administration tainted the American occupation of Iraq from the start. The too limited number of soldiers deployed did not allow to control and stabilize the country. The dissolution of the Iraqi army offered a qualified and available labor force to the insurrectionary movements which organized themselves from the summer of 2003. deprived the liberated country of its dictator of the living forces capable of making it work. Not to mention the lack of attention paid by the Bush administration to the ethnic and religious tensions that ran through Iraqi society.
Serious consequences of the invasion
In such a context, the “mission accomplished” announced by W. Bush on 1er May 2003 was short-lived and Iraq plunged into chaos, violence and civil war. Between 2003 and 2011, more than 4,000 American soldiers were killed there and more than 30,000 injured. According to the Watson Institute of Brown University, the amount of the wars launched by Washington after 9/11, including Iraq, amounts in 2022 to 8000 billion dollars. And while there are no precise figures for Iraqi casualties, estimates of the death toll range between 100,000 and 400,000.
Twenty years later, what are the consequences of this major and costly mistake for the United States? Admittedly, the “jump” decided by W. Bush in January 2007 allowed the American forces to adapt to the challenges of the counter-insurgency and to open a period of relative political stability. But the resurgence of Islamist terrorism in the form of the Islamic State in 2014 demonstrated its fragility.
Iraq has not become the stable, democratic country and potential ally of which the most convinced neoconservatives dreamed.
This military adventure has especially fueled among the American population and some of its decision-makers, Obama and Trump in the lead, a desire to withdraw from world affairs. However, the events and trends at work over the past decade, from the war in Syria to Beijing’s increasingly assertive ambitions for power, including attacks by Moscow, show that such an approach is neither beneficial for Washington nor desirable for international security.
The mistake of invading Iraq momentarily damaged the credit of the United States. The lesson to be learned, however, cannot be that they should renounce their international commitment. Biden’s determination and ability to form and maintain an alliance in favor of Ukraine are indeed proof that American power, despite its failures and mistakes, remains essential to the defense of liberal values.