Can we currently speak of a “Ukrainian conflict” when the old one has never been settled? After two months of tough exchanges and negotiations, international attention is once again refocusing on the secessionist territories of eastern Ukraine. Despite the Minsk agreements in 2014 and 2015, the fate of part of Donbass remains uncertain. And in an already tense context, the Duma, the lower house of the Russian Parliament, has decided to ask Vladimir Putin to recognize the independence of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk (DPR) and Lugansk (LPR) – de facto controlled by the separatists prorussians.
This initiative was immediately denounced by Westerners. But at this stage, it remains above all symbolic. “The Duma wanted above all to participate in the collective patriotic effort, but it does not play a central role in the functioning of Russian foreign policy”shade Anna Colin Lebedev, lecturer in political science and specialist in post-Soviet societies. The Kremlin, moreover, has already made it known that it has “take note” of this appeal but that he would not respond to it. Such a decision is not on the agenda, said spokesman Dimitri Peskov, because “it does not fit with the Minsk agreements” to which Russia remains attached.
The peace protocol certainly provides for the return of the territories to the bosom of Kiev, but in exchange for a very large autonomy guaranteed by the Ukrainian Constitution. These texts are “very advantageous for Russia”continues the researcher, and Moscow has every interest in keeping this framework to obtain concessions. “Russia wants the autonomy of these territories in the Ukrainian Constitution, elections in Donbass and then demilitarization – these points are in this order” in the text, explains Alexandra Goujon, lecturer at the University of Burgundy. “But Ukraine considers it impossible to hold elections until the area is demilitarized.”
The former German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, had indeed imagined a compromise formula in 2016: elections with international observers, according to Ukrainian law, then the entry into force of political autonomy if the elections were deemed compliant by theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), followed by immediate demilitarization. But this “Steinmeier formula” has little chance of being applied and the context is hardly conducive to concessions. In 2019, thousands of demonstrators marched in Kiev to denounce this scenario, experienced by the participants as a compromise for the benefit of Moscow.
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Diplomatic discussions in the “Normandy” format (France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia) have never stopped but the situation is blocked, despite some progress. “There were exchanges of prisoners [en 2019 et 2020] and a move away from heavy weapons on both sides of the line of contact”summarizes Alexandra Goujon, but “this conflict is made not to be resolved” in order to “to put Kiev in an uncomfortable position”. Anna Colin Lebedev also underlines a desire for Russian destabilization.
“Moscow prefers a zone of permanent instability and has little interest in resolving the conflict.”
Anna Colin Lebedev, specialist in post-Soviet societiesat franceinfo
“For eight years, these territories have been disconnected from Ukraine, with a gradual attachment to Russia”, insists Alexandra Goujon. A large part of the Russian forces withdrew and separatist military bodies were formed. “The eight years of war have fueled anti-Kiev sentiment and Russia has widely encouraged passport applications among the population”adds Anna Colin-Lebedev, with more than “600,000 new Russian citizens in these territories”. Residents cross the border daily to get the precious sesame, found a team from France 2.
Moscow invokes humanitarian grounds to justify the decree of April 2019 facilitating these passport applications. But Kiev denounces a desire for annexation. What to offer a future right of scrutiny to Russia? “If a large offensive were launched and residential areas and inhabitants were affected, Russia could intervene”, warns Denis Pushilin, leader of Donetsk. And Moscow is maintaining pressure on its neighbour, rightly invoking the safety of its ever-increasing numbers of nationals. “Our citizens and compatriots living in the Donbass need help and support”said the speaker of the Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, to motivate the appeal to Vladimir Putin.
This conflict has already claimed more than 14,000 lives and 850,000 people have been displaced, according to the Norwegian Refugee Council. While the fighting has waned since 2015, people are tired and ceasefire violations are countless. Witness the lists published each day by the dedicated monitoring mission within the OSCE: on 16 February alone, 24 incidents and accidents were recorded in Donetsk and 129 in Lugansk. “The armed forces can almost see each other on the line of contact”recalls Anna Colin Lebedev.
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Moscow therefore presents itself as the guarantor of regional security. “The probability that Kiev will launch a military operation is real and high”, according to Kremlin spokesman Dimitri Peskov, mirroring Western accusations about Russian troop gatherings. But even in the optimistic scenario of free elections, Moscow would have all the cards in hand to poison the life of Kiev. “There is a good chance that such an election will be won by pro-Russian formations, which can be destabilizing for the Ukrainian authorities.summarizes Anna Colin Lebedev. At the slightest legislative decision by Kiev which would be interpreted on the spot as an oppression, Russia could then intervene.
“The Russian objective is to destabilize Ukraine in depth, so that the country cannot make its own foreign policy choices, for example with joining NATO or the EU.”
Alexandre Goujon, lecturer at the University of Burgundyat franceinfo
At this stage, the hypothesis of a “Crimean” annexation is premature: “There will be no recognition of independence as long as the Russians seek concessions on the Minsk agreements.” Above all, Moscow has no immediate interest in integrating the secessionist republics, a fortiori with a significant risk of open conflict. “Russia does not need this mining basin with a high proportion of retirees, economically devastated and where there are no more investments.”
In return, Anna Colin Lebedev points out that “Ukraine does not really want to reintegrate these territories either and that opinion has risen very much towards the populations of these separatist territories, considered as traitors”. In summary, Kiev is reluctant to make concessions to recover these territories, and Moscow intends to exploit the file as long as it needs it. Enough to register this open conflict a little longer in the long term, unless there is a boost in the Minsk agreements. Alexandra Goujon recalls all the same that the case “of the other separatist states, including the oldest ones like Transnistria, are still unresolved while these conflicts are frozen”.