United States President Joe Biden broke the rules of diplomatic propriety last Saturday by declaring during an official visit to Poland that Vladimir Putin is a “butcher” who “cannot stay in power”.
Posted at 5:00 a.m.
His administration quickly sought to downplay the intervention, saying the United States is not seeking to hasten the downfall of the Russian leader.
Whether considered or not, calls for the overthrow of the Kremlin master are unlikely to materialize in the near future since Vladimir Putin has long had measures in place to prevent such a scenario, Alan E. Casey points out. , a researcher at the University of Michigan who studies the stability of authoritarian regimes.
In theory, he says, many of the factors that could favor a coup exist in the current context in Russia.
The difficulties encountered by the army, which has suffered much greater material and human losses than expected since the start of the invasion of Ukraine, including the death of several generals, as well as Vladimir Putin’s miscalculation in the face of the level of resistance offered by the population, are likely to fuel the grievances of high-ranking officers against him.
Logistical problems – partly attributable, according to Mr. Casey, to the corrupt awarding of contracts to friends of the regime – are also likely to fuel the discontent.
The spied army
Any conspiracy within the army aimed at forcing the departure of the Head of State could however be quickly brought to light because of the existence within the Federal Security Service (FSB), the country’s main intelligence service , a counterintelligence service monitoring the armed forces.
“Agents are established within the army itself to guarantee the political reliability of its leaders,” notes Mr. Casey.
Vladimir Putin also set up a National Guard in 2016 which is responsible for ensuring the regime’s internal repression needs and which could intervene if soldiers tried to mutiny.
They would probably be supported in such a situation by members of the Federal Protective Service (FSO), which provides close guard to the Russian leader.
“The National Guard and the FSO probably have more members in total in the Moscow region than the army,” Casey said.
An army far from internal politics
Eugene Rumer, a Russia specialist with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, notes that the Russian military “does not traditionally intervene in matters of internal politics”, contrary to what can be seen, for example, in countries like Burma or Brazil.
The hypothesis of an attempt to seize power by the leaders of the FSB or the FSO seems just as improbable, according to him.
“These are people that Putin has promoted, that he has showered with benefits of all kinds. He’s their man. They have no reason to act against him,” said Rumer.
Divided intelligence services
Mr Casey notes that Vladimir Putin has been careful to divide the intelligence services into several organizations which overlap in their functions and which “oversee each other”, which would complicate any eventual attempt to overthrow him.
This extended surveillance is also likely to dampen the ardor of oligarchs and highly placed members of the regime who have much to lose in the event of failure. “If they fail, what awaits them is prison, exile or death,” summarizes Mr. Casey.
“I don’t think they have any levers to act. The oligarchs who remain in Russia depend on Putin. If they can continue to extract resources, it is because he allows them to. The others who are abroad are too far away to act”, comments Mr. Rumer.
The popular uprising hypothesis
Failing to come from the army, the security forces or the economic or political elite, could the fall of Vladimir Putin go through street movements?
In the weeks following the start of the invasion in Ukraine, thousands of Russians defied the authorities to denounce the war. Many arrests followed. The security forces remain on the alert in the face of possible demonstrations, even minor ones, while the noose is tightening on the media to prevent any counter-speech opposed to that of the Kremlin.
According to Alan E. Casey, the Russian regime wants to maintain calm in the country by using a relatively “moderate” level of coercion and avoid having to switch to a more heavy-handed approach with significant risks of slippage.
In 2014, pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych ordered fire to be opened on protesters demanding his departure, killing dozens. The drama had galvanized the public and intensified the protest movement, leading several senior security force officials to resign until the leader found himself isolated, without means of repression.
Such a scenario is possible in Russia, but there are no signs that it is about to materialize, Mr. Casey says.
“It is difficult to get rid of autocratic regimes, even when they become deeply unpopular. It’s in their nature,” concludes the researcher.