Disbelief seems to have gripped some observers when Russia launched a full-scale war against its Ukrainian neighbor.
Posted yesterday at 10:00 a.m.
Although the two countries have tenuous ties and share a common heritage, their relationship since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been fraught with tension. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Moscow’s explicit support for pro-Russian separatists in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk republics mark a decisive shift in Russian policy towards Ukraine. If it is not new since it is based very largely on the scenario set up by Moscow in Georgia in 2008, it constitutes a break.
Ukraine proclaimed its independence on August 24, 1991, approved by referendum in December of the same year by nearly 92% of the inhabitants of the then Soviet republic. Faced with immense challenges, from the start of its existence as an independent state, it has had to deal with repeated attempts at Russian interference and ambiguous positions taken by Russian leaders regarding, among other things, Crimea. The signing of international agreements, such as the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and the Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty of 1997, recognize the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the inviolability of its borders. However, Russia is constantly trying to short-circuit the aspirations of a State, which decided in the mid-1990s to diversify its international cooperation strategies.
Without denying the ties that unite it to Russia, Ukraine is working on a rapprochement with its European neighbours. This orientation created strong reactions from the Russian leaders right from the start.
If Ukraine was one of the founding members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991, which was born on the ruins of the defunct Soviet Union and brings together most of the states that emerged from it, it refuses too much integration. It even founded in 1997 with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova an alliance seen as a competitor by Moscow, the Organization for Democracy and Development, better known by its acronym GUAM. Moreover, Ukraine will never be part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, created in 2002 by Russia to counterbalance the influence of NATO. From 1994 it preferred to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace and in 1997 signed the Specific Partnership Charter with the Transatlantic Organization.
It must be said that Russia, unattractive since 1991, is adopting an increasingly neo-imperialist policy towards its neighbor over which it seeks to establish indirect control. It thus exploits the internal political tensions between pro-Russians and pro-Europeans, multiplies thanks to the oligarchs gravitating around Russian circles of power, the acquisition of stakes in Ukrainian companies, in particular those working in the energy field.
The tensions surrounding the question of gas in the 2000s gave rise to major crises between the two countries, which indirectly affected the European countries which buy Russian gas which passes through infrastructures located on Ukrainian territory.
The tensions between the two states are also transported in the religious, cultural and linguistic domains. The Orange Revolution of 2003-2004 and the Euromaidan of 2013-2014 are two highlights. These internal political upheavals in Ukraine – but during which the interference of Russia was more than obvious – contribute to widening a gap between the two neighbors.
The signing in 2017 of an association agreement between Kiev and the European Union while Ukraine is amputated from Crimea and the war continues in Donbass confirms its European orientation. Russia sees this as further proof of the advance of NATO and the EU in its backyard.
The confrontational posture adopted by Vladimir Putin in no way suggests that he will accept a compromise on Ukraine. Indeed, the tensions of the 1990s gave way to total distrust of the pro-European political elites, of Presidents Poroshenko and Zelensky in particular. From paternalistic, the tone and words used by Vladimir Putin in his warmongering speeches have become contemptuous. Accused of being in the pay of NATO and the European Union, Zelensky was answered, before the outbreak of the conflict, by silence, a sign that Putin did not consider him a legitimate interlocutor with whom to engage in dialogue. Moreover, Ukraine is denied the right to exist within its current borders. This strategy of the worst reflects the repeated failures of Russian leaders to influence the course of Ukrainian politics and to keep Ukraine in its fold. It makes any de-escalation complex to negotiate, because the slightest concession from Russia would be perceived as a personal setback for Vladimir Putin.