In 2020, Mali opened an unprecedented season of putschs on the African continent. The most recent has just occurred in Burkina Faso, with the January 24 dismissal of President Kaboré. Interview with Issaka Souaré, international expert on peace, security and governance issues, and teacher at the General Lansana Conté University in Sonfonia-Conakry.
Franceinfo Africa: soldiers are in power in Mali, Guinea and Sudan. Others settle in Burkina Faso. Are we witnessing a resurgence of coups in Africa?
Issaka Souare: since independence, we are at 95 successful coups, not counting the one in Burkina Faso. The first, in Egypt, occurred in July 1952. The last putsch to date, with the exception of the case of Burkina Faso, is that of September 5, 2021 in Guinea. A “successful” coup d’etat is a seizure of power by elements of the security or defense forces who manage to keep it for at least a week. In the decade 1971-1980, there were 25 successful coups. There were about fifteen in each of the following two decades (1981-1990 and 1991-2000). Eight in the 2000s and, from 2011 to 2020, there were only six. We can see that the slider is going down.
From a quantitative point of view, there is therefore no resurgence. But from a qualitative and temporal point of view, it is clear that there is one. We expected to say goodbye to coups with democratization, which began in the early 1990s, and the regional instruments condemning these seizures of power and which have existed for two decades on the continent. These putschs “scandalize” us today whereas they surprised no one in the 70s and 80s. However, all is not gloomy because, alongside these acts of force, there are also peaceful alternations. Thus, 30 African Heads of State have been defeated in elections since 1990 and about thirty have also left power after having exhausted their constitutional mandates.
In 2007, you published “Civil wars and coups d’état in West Africa” (L’Harmattan) where you explained the causes of these putschs. Are they still current?
First, these coups are linked to questions of governance, as appreciated by the population and the putschists. I take the example of those who deposed the late former Malian president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK): the intervention of the military came as an epilogue to several weeks of popular demonstrations against the governance of IBK. Either the military aligned themselves with the civilian populations in a sincere way, or they were opportunistic.
Among the other explanatory factors, we find corporatist motivations: many of the 25 coups d’etat in the 1970s and 1980s were counter-coups, that is to say soldiers who ousted others from power. Similarly, the latter can interfere in the political sphere if they feel that they are neglected in advancements in rank to the benefit of people less competent than them; or that their hierarchy, made up of generals, doesn’t care about them. This explains why many putsches are carried out by non-commissioned officers.
As we see in Burkina Faso, the working conditions of the military, and more generally of the security and defense forces, matter a lot. Other reasons such as external interventions may be the cause of these acts of force. This is less the case today than at the time, for example, of Bob Denard (French mercenary involved in numerous coups in Africa, editor’s note). All of these factors remain relevant, but governance issues predominate today.
What is your analysis of the putsches in Sudan and Chad?
In Sudan, the army has dominated political life for too long. As in Egypt, it is invested in many key areas that it does not intend to let go of anytime soon. As for Chad, there is the question of the Déby family, and more broadly that of the clan which is not the majority in the country. The loss of power, to someone else outside of this family, could be painful for her.
Pan-African organizations have adopted measures to prevent the military from coming to power. What are those of the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS which recently sanctioned several countries?
Two instruments exist at the level of ECOWAS. Namely the Protocol of May 1999 relating to the mechanism for the prevention, management, resolution of conflicts, maintenance of peace and security and its additional Protocol of 2001. As for the African Union, it has three: the Lomé Declaration of July 2000, Article 25 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance adopted in 2007 but which entered into force in February 2012, and Article 30 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. In this area, ECOWAS is more advanced than the AU because its additional protocol also prohibits the modification of the Constitution or laws relating to elections within six months before they are held.
How do you explain the distrust aroused by the ECOWAS sanctions against Bamako?
This is the result of a difference in appreciation of the situation between African populations and organizations. Faced with third terms in Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea, ECOWAS did not act as some citizens of the sub-region hoped for, for whom what happened in these countries – there were deaths – was condemnable. Unlike coups, ECOWAS does not have instruments that explicitly prohibit these third terms. It can only oppose it if the modification occurs within the six months preceding the elections, as was the case in Niger under Mamadou Tandja in 2009. The country was then suspended from ECOWAS.
Moreover, in Mali, the positioning of France is one of the factors that allows the military to play on the nationalist fiber. Paris has become inconsistent on Mali because there was Chad: it welcomes the coup in the second and hits hard on the first. Added to this are the remarks of the French leaders who can be considered as paternalistic towards the Malians. The inconsistency of the French can be interpreted on the Malian side as being linked to the fact that Bamako is turning towards Russia. All these elements add to the ignorance of the functioning of ECOWAS and motivate this feeling expressed in the Malian population and beyond. Otherwise, France’s position on the coups d’etat is in line with the instruments of ECOWAS, which took the same sanctions against Mali in 2012. Paris was then this country’s best ally.
What should be done to reduce political instability in countries that need strong states to emerge first from underdevelopment and then, for some, from insecurity?
Term limits can help. Of the 15 members of ECOWAS, for example, all have an article on the issue, except Gambia where President Barrow has just been re-elected. An exception to which must be added today Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso whose Constitutions have been dissolved. In 2015, ECOWAS began a process in this direction after the events of 2014 in Burkina Faso (Burkinabe took to the streets to prevent former President Blaise Compaoré from staying in power by modifying the Constitution, Editor’s note). The ban was proposed but was then defeated. However, the Ghanaian head of state Nana Akufo-Addo, who is now the current president, relaunched the process. If ECOWAS could modify its Additional Protocol of 2001 by prohibiting third terms, then we would have leaders who would not reign for more than twelve years in West Africa.
Obviously, in countries facing acute security challenges, such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, or even Niger or Nigeria, there is reason to review the strategies for combating armed groups, which must combine measures security to political and economic arrangements. It will also be necessary to ensure that the defense and security forces are placed in good conditions of service, in terms of training and equipment, to enable them to better carry out their mission of safeguarding territorial integrity. of their countries and the protection of their fellow citizens. In turn, the military would have fewer arguments to interfere in the political life of their country.