Foreign interference having now proven its sprawling reach far too many times, the long-awaited legislative response to close the doors of our democracy as much as possible had to erect new firewalls on multiple fronts. The imposing Bill C-70, however, casts its net very wide, and too wide, by stretching the scope of police and espionage arms into worrying territory. The risk of compromising the achievement of its consensual objective is very real.
Justin Trudeau’s government will thus finally create the register of foreign influence that everyone has been demanding for months. Registration will be mandatory for anyone carrying out activities aimed at influencing the political or governmental process at the request of a foreign principal. This nomenclature will obviously not catch every offender in the meshes of this new net. To be subject to it, it will still be necessary for the agent in question to have agreed to an “arrangement” with a foreign entity. Clandestine spies won’t suddenly come out in the open to comply either. And the future register seems less restrictive than that imposed on lobbyists, who must also record each of their meetings.
It is nevertheless an important tool that strengthens the arsenal allowing us to hope to protect ourselves against attempts at foreign interference. Its creation has already taken too long and must no longer be postponed.
However, under the cover of a modernization of the laws described as supposedly necessary by the government, without it having demonstrated it, Bill C-70 defends possibly sincere intentions, but with measures potentially deleterious. And the scope of which would extend well beyond foreign interference, although presented as the primary target of this vast legislative proposal.
A new offense of sabotage would thus be added to the Criminal Code, prohibiting attacks on a whole list of “essential infrastructures” (energy, transport, communications, financial, and more). To contravene it, it would be enough to hinder access – in short, to demonstrate -, to cause their loss or to render them unusable. The only exception would be to not have had the “intent”, in doing so, to harm the security or safety of Canada, or to compromise the security or health of the population.
A very vague and subjective exemption, if ever there was one. And which makes lawyer Paul Champ, specialized in the defense of human rights, fear a “paralyzing effect” on fundamental freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly.
On the other hand, C-70 proposes to allow the filing as evidence of secret information that can only be consulted by the judge at a trial. This derogation from an accused’s right to full defense was until now limited to exceptional cases in the context of immigration security certificates. The guidelines and guarantees provided for in the bill are insufficient in the eyes of groups gathered under the aegis of the Coalition for International Civil Liberties Monitoring, who fear a “vast impact on the rights and freedoms” of Canadians.
Such a provision raises serious concerns about the preservation of one of the fundamental principles of the legal system and effectively mandates meticulous parliamentary scrutiny. The dark history of policing and intelligence services today deprives them of the luxury of enjoying the inherent trust of the public.
The flaws in the current system have been abundantly revealed by experts, diasporas, testimony before the commission of inquiry into foreign interference and in the media. These alarm signals do not, however, give carte blanche to a repressive legislative response.
A bill of such impact, submitting a host of important changes over a hundred pages, requires an exhaustive and thoughtful parliamentary study. Knowing that the government’s last bill on national security took two years to be adopted, and that another on cybersecurity is still only being studied 22 months after its submission, the adoption of the C-70 by the next election is more than unlikely.
The creation of a register of foreign influence, however, is, a priori, unanimous. Other more narrow sections, creating criminal offenses of intimidation or deceptive conduct for the benefit of a foreign entity, could perhaps also receive support from a parliamentary majority.
Splitting the Law concerning the fight against foreign interference in this way would allow their rapid adoption, while taking the necessary time to perfect or correct the more contentious clauses. The government would thus put every chance on its side to protect the integrity of the next election. And all the chances are on the side of democracy.