At the opening of the UN General Assembly last week, the United States and France revived the idea of a reform of the Security Council in order to welcome new members and limit the use of the right of veto. Do the French and American proposals have a chance of succeeding? Not in the least, so many obstacles stand in the way of reform.
The two presidents ignored the fact that for more than 30 years, the reform of the Council has been on the agenda of the debates of the General Assembly. Created in 1945, the Council consecrates the domination of the winners, the five current permanent members, the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom, and gives a large place to the countries of the North (United States, Russia, Europe) , to the detriment of those in the South. It was expanded once in 1965 to accommodate new non-permanent members, which grew from six to ten, following the accession to independence of dozens of countries. But this has in no way satisfied the desire for representativeness of the states of the South or of those whose power has emerged in the reconfiguration of the world which followed the end of the cold war.
Discussions on reform have dragged on for decades because they stumbled over two issues: the revision of the composition of the Council by adding permanent and non-permanent members, and the right of veto.
Quicksands
There is a consensus on the revision of the composition of the Council, but it comes up against at least two obstacles. The first concerns geographical representation. How many new seats should be granted to each of the five regional blocs recognized within the UN? Africa has particular claims in this regard, as it is the only region that does not have a permanent member on the Council. Whatever proposals are put forward, the total number of Council members would increase from 15 to 21, 24, or even 27.
The second obstacle is intimately linked to the previous one. If the number of seats must increase in order to better represent the 193 members of the organization, it remains to determine their distribution between permanent and non-permanent. Here, we enter the shifting sands of international politics where the will to power and regional rivalries collide. The questions multiply and rarely find clear cut answers.
To the group of five current permanent members, how many new permanent members should be added? And on what criteria should their selection be based? If India seems like an obvious candidate, Pakistan could use its status as a nuclear state to claim a place. Germany and Japan see themselves occupying a seat, but would this not add to the preponderant weight of the Western States (France, United States, United Kingdom) in their ranks?
Failing to designate new permanent members, would it be possible to create a category of semi-permanent members whose holders could serve for a few years and be re-eligible? Finally, what about the non-permanent members elected for two years? How far should this group, currently made up of 10 countries, be enlarged, and should the rules be modified so that its members are eligible for immediate re-election, which is not the case today?
There is the question of the right of veto, the most delicate. Aspirants to a new seat of permanent membership claim this privilege. They consider themselves just as powerful and responsible as the Big Five. This claim does not meet with consensus. A majority of countries, including Canada, reject the extension of the veto, not to say the veto at all. They consider it archaic and see in it a symbol of the unequal nature of international society.
The five major powers are keen on their veto, but display a certain ambiguity as to its extension to other countries. France is in favor of it under certain conditions, but not the United States. Opinions on this issue are as entrenched as they are vague, making it almost impossible to reach a common position.
Finally, reforming the Charter requires the agreement of two-thirds of the members of the UN, including the five major powers. A single veto blocks everything.
New basics
On paper, the reform of the Council is an attractive project. However, one must ask whether a reformed Council would really change the realities of power on the international stage. It would no doubt be more representative, but in the exercise of power, would the addition of India, Brazil or Japan have prevented the United States from illegally invading Iraq or Russia from brutally attacking Ukraine? No.
As for the idea of limiting the use of the great power veto in the event of large-scale crimes or rare and extraordinary situations, as suggested by Presidents Macron and Biden to counter Russian vetoes on Ukraine , can it be applied in reality? No. Because, at the end of the day, the great powers do what they want in the UN or outside it, knowing that they run practically no risk.
Is change possible? Historically, great catastrophes have resulted in the creation of a new world order and its institutions. The defeat of Napoleon in 1815 gave rise to the Concert of Europe and an arrangement between European powers until 1914. The First World War reshaped Europe and enabled the creation of the League of Nations, while the Second World War consecrated the birth of two superpowers and the replacement of the League of Nations by the UN.
Perhaps the only way to change the Council while avoiding war would be to found a new UN on new foundations. Good luck !