The Brownshirts were to invade the Colosseum and their armed militias would descend on the Piazza del Popolo at a goose step. Twenty months after the election of Giorgia Meloni, we still have not seen a trace of it. One clue should have alerted us: if the foreign press described it as “neofascist extreme right”, the Italian press was much more reserved. Perhaps because she knew that, despite her youthful mistakes, Meloni came from a party, that of Gianfranco Fini, which had radically broken with the legacy of fascism, even describing it as “absolute evil”.
But how can we resist the morbid passion of replaying the great moments of history? Recent news has continued to refute these fanciful scenarios. Leading the polls for the European elections, the President of the Italian Council has not only had a virtually flawless run in her country, but she is in the process of making her mark well beyond the Italian peninsula.
From Mussolini to the “Cavaliere”, via the techno-populist Beppe Grillo, Italy has often been at the forefront of new political trends. It could be that the one who entered politics at 15, revolted by the assassination of judges Falcone and Borsellino by the Sicilian mafia, is the last on the list.
To understand the Meloni phenomenon, we must first understand the origins of populism. This was born from the anger of the working classes against a left and a right who abandoned them by throwing themselves headlong into unbridled globalization, wild deindustrialization and a policy of mass immigration for which they were the first to pay the price. priced by unemployment, the housing crisis and the wage freeze. As for the nation – which Jean Jaurès would have said was the only good of those who have nothing – it was given for dead.
What distinguishes Meloni from her coalition partner and far-right rival Matteo Salvini for the moment is that she seems to want to overcome this populist wave that carried her, control its excesses and transform it into a real force. government policy. Firstly by avoiding shaky political compromises and by ensuring its own political stability through constitutional reform, which is never achieved in Italy. Then, by rigorous management of public finances, unlike his French counterpart, Emmanuel Macron. Finally, by unwavering support for Ukraine and NATO.
As a pragmatic leader, Meloni has also refrained for the moment from throwing the weights of the European Union, in particular in order to recover the 190 billion euros which were lying dormant in the European recovery plan. She is even betting on changing Europe from the inside by forging new alliances.
Many criticized her for not having put in place the naval blockade she had promised in the Mediterranean in order to return migrants to their port of origin. This did not prevent Italy from reducing arrivals by three at the start of 2024 thanks to agreements with departure countries.
What political scientist Thibault Muzergues calls “postpopulism” (Postpopulism. The new wave that will shake the WestÉditions de l’Observatoire) is characterized by economic liberalism mixed with protectionism, the defense of the social state but without fiscal inflation, the return to the traditional notion of national identity, the refusal of mass immigration and the rejection of what sociologist Jean-Pierre Le Goff calls “societal flight forward”.
Basically, we are witnessing the transformation of certain populist parties into what could be described as national-conservative parties. Which would be a backlash, since for a number of years, the center-right and center-left parties had gradually moved closer together, practicing a form of technocratic management that wanted to be above political currents. Arriving late, Emmanuel Macron represents the living example of this fusion: the right and the left embodied in the same body!
While the question of identity is back all over Europe, the Meloni method has spread to several countries, including Sweden, Finland and the Czech Republic. In France, the announced triumph in the European elections of the president of the National Rally, Jordan Bardella, is due to a very similar strategy. This political gifted, who collects around 31% in the polls, like Giorgia Meloni, could in fact be closer to the latter than to Marine Le Pen.
The RN may be less liberal in economics and ignore societal issues, but that has not stopped the two parties from getting closer in recent months, even if they do not belong to the same group in Brussels. In January, Meloni described Marine Le Pen’s developments on Russia as “interesting”. Another sign of rapprochement: the break of the RN and several parties in its group with the German party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), certain personalities of which have been at least conciliatory with the country’s Nazi past.
Are we not only facing a return, but also facing a redefinition of right and left which heralds the birth of a new political movement? After the populist adventure, will he be able to lastingly influence Europe – and why not America? The European elections on June 8 and 9 could offer a first answer.