On 28th May next Turkish voters will return to the polls for a second time to choose their future president. An optimistic observer would present the first round of the presidential election as an indicator of democratic vitality in Turkey. Approaching a turnout of 90%, the Turks voted overwhelmingly in this first round.
We can also see a great diversity of political parties within the People’s Alliance and the Alliance of the Nation, the two major political coalitions in this election. A more pessimistic observer would rather worry about the division of the votes (50% in favor of the status quo and 45% in favor of a change) and would anticipate social tensions.
Regardless of the electoral result of this second round, the repression of the Kurdish opposition, like other cyclical problems, persists in Turkey. A new presidency can bring a “breath of fresh air”, but without real reforms of presidential powers, stories of abuse are likely to be repeated.
A revitalization of democracy in Türkiye?
PHOTO YASIN AKGUL, FRANCE-PRESSE AGENCY
Poster of the leader of the people’s republic party (CHP), Kemal Kiliçdaroglu
In power since 2002, the development and justice party (AKP) must face for the first time a less fragmented parliamentary opposition: the alliance of the nation. Even if these opposition parties advocate different ideological positions, they all rally behind the leader of the people’s republic party (CHP), Kemal Kiliçdaroglu.
It should be noted that the current Turkish President, Recep Teyep Erdogan, and his AKP party, rules the country with an “iron fist”. In 2013 and 2015, his party was particularly criticized for the violent suppression of demonstrations against a housing project near Gezi Park.
The AKP has also been accused of adopting discriminatory measures leading to the arrest and dismissal of more than 250,000 civil servants on unfounded grounds of terrorism after the failed coup in July 2016. The alliance of the nation therefore represents a form of “degagism”, insofar as the majority of the parliamentary opposition unites to overthrow the presidency of Erdogan (and indirectly the popular alliance). However, behind this apparent unity, social divisions persist in Türkiye.
The Kurdish parliamentary opposition: the elephant in the room
The use of the term nation in the covenant of the nation is not without irony. In fact, no Kurdish party is found in the two major coalitions. Also, the former leader of the Kurdish party (the HDP), Selahattin Demirtaş, remains imprisoned. However, the Kurds represent approximately 25% of the population of Turkey according to the Kurdish Institute of Paris. A great player is missing in this election.
Kemal Kiliçdaroglu as well as other political figures of the alliance of the nation promise to settle the situation. Among other things, they undertake to put an end to conflicts with the Kurds. So where is the problem?
This is not the first time that Turkish politicians have used the Kurdish cause to obtain electoral gains. In 2002, the AKP made similar promises.
More than words, the AKP had even abolished the state of emergency in the Kurdish provinces, established since 1987 in order to limit the Kurdish separatist movement. Discussions with the Kurdish opposition had also resulted in the addition of new cultural rights to Kurdish, Jewish and Alevi minorities in 2005. Shortly before the Arab Spring, the struggle between Kurdish forces and the Turkish government had nevertheless resumed.
Between the will to dialogue and the recurrent abuse of presidential powers
The Kurdish opposition is more a common case than an exception in Türkiye. Throughout history, many “disturbing” movements have been banned, such as the Gülenists after 2016 or the Islamic parties during the 1990s. First open to dialogue, Turkish presidents often use their powers to put an end to the political opposition. The 1982 constitution has been amended many times, but a vagueness persists concerning the use of force during a social crisis.
After abolishing the state of emergency in 2002, the AKP instituted new exceptional measures in response to the failed July 2016 coup. The law on terrorism, adopted in 1991, has not been fundamentally reformed . Arbitrary arrests are still common practice. The imprisonment of Demirtaş illustrates this. Denouncing the abusive practices of his predecessor, the outgoing president always ends up adapting to repressive tools.
Without doubting the true intentions of the CHP and the other parties of the alliance of the nation, the Kurdish problem (like other problems) persists, regardless of the initial intentions of the president. The aim is not to contest the changes, but to point out that the Turkish political system seems to be holding them back and, on the contrary, encouraging the abuse of power. Let’s hope the president-elect changes the rules of the game a bit and allows everyone to participate. Turkish society will then be victorious.