There is not, strictly speaking—finally, as far as we know—an international of despots. No university teaches how to become and remain a dictator. Tyrants are nonetheless very attentive to the lessons of history. All were traumatized by the Soviet experience. Mikhail Gorbachev only wanted to inject more initiative into a mediocre economic model. Politically, he agreed at most to allow citizens to criticize not only Stalin, but also, why not, his predecessor Lenin.
But faced with the great wind of freedom, it is risky to half-open a door. It doesn’t take much for the breath to become a gust, then a storm. Soon, the whole building is washed away. Gorbachev’s minimalist flexibility led to the fall of communism, the dismantling of the empire, his own removal.
The Chinese authorities, in particular, grasped the extent of the risk and, following the Tian’anmen demonstrations, decided that hope should never be given to those thirsting for freedom. It is better, to establish absolute power, to let them die of thirst, both literally and figuratively.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban have just tightened the bolts to eliminate, among other things, the last spaces of freedom available to women. You will no longer find them in employment or in parks, gardens, sports halls or public baths. No young girl can now go beyond primary school. This plunge into obscurantism coincides with the Iranian women’s revolt. Their movement is contagious. In Afghanistan itself, sporadic demonstrations by women in solidarity were, of course, repressed.
It has not escaped the Taliban that the Iranian Islamic revolution has taken a huge risk by allowing women to go about their business, as long as they hide their hair properly. This is how, despite the mullahs, secondary and university education remained open to them, how women became doctors, business executives, teachers, researchers. Free in their head, if not above.
Iranian theocrats have been paying for this historic mistake for a month. As explained in Release Franco-Iranian sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar, the revolt went through three stages, in concentric circles. The first was that of the women, horrified by the death of one of them, imprisoned for having put on her hijab incorrectly. They were supported by men, many young people. At this phase carried by the cry “women, life, freedom”, followed a second around the slogan “death to the dictator”. Young people, including teenagers, took to the streets, and the protest spread to the regions of Kurdistan and Baluchistan. There, the demands for autonomy are combined with the demand for freedom.
The third phase, in progress, is that of strikes mobilizing older Iranians. The closures of bazaars, run by microentrepreneurs, are also emblematic, having historically preceded the changes of Iranian regimes. The Muslim tradition of accompanying a deceased to the 40e day of mourning also produces a calendar effect that structures anger over time, the regime having so far killed more than 416 people, including 51 minors, according to the NGO Iran Human Rights. Not to mention the 15,000 people arrested—some specifically accused of “enmity toward God”—the confessions extracted under torture and shown on state television.
Dialogue is obviously impossible. All reform is pushed aside by leaders who believe they have been chosen by God to inflict his wrath. Power knows only one possible response: repression. It worked against previous revolts, many over the last quarter century. Never, however, had such a strong connection occurred between the women, young and old, of the regions.
A dictatorial regime can only crumble by force. There are three scenarios. Part of the military apparatus may consider the power incapable of maintaining order, and decide to overthrow it (as in Egypt), and then do what it wants with it. The Iranian ayatollahs, however, have created their own militia, the Revolutionary Guards, which, as their name suggests, do not guard the country or the people, but the Islamic revolution. These guards are present within the regular police and military forces to ensure their loyalty to the regime.
The second scenario is where some of the police and soldiers, and a few officers, defect and join the movement, becoming its armed wing. This is how Lenin succeeded in his revolution. In this scenario, it is possible that the Kurds of Iraq, who spearheaded the war against the Islamic State group, come to the rescue of the Kurds of Iran. (Iran incidentally made a strike in Iraqi Kurdistan recently). Kurdish women have been particularly heroic in the fight against Daesh. There would be strong symbolism in seeing them fight Iranian misogynists.
If this armed wing of the revolution wins a few battles, the conflict will become international. Some Islamists will want to come to the aid of the mullahs, but not all of them. Saudi Arabia would be happy to see its Iranian enemy mired in internal conflict. The Syrians, and the Russians, could choose to support the Iranian ally, which has also forged ties with China in recent years.
Could there also be international women’s brigades coming to the aid of the Iranian sisters? Like the Dr Norman Bethune leaving Montreal with the Mackenzie-Papineau Brigade to support the Republicans during the Spanish Civil War? The question is open.
But unless the regime succeeds in crushing this revolt in blood, we will be faced with a case in point. A first real revolution carried by women, for their freedom and their equality, hair in the wind.