Censorship and propaganda: culture as a battlefield in post-Soviet Russia

As the invading Russian army destroys and plunders Ukraine’s cultural heritage, the West boycotts Russian artists and Moscow extends its grip on Russia’s arts and culture sectors. State censorship resumes with renewed force against films, plays or books deemed “pro-Western”. Evgeniya Pyatovskaya is pursuing doctoral studies in communications at the University of South Florida. She previously worked to develop and implement implements the internationalization strategy of a Russian state university. She has recently co-authored several analytical articles on Russian propaganda and politics in light of the armed conflict in Ukraine.

A decree on “strengthening Russian traditional, spiritual and moral values”, signed in November by President Putin, grants state officials the means to block “Western influences” in the arts and culture sectors . What are the implications of this new law?

One of the main consequences concerns the return of state censorship. It could possibly slow down the development of the culture. Censorship could also ironically undermine the country’s ability to communicate to the outside world the culture and values ​​that the state tries so hard to impose and “protect” with the decree. Ultimately, this could lead to a deeper isolation of Russia from the global cultural scene, or even the severing of the few remaining ties with the rest of the world. Even before the decree saw the light of day, Russia was largely excluded from the sports and arts sectors. Limitations on potential collaborations with outsiders, such as state control to ensure that members of the artistic community conform to “traditional, spiritual and moral values”, will only increase the isolation of the Russia. Another consequence of this decree concerns the dangerous ideological manipulation of culture.

Can you provide concrete examples of the effects of this control?

After the approval of the decree, it became possible for anyone in a position of authority to control the cultural sector. This influence stems from the vagueness of the decree and the subsequent possibility of interpreting it subjectively. People are, for example, fired or forced out of their jobs when they defend a critical position on the current war. It happened to teacher Nikita Tushkanov. Others are targeted if they read poetry to high school students by authors who have long since died, but whom the high school principal deems “accomplices of fascism” or “enemies of the state”. Of course, these cases may seem quite isolated and insignificant, but I think they illustrate a trend where those in power are given carte blanche to judge art and cultural products and to impose their interpretations. There is a lot of leeway for the state and its officials, who can punish those who show any form of disagreement with the government. The decree also removes the multicultural aspect that the state, ironically, presents as one of the main traditional values ​​to be protected.

What are these “traditional, spiritual and moral values” also made of?

In my opinion, the decree is based on three assumptions defended by the government. The first says that Russia is surrounded by enemies. The second postulate asserts that the powerful United States, with its pervasive culture, presents the main adversary. The last postulate affirms that Russia has a unique role, cultural and spiritual, to play in the world, a role resolutely different from that of the West, said to be “soulless”, which would also explain the supposed Western will to destroy Russia.

Violation of a law repressing “LGBT propaganda”

Do anti-Westernism, patriotism and traditionalism bring us back to the time of the USSR?

Absolutely, and especially with the illicit return of state censorship of art (films, exhibitions, etc.), once the norm in the USSR. I say “illicit” because it seems that the decree is open to malicious interpretations and that it goes against the Constitution, which prohibits censorship. The language of this decree is very similar to that of the Cold War: “We are surrounded by enemies who aim to undermine Russia; the United States should be placed in the same group as terrorist and extremist organizations; if we don’t protect our culture and our values, we will be destroyed…” Scaring and blaming the West for everything that went wrong was very typical of the USSR. The Russian government today, similarly, believes in the external threat without actually being able to prove it. This decree, however, surpasses what was seen in the days of the USSR: there were then separate documents which regulated censorship, while the new document reinforcing Russian traditional, spiritual and moral values ​​is the first of its kind. The Russian media is still full of state-sponsored propaganda. However, to support efforts to persuade its own people of the reality of what the state thinks is real, an executive order like this is needed. Culture is now swallowed up by the state the same way it swallowed free media. There is no room for critical thinking and therefore for resistance.

How do artists react to these new conditions?

Several prominent leaders of the theater sector in Moscow and St. Petersburg, such as Alexander Kalyagin, president of the Union of Theater Professionals, spoke out against the decree. The artistic directors of Russian companies like the Bolshoi and the Chekhov, Sovremennik and Satirikon theaters wrote a letter of support for the criticism of the decree by Alexander Kalyagin. Calls are being made to create a common opposition to the decree by theater professionals. Comedian Oleg Basilashvili, winner of the title of People’s Artist of the USSR, pointed out that the decree grants too many rights and powers to the state over cultural institutions.

What is the connection between cultural control and the war in Ukraine?

The decree looks like an extension of the Russian law on “foreign agents”. Russia, in my view, struggled to forge a unique identity after the collapse of the USSR, an identity that was intended to be different from what Russia stood for as the main republic of the Soviet Union. In the Russo-Ukrainian war, the two peoples who confront each other are alike. They often speak the same language and share similar cultural references. It therefore becomes important for the Russian state to justify its right to aggression, especially inside Russia. The recent decree symbolically makes it possible to announce the (presumed) superiority of traditional values ​​and to defend the role assumed by Russia as a bulwark against Western influence deemed malignant. Since the war is seen as a struggle between the West (led by the United States) and Russia, it is necessary to emphasize the main distinction with the enemy. The easiest way is to extol Russian values ​​and portray Western values ​​as morally inferior. For people inside Russia, this position sends another signal, that the war is just because it simply seeks to “protect” Ukraine (not conquer it) from the dangers of Western influence.

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