Access for intelligence services to encrypted messaging services has been rejected once again, despite attempts by Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau. Amendments aimed at easing this access were dismissed during a session on March 20-21, 2025. Opponents, including Éric Bothorel, emphasized the risks to encryption integrity, while Retailleau’s proposed “ghost proposal” was deemed problematic. Despite this setback, the government has found some support for other legislative measures related to surveillance and counter-terrorism efforts.
Access to Encrypted Messaging Services Denied Again
Despite the persistent efforts of Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau, the proposal to grant intelligence services access to encrypted messaging service content has been firmly rejected once more. During a public session held on the night of March 20 to 21, 2025, deputies once again voted against the amendments that aimed to facilitate this access.
Éric Bothorel, a prominent parliamentarian opposing these changes, stated, “This evening, encryption will not be threatened; the amendments have not passed.” Recently submitted, three similar amendments proposed milder adjustments to the original text, yet failed to sway the most steadfast members of the Assembly. The controversial amendments were dismissed overwhelmingly, much to the relief of digital security experts and cryptology professionals who expressed concerns about the potential negative impact on encryption standards.
The Risks of Compromised Encryption
The proposed measures, which were intended to be part of legislation aimed at combating drug trafficking in France, had already faced significant challenges earlier this month. During discussions in the law commission at the National Assembly, Retailleau’s desired access was also rejected with near-unanimous consensus.
Opponents of the proposed special access for intelligence services within encrypted platforms like Signal and WhatsApp acknowledged the overall goal of combating drug trafficking. However, they emphasized that the end does not justify the means. They highlighted the critical risk of undermining the robust protections offered by end-to-end encryption, which ensures that only intended recipients can access communication content.
Retailleau had suggested a mechanism that was neither a full backdoor nor a complete dismantling of encryption. His concept involved a “ghost proposal,” aiming to insert a third party into encrypted conversations discreetly. Nonetheless, this approach was largely dismissed by deputies, with cryptography experts labeling it as potentially more problematic. Ultimately, the proposal represented a risk of weakening encryption quality by introducing a vulnerability that could be exploited.
Despite this significant setback, the government is not completely left empty-handed. As reported by La Chaîne Parlementaire, other elements of the legislation have gained support, including algorithmic surveillance aimed at detecting weak signals—initially launched in 2015 for counter-terrorism efforts—and the extension of satellite interception trials.
As the National Assembly prepares to finalize discussions on this legislation by March 21, several contentious issues remain on the table, including the “safe-box file,” designed to prevent information leaks during procedures. However, like previous intelligence strategies, this proposal presents its own set of complexities.