Amid a world rife with threats, the discussion highlights the complexities of global dangers, including America’s retreat from Europe, Russia and China’s ambitions, and the rise of radical Islamism. The role of allies, particularly the United States, is scrutinized, with a focus on France’s potential leadership in European defense. Challenges in military investment, Franco-German relations, and Europe’s geopolitical stance, especially regarding its influence in Africa, are explored, emphasizing the need for unity against external pressures.
The Global Landscape of Danger
Mr. Tertrais, as echoed by the French president, we find ourselves in a “world full of dangers,” and it would be utterly “madness to be merely a spectator.” In your view, which threat looms largest: America’s retreat from Europe, Russia’s imperial pursuits, China’s ascent as a global powerhouse, or the specter of Islamist terrorism?
It’s essential to recognize that these threats cannot simply be weighed against one another. France, along with the entire continent, is currently grappling with the ambitions of both predatory rivals and allies, namely Russia, China, and, to some extent, the United States. Additionally, France faces a unique challenge with radical Islamism, as terrorist groups have long viewed the nation as a target.
Assessing the Role of Allies and Leadership in Europe
When you mention “predatory allies,” it raises eyebrows. Are you suggesting that the United States is acting in a predatory manner?
Indeed, the United States remains a crucial ally. However, the current administration has exhibited increasingly predatory behavior, such as claiming Greenland, a Danish territory, as its own. Furthermore, the president has imposed exaggerated trade demands on Europe and has suggested that the EU was established to deceive the USA.
What role does France, as a nuclear power, play in this complex scenario? Can it assume a leadership position within Europe?
I am skeptical about the notion of a single leading power in Europe; rather, different countries can take on pioneering roles. In terms of defense, no undisputed leader exists. Each of France, the UK, Germany, and Poland has distinct responsibilities, but none can substitute for the USA as the principal security guarantor. Nonetheless, France is indeed a driving force, with a president who emphasizes the need for Europe to assert its independence from American reliance and who is experienced in dealing with Donald Trump.
Emmanuel Macron has also proposed a peace initiative for Ukraine. If American military aid were to cease, could Europe fill the gap left behind?
Europe might temporarily bridge the gap created by a halt in American military support, but we lack equivalent military capabilities. It’s crucial not to overstate the situation in Ukraine; U.S. assistance is less vital now than it was two years ago. Regarding Macron’s peace plan, the absence of American security guarantees would render it ineffective. Deploying European forces would only be feasible with U.S. support. While Trump has suggested that American companies could provide protection on the ground, I find that unrealistic. Presently, there exists no consensus among Ukraine, Europe, Russia, and the USA regarding the terms for a lasting ceasefire.
The president has also floated the idea of sharing France’s nuclear umbrella with Germany and other nations…
No! Macron has not proposed sharing a nuclear umbrella. What he has suggested is a de facto security guarantee, acknowledging that France’s vital interests are increasingly linked to those of other European countries. However, this does not equate to a formal protection guarantee but rather a form of indirect deterrence. Macron has also initiated joint nuclear exercises and strategic dialogues, a concept that has been in development for several years.
This debate seems to revolve around the idea of Europeanizing the Force de Frappe.
No one seriously entertains that notion. When the Rassemblement national asserts that nuclear deterrence should remain exclusively French, it’s a superficial debate. In actuality, no alternative proposals have ever emerged. Additionally, the USA has never offered to share its nuclear decision-making, nor have the British. Conversely, the French have maintained since the era of Charles de Gaulle that their deterrence indirectly safeguards Europe due to France’s geographical positioning.
If Europeans aim to take charge of their own defense, substantial military investment is necessary. Is France prepared for that?
France will encounter considerable challenges in maintaining its welfare state while significantly boosting its military budget. I remain doubtful that we can increase defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP, as Macron envisions. Even with new European financing initiatives like defense bonds, keeping pace with the Russians remains a daunting task, which represents our most significant vulnerability.
Meanwhile, in Germany, debt appears to be less of a concern…
Indeed, the shift in Germany’s willingness to incur substantial debt for defense marks a significant change. It’s encouraging that Berlin is advocating for adjustments to EU deficit rules to align with security policy needs.
Does this development inspire confidence in Franco-German relations? With Friedrich Merz as the designated chancellor, known for his Francophile stance, is there hope for improved cooperation?
One should never underestimate the resilience and structural strength of Franco-German cooperation, which remains a cornerstone of French foreign policy. However, it is influenced by the personal dynamics between leadership. The rapport between Macron and Scholz has not been optimal, so a shift toward Friedrich Merz could enhance relations. Moreover, German leaders have finally grasped that they can no longer rely exclusively on American support. This realization brings our nations closer together.
In your book “La Guerre des Mondes,” you caution that Europe risks becoming a pawn for larger powers. How can the continent extricate itself from this predicament?
The pressing question is whether we will be seated at the table of the powerful or end up as the main course. Europe will not coalesce into a unified power bloc akin to the USA, China, or Russia. Yet, can it achieve sufficient unity and coherence to shield itself from predatory ambitions? I remain cautiously optimistic. Europe often makes strides in times of crisis. Despite obstacles posed by nations like Hungary or Slovakia, the heightened awareness of geopolitical threats might prompt our coalition to evolve into a genuine defense union.
France plays a pivotal role in this endeavor, as it has historically. Nevertheless, the nation appears to be losing influence beyond Europe. Is the withdrawal from “Françafrique” a strategic pivot or a geopolitical regression?
It’s a bit of both. To be frank, I do not use the term “Françafrique,” nor do French officials. The reality is that France has been militarily ousted from several African nations. We would have preferred this transition to occur more smoothly and consensually. However, we cannot fault African states for asserting their sovereignty; after all, France values its independence as well.
Within parts of French society, there seems to be a sense of nostalgia for “Françafrique.”
If nostalgia exists, it stems not from colonialism but from a genuine appreciation for the military collaboration between the French military and African forces, which has fostered strong relationships over the years.
Yet, in various regions of Africa, France now faces outright rejection.
Moscow is successfully cultivating influence in Africa, leading segments of the population to see Russia as a preferable partner compared to France. Over time, I believe many Africans will come to realize their misjudgment regarding the Russians. Additionally, even though we’ve had to withdraw militarily from some African countries, it does not signify the end of