On Sunday, the army of Burkina Faso announced the official end of the operations of French soldiers on its territory. Latest episode of a relationship that has become stormy.
Another withdrawal from a West African country. The Burkinabé army announced on Sunday February 19 the official end of the presence of the French Saber force in Burkina Faso. A month ago, the local authorities had denounced the agreement recording the presence of French forces in their country, giving them one month to leave.
This break follows the departure of the last French soldiers from Operation Barkhane still present in Mali, in August 2022, and the suspension of tricolor military cooperation with the Central African Republic, the previous summer. At the time, the Ministry of the Armed Forces denounced a campaign of “massive misinformation” targeting France in this Central African country, with the help of Russia. The last French soldiers still present in the Central African Republic left on December 15, in a country where the Russian Wagner militia has gained ground.
How to explain this series of departures of French forces, and what role did Russian actors play in this contestation of the French presence? Some answers with Alain Antil, researcher and director of the Sub-Saharan Africa Center at the French Institute for International Relations (Ifri).
Franceinfo: Yesterday, the Burkinabe army announced the official end of the operations of French forces in Burkina Faso. The last French soldier present in Mali left the country in August, the last French soldiers still in the Central African Republic left in December… How would you describe this contestation of the French military presence in these countries?
Alain Antil: The first thing to say is that these three countries are in a more than worrying security situation. Mali and Burkina Faso relied on France, and in Mali, despite the intervention of Operation Barkhane, the situation did not improve, and even deteriorated. After Operation Serval [en 2013] which had been effective, French officials were too optimistic. The gap between what had been promised and what happened is very significant, and the populations see that despite the significant resources available to France, the jihadist groups tend to prosper and the areas affected by the violence extend.
France has become the scapegoat for all this, while the main causes of the problem are the bankruptcy of the security forces in Mali and Burkina Faso, and the poor governance of these countries. The political situation has therefore become considerably tense in Mali and Burkina Faso, of which the coups d’etat are one of the manifestations, and these countries have decided to review their security policies and their alliances.
What are the common elements in this contestation of the French presence in different countries?
We were able to observe quite similar things. Demonstrations, of course, but also a bubbling on social networks which become a field of political confrontation, and where a lot of anti-French comments circulate. There is correct information, information taken out of context, but also real lies. In Mali, for example, some people are convinced that France is helping jihadist groups, or that it is there to exploit the country’s mining or energy resources. The circulation of false information started on social networks in the Central African Republic (CAR), then we saw the same thing in Mali and Burkina Faso. This played a role in the departure of French forces, as it helps to galvanize protesters in capitals. These rumors on social networks, added to the militancy in the capitals and the fact that certain elites repeat the same slogans as those published online… This draws an extremely difficult environment [pour la présence française].
The demonstrations took place mainly in the capitals, with maximum media impact. In some gatherings, French symbols were burned, the French presence was vilified… Symbols of the French presence were attacked, such as the French Institute in Burkina Faso, and Russian flags could be seen flying in these demonstrations.
You mention Russian flags. How did Russian actors contribute to fueling this contestation of the French military presence?
Russia contributed to the fight on social networks against the French presence. Ffunding of activists, distribution of content… A whole range of actions have been deployed by Russia to damage the image of France in these countries. For example, anti-French cartoons have been broadcast. Activists have been paid to spread false information, or to take elements of French-speaking Russian media and distribute them… This social network activism has contributed to accelerating the deterioration of France’s image. Many urban Sahelians are on social networks, and can pick up a whole range of information without filter.
Figures of current pan-Africanism, such as Kémi Séba and Nathalie Yamb [deux militants influenceurs], also displayed their ties to Russia. Nathalie Yamb called on West African leaders to approach Moscow, Kémi Séba said he had met the CEO of Wagner’s parent company, Yevgeny Prigojine, and received a “logistical support” of this group… The Wagner Militia provides an alternate partner to these countries. This presence [en Centrafrique et au Mali] is accompanied by great violence against armed groups opposed to the government, but also against civilians.
What can the Wagner militia offer compared to the French military? You talk about violence, abuse…
Wagner offers something that France no longer offers: the security of the regime. If Wagner had not been there, the current CAR president might not be in power. These countries also have difficulty attracting new security partners. Little countries want to send soldiers to the Sahel, for example. Wagner’s involvement also presents a double interest for Russia: to be present, without being present officially. Moscow can always retort, particularly on accusations of human rights violations, that it is a commercial contract with a Russian company and not bilateral cooperation.
By accepting Wagner, the African partner could also obtain easier access to Russian arms deliveries. Russian weapons are less expensive, and are more suitable for countries with lower defense budgets. However, these countries are demanding armaments. Moreover, France and other Member States of the European Union do not wish to deliver arms to countries where abuses are committed by the armed forces against civilian populations.
It should be stressed that it is too early to know if Wagner is present in Burkina Faso. At this stage, the authorities say they don’t need foreign fighters.
What are the differences between these countries in their contestation of the French presence?
For Burkina Faso and Mali, there are many similarities. The protest comes from urban youth, but also from part of the elites, including state elites. Some soldiers are quite anti-French, even if the deterioration [des relations] is much stronger with Mali than with Burkina Faso.
Should we also see, in these countries, a challenge to France as a former colonial power?
Of course. The former colonizer was greeted by the people of Mali when he came “save” the country with Operation Serval. But several elements have gradually generated strong dissatisfaction, even rejection, among the populations: linstallation of Operation Barkhane without defining its duration, first of all, but also sometimes disastrous political communication – I am thinking in particular of the Pau summit – or even the speeches of the elites of the countries which evaded their responsibilities on the French partner .