Iranian cyberattacks aimed at disrupting the Republican campaign backfired as media attention shifted to the attacks themselves. As the 2024 elections approached, foreign interference tactics were notably less effective due to improved preparedness and proactive measures by authorities. Despite predictions of last-minute operations, none were observed, indicating a more challenging environment for foreign actors. Concerns about overestimating the threat of foreign influence were raised, especially with the potential changes in U.S. foreign policy following the election.
Iranian Cyberattack Attempts and Their Impact
During a recent cyberattack, Iranian operatives managed to capture sensitive information regarding Republican Vice President J. D. Vance. Their intention was to leak this internal data to the media, likely aiming to disrupt the Republican campaign. However, their strategy backfired as the media opted to focus on the Iranian cyberattack itself rather than the leaked information. This incident occurred last summer.
Election Security and Foreign Influence Operations
As the elections approached, concerns grew regarding potential foreign interference, reminiscent of the successful hack-and-leak tactics utilized by Russian operatives in 2016 against the Democratic party. At that time, authorities and media in the United States found themselves overwhelmed. Yet, during the 2024 election cycle, such dramatic incidents were noticeably absent. John Hultquist, the chief analyst at Mandiant, has insights into why this year’s situation differed.
According to Hultquist, the impact of foreign influence tactics was significantly reduced compared to previous election years. This decline can be attributed to better preparedness and the likelihood that some operations were thwarted. Mandiant actively monitored known Russian and Iranian groups, implementing additional protective measures for their clients, which may have hindered these groups’ ability to execute their plans. Overall, heightened public vigilance makes executing influence operations more challenging.
The authorities also played a crucial role, being more proactive than ever in identifying and exposing foreign influence attempts. In the past, investigations into such operations often took years, with authorities hesitant to publicly discuss intelligence activities of other nations. However, quick action to disclose these attempts significantly hampered the effectiveness of foreign operatives.
Despite predictions of potential attacks, particularly as election day approached, the anticipated actions did not materialize. Hultquist noted that while there were typically active players, especially from Iran, no signs of last-minute operations emerged, which is encouraging news.
This situation likely stems from both enhanced defenses and the scrutiny faced by foreign actors. Security firms like Mandiant continually target these groups and expose their tactics, making success increasingly elusive. Interestingly, while these groups aim to disseminate their messages widely, they also try to conceal their ties to government entities. The paradox of their operations complicates their effectiveness.
In previous election cycles, Russian and Iranian groups were more adept at carrying out influence operations, likely due to a lack of experience and preparedness from authorities and security firms at the time. The 2016 election was a learning experience for all, leading to a more challenging environment for such actors today, who often find their elaborate schemes thwarted before reaching any significant audience.
While artificial intelligence was touted as a major threat leading up to the election, Hultquist believes its role was overestimated. Although there have been instances of AI use, the core struggle for these foreign groups has always been about audience reach rather than content creation. Many of their influence efforts fail to engage a wide audience, with some relying on third parties to amplify their messages. However, gaining public attention remains a significant hurdle, especially in the critical days leading up to an election.
In a notable case from September, U.S. authorities uncovered a media company funded by Russia that had been compensating right-wing influencers. This tactic mirrors past strategies where foreign actors attempted to spread their narratives through journalists or leak sites. Yet, this approach proved ineffective in the recent election cycle. Despite the Iranian attempt to leak internal Republican documents, the desired impact was not achieved, and the influence of foreign operations on the American election remains difficult to quantify.
While taking the threat of foreign influence seriously is essential, it is equally important to avoid inadvertently facilitating their agenda by amplifying their perceived danger. Overestimating their impact can contribute to public uncertainty, playing into the hands of those attempting to undermine the electoral process.
Looking ahead to Donald Trump’s inauguration in January, various scenarios could unfold. The primary concern will likely revolve around intelligence operations, particularly with a new administration expected to pursue a different foreign policy. Foreign intelligence services will undoubtedly seek insights into these policy changes, escalating their cyber espionage efforts to gather crucial information. The landscape may shift, but the game of influence and espionage will persist.