More marginal within the institutionalized right, the paleoconservatives nevertheless reflect the perspective of a significant part of the republican base today. Adopting a less conciliatory tone than their peers, the paleoconservatives are distinguished by their biting criticism of the elites and their more radical positions on multiculturalism, globalization and interventionism in foreign policy. While there are differences between representatives of this trend, paleoconservatism is generally associated with the hard-right Republican Party on issues like immigration and race relations.
Paleoconservatives almost all share a marked dread for what they call the Deep State, with its armies of progressive bureaucrats attempting to mold citizens into their own image. Considering that the rise of the liberal left threatens Judeo-Christian civilization and Anglo-European heritage and wanting to preserve the United States from the corrosive influence of globalization, the paleoconservatives advocate a nationalism that is both economic and identity-based. . This remedy is also common to several supporters of right-wing populism elsewhere in the world. Inhabited by a sense of urgency, the paleoconservatives intend to wage a “war of position” to dislodge their ideological adversaries.
Paleoconservatism deserves special attention, because the tone and ideas associated with it certainly inspired Donald Trump. Without being an ideologue, Trump understood the needs and wants of the Republican electorate. Long neglected by the two main parties, poorly educated white voters are more hostile to free trade, immigration, and the expansion of civil and political rights to visible minorities.
Donald Trump was able to motivate this demobilized base by his rebellious style, his anti-establishment stance, his promises to build a wall on the border with Mexico, to withdraw from various international agreements and to favor “America first” .
Several commentators have also associated this slogan with the desire to return to an America that is more homogeneous from both an ethnic and cultural point of view. Driven by resentment against globalized political and economic elites, by fear of being relegated to minority status in the wake of demographic change, by disgust with political correctness and by an obsession with immigration, this base was clearly open to more radical proposals than what the Republican Party had offered so far.
If the coexistence between the multiple branches of American conservatism, including traditionalism, libertarianism, the religious right and neoconservatism, has been at times difficult over the past six decades, it has nevertheless given rise to a relatively durable electoral coalition. With the election of Donald Trump in 2016, economic populism and the growing nationalism of the Republican base, the Republican Party is preparing to experience an unprecedented existential crisis. The party must deal with the radicalization of its supporters and the fact that its social, political and economic program is simply no longer popular with public opinion. Against this background, it is not surprising to see the Republican Party employ tactics, such as suppressing the minority vote, which would be deemed illiberal in any other mature democracy. This besieged mentality has only heightened the political polarization that has been observed since the 1990s and fueled the deep hostility of the Republican base towards the Democrats and the liberal left.
While the relative resurgence of socialism in organizations like Democratic Socialists of America and publications like Jacobin involves a refocus on material conditions and class identity, somewhat like the old left, another section, which takes this time rooted in the new left, insists on the experience of oppression by minorities, the eradication of symbols of white supremacy and heterosexism, reparations for the country’s slavery past and a will of minorities to represent and define themselves.
Although this is not always obvious, this last faction is more able to coexist with the more centrist figures of the Democratic Party, who especially balk at the idea of reconnecting with social democracy. This means that the left in the United States must also deal with major differences on the strategic and philosophical levels.
Ideologies and polarization in the United States
Philippe Fournier
Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, November 2021
64 pages
Who is Philippe Fournier?
Doctor in international relations from the London School of Economics, Philippe Fournier taught political science at the university for almost 10 years and was a research fellow for the United States and the Americas at CERIUM. He is currently professor of political science at the Collège Jean-de-Brébeuf.