what is China’s position, one year after the start of the Russian invasion?

Franceinfo interviewed Antoine Bondaz, researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research and teacher at Sciences Po, to better understand Beijing’s position vis-à-vis Russia and the war.

“Cease hostilities”, “launch peace talks”, “respect the sovereignty of all countries” And “Give up the cold war mentality”. The Chinese authorities made public, on Friday 24 February, a document summarizing “China’s position on the political settlement of the Ukrainian crisis”, a year after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This document “is not a peace plan”reacted the head of European diplomacy, Josep Borrell, while declaring that he did not want the “dismiss”. “China reaffirms the positions expressed from the beginning”, he stressed, noting that for this document to be “credible”, Chinese representatives should travel to kyiv.

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How to interpret China’s position with regard to the Russian invasion of Ukraine? What are Beijing’s objectives and what is its relationship to Russia? Franceinfo interviewed Antoine Bondaz, researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research and teacher at Sciences Po, author of the article “Beijing and the Ukrainian conflict: a pragmatic opportunism” (subscribers only) appeared in the magazine International politics.

Franceinfo: How do you interpret this publication from China in view of the “political settlement” of the war in Ukraine? Volodymyr Zelensky, before reading these proposals, welcomed the fact that “China is starting to talk about Ukraine and is sending some signals”but Beijing continues, for example, to use the term “Ukrainian crisis” rather than to speak of war…

Antoine Bondaz: We must already put them into perspective, because this is not the first time that China has made proposals on the subject. Humanitarian aid, the nuclear question, the sovereignty of States, the call for a ceasefire… All these elements had already been expressed, mentioned directly or indirectly by Beijing. There is also no concrete proposal in these twelve points.

It should also be noted that China is not neutral. It puts on a form of false equivalence between Russia and Ukraine, but Beijing continues to refuse to talk about war and still refuses to condemn Russia. His remarks, in the text, on the“integrity, independence and territorial integrity of all countries” are an element of language used since the beginning of the war.

“It’s not about condemning Russia – China would say so – but about protecting ourselves on the Taiwan issue.”

Antoine Bondaz

at franceinfo

This is a way of saying to Westerners: “VSHow can you call for respect for the integrity of Ukraine, when you are violating the integrity of China by approaching Taiwan? However, Taiwan has never been part of the People’s Republic of China, while Crimea and Donbass are part of Ukraine. These are false equivalences used by China and which must be deconstructed.

We cannot dissociate Friday morning’s document from the “global security initiative” presented Tuesday in Beijing, after a first presentation in April 2022. It is a question of promoting to non-Western partners Sino-centric initiatives, alternative frameworks to shape international security to benefit Beijing. China does not want to play the role of mediator in the war in Ukraine, it wants to appear as a responsible power. She does not openly support Russia, her goal is to appear responsible and to differentiate herself from the United States.

When the text is published, you explained on Twitter that many elements of these 12 points were criticisms aimed at the United States…

It must be understood, the whole text is a criticism of the United States. China portrays Washington as responsible for continuing the conflict and portrays itself as a responsible power calling for peace. When Beijing says we must “refrain from adding fuel to the fire and aggravating tensions” or declare that “Humanitarian issues should not be politicized”, it is a criticism of the United States. China also says it opposes the research and development and use of chemical and biological weapons by any country.” Since the beginning of the war, a Chinese disinformation effort has aimed to spread the rumor of American laboratories working on biological weapons in Ukraine.

Other Chinese remarks on “cold war mentality” are a classic criticism of the United States, not at all a criticism of Russia. Also, the fact of “not to seek the security of one country to the detriment of that of others, nor to guarantee the security of a region by the reinforcement, or even the expansion of military blocs”… There is also a criticism of NATO, the idea of ​​an Atlantic Alliance which has been enlarged to the detriment of Russia. The idea that the West would disregard the legitimate security interests of other countries is yet another Chinese language.

“What is playing out in this war, for China, is not centered on Ukraine. What is playing out is the evolution of the Sino-American rivalry.”

Antoine Bondaz

at franceinfo

How can China use the conflict to discredit the United States with non-Western countries and its own population? Because if China is a mediator and so responsible in this conflict, why has Xi Jinping not yet met Volodymyr Zelensky?

A few days ago, Wang Yi, former head of Chinese diplomacy and director of the Chinese Communist Party’s central foreign affairs office, met with Vladimir Putin in Moscow. If Washington is seen as a rival of Beijing, are Russia and China allied countries?

It is not about allies, but about a strategic partnership. It is a convergence of political interests between two authoritarian regimes. Two regimes for which their security is the priority… And China is not a threat to the Russian regime, just as Russia is not a threat to the Chinese regime. China and Russia are not perfectly aligned, but these two countries are very close. There is a real strategic proximity, which is based on a convergence of political interests.

Wang Yi’s visit to Moscow is a continuation of this relationship. The rapprochement accelerated in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea by Russia, then with the authoritarian turn in Russia and China. There was also the Sino-Russian declaration from Beijing on February 4, 2022, and since then Beijing and Moscow have continued to grow closer. At this stage, there is no reason for China to distance itself from Russia.

The US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, has also recently expressed concern that China is supplying “weapons” to Russia. An investigation by the German newspaper Der Spiegel suggests that a Chinese company plans to deliver “kamikaze” drones to Moscow for its offensive in Ukraine… How do you view this information? Wouldn’t this mark a turning point in the Chinese positioning?

Antony Blinken’s remarks are a way of warning China, but also of reminding Europeans that China is a problem, of linking the Russian question to the Chinese question.

What would be the interest for China to deliver some weapons? If she delivers 100 drones, it’s not going to drastically change the war. And all his talk of responsible power, which does not deliver weapons, will collapse. It will also be exposed to actions… What would be the point of delivering 100 drones? A private Chinese company was able to request this authorization, but I doubt that China thinks of delivering weapons. Either it will be a mass delivery, which would allow Russia to win, or Beijing will do nothing. For Beijing, does the cost of helping Russia outweigh the benefit of doing nothing? China may have an interest in helping Russia, but you have to think about the cost to China.


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