Partial mobilization has been decreed in Russia, and it comes into effect immediately. During a televised address on Wednesday September 21, President Vladimir Putin plunged his country into a new chapter of the war in Ukraine. A total of 300,000 reservists will be called up to bolster the current special operation, said Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. A spectacular goal: at the start of the invasion, the Russian army had about 190,000 soldiers in Ukraine, according to Western sources.
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“It is both a turning point on the ground and in the way Russia views its military operation”, explains to franceinfo Anne Le Huérou, specialist in Russian society. And especially, “a political test against opinion”. The role of these mobilized citizens, specified the Minister, will be to “consolidate” and of “control” the territories allegedly “liberated” by Russian forces, along a front line that stretches for 1,000 kilometres. Thus, Moscow intends to boost its numbers, while kyiv has regained the operational initiative, after a successful counter-offensive in the Kharkiv region.
Hiring of volunteers, territorial defense battalions, recruitment of prisoners, promise of citizenship for migrant workers… Russia had already explored several avenues to increase its workforce and the specter of a general mobilization hovered over social networks. Part of the population had gone to bed late the day before, while Putin’s intervention was expected in the evening. His dreaded speech had led to a sudden spike in Google searches: “How to leave Russia?” Where “How to escape the army?”.
Vladimir Putin therefore hammered home that “sonly the reservists” were concerned. Then he drew up the profile of the citizens targeted as a priority: they must have already served in the armed forces, have experience in the field as well as a military specialty. Students are not affected. Quoted by Kommersant (in Russian)Andrei Kartapolov, head of the Duma’s defense committee, mentioned in particular “foremen, non-commissioned officers, midshipmen under 35 and non-commissioned officers under 45″.
“Sergei Shoigu mentions 300,000 reservists, but the decree opens the door to mobilizations in greater numbers.”
Anne Le Huérou, specialist in Russian societyat franceinfo
The text of the decree (in Russian), however, seems much more hazy than these statements from the Kremlin. As Russian political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann points out, no restrictions are mentioned in black and white. “Anyone can be solicited, with the exception of employees of the military-industrial complex”she writes on Telegram (in Russian). “The decree thare actually much broader and potentially more dangerous than ads”, confirms Anne Le Huérou. According to Sergei Shoigu, “1% of the reserve is mobilized, which assumes that 30 million Russian citizens are formally paid into this reserve.”
Aware of its difficulties in Ukraine and the explosive potential of a mobilization, the Kremlin had to solve a delicate equation. How to raise troops without rushing public opinion, and, if possible, preserving the appearances of a special operation that is taking its course? It was a hybrid solution that prevailed.
At this stage, “partial mobilization indeed applies to people who have already served and hold skills”, explains Anne Le Huérou. What therefore concerns, a priori, “people who are not resistant to the military thing.” While providing for a possible increase in speed, the decree “therefore continues to spare a potential core of resistance composed of graduates and urban executives, who were able to escape military service in one way or another”.
“The idea of this partial mobilization is to avoid mobilizing those who might have had a different or hostile reaction.”
Anne Le Huérou, specialist in Russian societyat franceinfo
This mobilization order therefore organizes a “system of concentric circles”first targeting the public least hostile to the operation in Ukraine. Enough to avoid possible social protests? “This is the great challenge for the hours and days to come. But we can imagine that it will continue to work, in a context of intense propaganda.” Witness the many departures to the front of young volunteers, explains the researcher, as well as these examples of families “considering that their child died for good reasons”.
Difficult, at this stage, to gauge the reactions of these conscripts, who will swap the costume of a spectator of the conflict for that of an actor. In the meantime, the Kremlin has tried to give them certain pledges, at least on the face of it, by evoking a “compulsory training period”. A way of dispelling the memory of the first war in Chechnya (1994-1996), where simple conscripts, recalls Anne Le Huérou, “had been sent as cannon fodder”. But also to distinguish themselves from the separatist militias of Donbass, “where mobilized men hide so as not to be sent to the front line without training.”
“For the government, this passage on training is a way of appeasing and reassuring the population.”
Anne Le Huérou, specialist in Russian societyat franceinfo
Another important point of the Kremlin’s announcements: the mobilized will benefit from a contract, a salary and a military status, equal to professional soldiers. “This should particularly motivate regions facing employment problems, such as Buryatia [au sud du lac Baïkal]where the army is the only possibility of social ascent and technical training.” Here’s to the carrot. The stick, now: under amendments adopted the day before in the Duma, the law now provides ten years in prison for citizens who do not respond to the mobilization order. And the same penalty for those who surrender without a fight.
Vladimir Putin’s announcements therefore mark a real turning point in the way of considering the special operation. “During the first months of the invasion, soldiers under contract could still break it to leave their barracks or garrison”observes Anne Le Huérou. “The military courts, obviously, didn’t consider that desertion.” But the tone has hardened over time, “with convictions and orders not to leave his unit”. Current contracts, moreover, are extended sine dieand without any other prerequisite, until the end of the mobilization period.
In the very short term, the Kremlin must now look into the logistics to meet its pharaonic objectives of mobilization. “The conscripts could receive their mobilization order on Gosuslugi [la plateforme qui centralise l’ensemble des interactions avec l’administration, ndlr]which implies a fairly centralized dimension”explains Anne Le Huérou.
Mobilization quotas will be established at regional level, underlines Pavel Chikov, lawyer for the human rights NGO Agora, quoted by the Moscow Times (in English). “LGovernors will be responsible for their implementation”, which paves the way for differentiated geographical treatment, making it possible to better target mobilized citizens. It also specifies that these convocations can be sent to home or to the workplace, against signature.
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At this stage, the major unknown concerns the Russian capacity to train hundreds of thousands of soldiers. “Russia does not know how to train fighters on a massive scale. The very poor quality of military service, in its content, has also been criticized by the Russian command”, recently explained to franceinfo Anna Colin Lebedev. Many observers question the capacity of the military infrastructure and the presence of competent trainers. “Will there be a break in the Ukrainian field allowing executives to be sent to Russia to train conscripts?”also wonders Anne Le Huérou.
Finally, the operational effects of a mobilization, even successful, will not be immediate. “It takes months and months to turn civilians into soldiers”points out to Forbes (in English) Mike Martin, researcher at King’s College London (United Kingdom). Gold, “Russia already needed soldiers yesterday, not in six months.”