The celebrations of the 70e Vladimir Putin’s birthday last week were duller than usual in Russia. This is the time for concern since the Ukrainian armed forces have won victories, leading the Kremlin to resort to the mobilization of reservists to replenish the front. Almost eight months after the start of the invasion of Ukraine, what is the pulse of Russian public opinion?
Posted at 4:00 p.m.
Polls by reliable organizations indicate that a large majority of Russians support their country’s military actions. The Levada Center, an independent Russian polling firm that cannot be suspected of complacency with power, reports 72% support for the “special military operation”. Russia Watcher, a research team from Princeton University, comes up with a similar figure of 74%. In both cases, the support observed has remained stable since the start of the invasion and does not seem to have suffered from the announcement of the “partial” mobilization on 21 September.
There are, however, several reasons for putting this observation into perspective. Poll results can be biased when respondents feel afraid to express a position different from what is perceived as the dominant opinion.
The weight of such conformity is certainly significant in an authoritarian country like Russia, which in March criminalized the public expression of any opposition to the war in Ukraine.
Moreover, acts of protest and disobedience are increasing in Russia. Admittedly, active resistance is limited to isolated, albeit spectacular, acts, such as the numerous attacks on military police stations with Molotov cocktails, but passive resistance takes on gigantic proportions. Nearly 200,000 Russians have fled the mobilization by leaving the country in recent weeks, which testifies to a disaffection much wider than the exodus of the educated middle class last spring.
In fact, opinion studies conducted on the basis of interviews, which question the reasons for supporting the war, show that Russian society is divided into three unequal groups.
Warring Minority
A first minority, which accounts for approximately 25% of the population, is that of the “warmongers”, who consider that the invasion of Ukraine is justified and who advocate a greater military commitment, in particular by general mobilization and the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This bellicose minority has enjoyed growing media influence in Russia since February, thanks to the support of the Kremlin, which seeks by contrast to present itself as “reasonable” and “moderate”. This official support for the “warmongers” is not without risk for those in power, however, because it is among them that the most virulent criticism of the state has emerged lately. Russian major, denounced as timorous and corrupt.
At the other end of the political spectrum, a minority of “pacifists” categorically reject the war in Ukraine, for which Putin is held personally responsible. Although this group seems small – around 18% of respondents – it should be borne in mind that this figure only includes those who openly declare their position during opinion polls.
Faced with these rival minorities stands, finally, the majority of the Russian population, which claims not to understand the reasons for the war in Ukraine or to have no opinion on this subject, but which insists on its loyalty to Putin and his relies on his decisions.
There is no need to examine the depths of the “Russian soul” to find the keys to such an attitude.
For more than 20 years, the political system in Russia has been based on an implicit social contract under which the state agrees to let people live in peace as long as they stay out of politics.
This strategy of demobilization dictated the conduct of the war until very recently. Unlike Kyiv, which beats the patriotic drum and decrees general mobilization to save the homeland in danger, Moscow was leading the fight by pretending that it was only a localized conflict that did not justify mobilization. Ordinary citizens were invited to live as usual and, above all, not to meddle in what does not concern them.
In this context, the “partial” mobilization decreed on September 21 does not only mark a concession of power in favor of the “warmongers”. It is a profound break in the relationship between the state and Russian society, which is no longer asked to stay away from politics, but to be willing to die for it. The first reactions of the Russians to this mobilization show the extent of the disarray: “anxiety, fear, horror” (47% of respondents) and “shock” (32%). The consequences, which are still imperceptible in the polls, should be felt in the long term.