Ukrainian forces try to find the breach amid Russian minefields

kyiv must meet an immense logistical challenge to hope to reconquer its territories. The Russian forces have indeed set up for several months a gigantic defense system to thwart a possible counter-offensive.

This one respects “a classic scheme” in three lines, details Guillaume Ancel, a former officer in the French army. A first is made up of obstacles (“dragon’s teeth”, explosive devices, ditches, etc.), in order to slow down any incursions as much as possible. Military units equipped with heavy machine guns and mortar form a second curtain. Finally, as a last resort, the artillery and maneuver units have the mission of denying access to the enemy.

At this stage, the Ukrainian forces “are breaking into this long wall like armored glass, on all sides”explains Guillaume Ancel, who counts about twenty attacks in progress. “The Ukrainians do not engage very large units, but ‘spikes’, and then they withdraw”, which forces Russian forces to move constantly, in order to cover a potential Ukrainian breakthrough. Eventually, “their ability to react will be weakened when the first line is started in several places on the front”, believes the former French officer. From then on, the breach so much desired by the Ukrainian general staff could open up.

An essential component of the first curtain

While the counter-offensive has just entered its dynamic phase, Ukraine is just beginning to test the front line, covered with explosive devices. The Russian Ministry of Defense broadcast on Telegram on May 22 the video of paratroopers rushed to carry out a mining operation near the front line, from armored vehicles.

The army also uses Zemledeliye ISDMs. These vehicles launch guided rockets loaded with mines, in order to disperse them several kilometers away. “The mines are part of the defensive line in the same way as the concrete works [“dents de dragon”] or preparing the ground [tranchées antichars] “underlines Thibault Fouillet, military expert at the Foundation for Strategic Research. “But it’s the most iconic element, because it’s the one that does damage.”

However, minefields are of interest only in “a larger system”. The other obstacles are intended to guide the Ukrainian forces towards these trapped sectors or positions covered by artillery. In January, at Vouhledar, the Russian forces had lost an entire armored column, blocked by a minefield. “Vehicles trying to retreat were caught in the artillery”says Thibault Fouillet.

This time, it’s kyiv’s turn to look for the parade. “ Our troops encounter continuous minefields, which are combined with anti-tank ditches”, recognized on Telegram Hanna Malyar, Deputy Minister of Defense. Demining operations are all the more complex as they are carried out near the front line, under the ballet of drones and within range of anti-tank missiles. These explosive devices are difficult to identify and the threat is ever-present. Several videos already attest to losses on the front line. Images, which emerged on Monday, show the explosion of a mine as a transport vehicle passed American Humvee.

According to two US officials interviewed by CNN, Ukrainian forces suffered casualties “important” in men and heavy equipment, during their first attempt to break through in the East, including concerning the MRAP armored transport, designed to resist mines and provided by Washington. The ability to overcome these obstacles, the “breaching”, is therefore a central issue for the coming weeks. Ukrainian army deminers have started to neutralize mines by hand, taking advantage of the stealth of the night, a Ukrainian commander told washington post.

Specific “breaching” vehicles

But in general, “It starts with an artillery bombardment, in order to destroy as many mines as possible”, explains Guillaume Ancel. There are then several systems. A Soviet-made UR-77 Meteorit tank can be used to launch an explosive charge attached to lanyards. The detonation causes vibrations in the ground, which lead to the explosion of the mines. This vehicle must allow “to open passages during combat”, assured the end of May the Ukrainian army in a video. The tanks and armored vehicles that accompany it have the task of protecting it from enemy fire.

Another option: a tank with an anti-mine roller, which “makes everything he touches explode and leaves a single trace, behind which everyone must pass”, continues Guillaume Ancel. Finland had notably delivered six Leopard-2Rs, a vehicle transformed to respond to this mission. But three of them were destroyed last week in the Zaporizhia region, according to a document shared by pro-Russian channels. This video is considered authentic by the main analysts and the specialized Dutch site Oryx, which lists military losses since the start of the war.

This event “is not insignificant”, comments Thibault Fouillet. Of course, Ukrainians “expect to lose vehicles, but specific breaching systems are few in their army and in the world.” The challenge, however, is to make this equipment profitable, and that it has at least produced an operational effect. “Here, it looks like those tanks were destroyed before they could even act.” According to the former officer, “If it happens again, it could become a problem and slow down the tempo of the operation. Conversely, if these cases remain limited, it will mean that the Ukrainians keep their means to move forward.”

This specific equipment received less media coverage than tanks or planes. However, Ukrainians “need engineering capabilities to cross minefields (…) and break through obstacles”, recalled at the end of May Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO, on May 24. In recent months, Germany, Slovakia, Canada, South Korea and Denmark have announced the transfer of dedicated armor (Wisent 1, for example) or mine clearance systems (GCS-200). The United States has transferred armored MRAPs and includes, in its military aid, “demining systems” and “demolition munitions”. kyiv, on the other hand, did not get any M1150 Assault Breacher, 80-ton monsters produced in the United States.

A different timeline compared to last year

The Ukrainian army is currently only using between a quarter and a third of the newly formed brigades, according to Thibault Fouillet, while waiting to find the breach and rush into it, and even if it means being patient. “The tempo is not the same as last summer”, he analyzes. In Kharkiv, the Ukrainian forces had benefited from a surprise breakthrough, on a badly or poorly defended point. In Kherson, there was no defensive system with successive lines. “Operations are slower, and the risk of attrition higher. But the logic is to produce breakthroughs and move fast enough to avoid an orderly withdrawal of Russian forces.”