Emmanuel Macron’s announcements are not “not a revolution in changing military doctrine”estimated Jean-Dominique Merchet, journalist at Opinion, specialist in military and strategic issues, Wednesday November 9 on franceinfo. The Head of State presented from Toulon, on the frigate Suffren, France’s military strategy for the years to come, and formalized the end of Operation Barkhane in the Sahel.
franceinfo: Was it necessary to redefine the strategic objectives of French defense policy in light of the war in Ukraine?
Jean-Dominique Merchet: The objectives, as President Macron has just presented them, are very much in line with France’s policy for 20, 30, 40 years. What he announces is not a revolution in changing military doctrine. It’s mostly an adaptation. He also spoke relatively little about Ukraine, saying that it was not necessary to prepare the defense of 2022, but the defense of 2030. There are quite a few novelties.
What should this French defense look like in 2030?
We won’t know right away. The Head of State’s speech is a very doctrinal, very theoretical speech. It is a strategic review which is the introduction to the decisions which will be taken within the framework of a military programming law which will be voted at the beginning of the year 2023. There, we will really know. There will be billions, programs that will be launched and others stopped. We will see more clearly. There, we are in a strategic vision of France, the role of France in the world. France must continue to be able to influence world affairs. We have remained in something rather general which will result in the coming months in much more concrete decisions.
“Obviously, the president did not say what everyone has been waiting for for months and months, that is to say the amount, the number of billions that will be spent on defense by 2030.”
Jean-Dominique Merchet, journalist at “L’Opinion”at franceinfo
Isn’t it also a question of no longer preparing the French army solely for occasional external operations?
There is much talk of a return to high-intensity warfare, to major engagements. It’s true that we came out of an open period in 2001 with the attacks in New York and the whole war against terrorism. The most obvious illustration of this is that the French army left Mali in August 2022, where it was leading a fight against terrorism. And the president announced today the official end of Operation Barkhane, the French engagement in Mali, which had in fact ended since August.
Is it a question of preparing a new kind of war?
It is a question of preparing France to face new challenges, for example what is called the informational struggle, influence, that is to say social networks, misinformation. We see it in Africa, for example, where the Russian Wagner company did a lot of anti-French propaganda. So it’s about being able to resist that.
It is also a question of being able to intervene in other fields, for example in the seabed. We saw this recently with the attack on the Nord Stream gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea. Places where nothing happened potentially become places of confrontation. This is obviously the case of cyber defense, it is the case of space with satellites.
“So the defense is arguably taking on an even more global form than before. But that was already known stuff.”
Jean-Dominique Merchet, journalist at “L’Opinion”at franceinfo
Today there is more the reaffirmation of a French and European ambition. The President talked a lot about European sovereignty. It nevertheless gave a small kick to Germany on the German anti-missile shield project. He had rather harsh words, without obviously quoting Germany in a diplomatic way, but everyone will have understood. On the contrary, he reached out more than he had before in the UK, announcing a Franco-British summit early next year. We see a France which has a European ambition, but not necessarily always easy with our Germans.
Is this European defense a sea serpent?
In a way, it’s a sea serpent. Especially since the war in Ukraine, if it makes Europeans realize that they have to take on an important part of their defence, and that war is at our doorstep, it especially strengthens the Atlantic Alliance, especially NATO. Everyone has understood that if the Americans were not there, things would not happen as they happen in Ukraine. The Russians would have already won the war. France, in this context, is trying to play a card. But she doesn’t necessarily have a lot of strengths in her game.