In 1976, Quebecers decided to entrust the reins of government to the Parti Québécois (PQ), which had committed to holding a referendum in its first mandate, even though a majority of them undoubtedly knew that they would vote ” No “.
The PQ started from afar. Three years earlier, Robert Bourassa’s Liberals had elected 102 deputies out of 110. It is true that the distortions generated by the voting method had been particularly acute. With 30% of the votes, the PQ would have deserved better than six deputies. From there to seeing him in the antechamber of power, that was another matter.
It would be Marx who said: “History does not repeat itself, it stutters.” » It amounts to practically the same thing. At the rate at which the PQ’s voting intentions are increasing, a victory in the 2026 election constitutes a hypothesis that must be considered, even if a lot of water will flow under the bridge between now and then.
The Liberals of 1976 and the Coalition Avenir Québec of 2026 will have in common that they served two mandates. We cannot say of Prime Minister Legault that he is “the most hated man in Quebec”, as was once said of Mr. Bourassa, but the fall in his popularity is no less dizzying.
Of course, Paul St-Pierre Plamondon is not René Lévesque, who was already a hero long before becoming prime minister, but we voted less for Lévesque than against Bourassa on November 15, 1976.
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Mr. Legault predicts that the PQ will want to make holding a referendum the issue of the next election. It is rather he who would like to make it the question of the ballot box. The PQ would certainly prefer that it relate to the government’s record, but the referendum will inevitably appear in the background.
Mr. St-Pierre Plamondon wanted to see a progression of sovereignty in the 36% to which the last Léger poll credited the Yes. In reality, it has been fluctuating within the margin of error for years.
He should rather be pleased that the stagnation of sovereignty does not prevent the progress of his party. It is as if the voters had come to the idea that, even if it was a bad time to go through, a referendum was the price to pay to get rid of a government which no longer satisfied them, even if it meant vote “no” if the PQ persists in holding one, as they did in May 1980 after first dismissing the Liberals.
Or perhaps they believe that despite repeated assurances from its leader, the PQ will eventually change its mind and that once elected, it will prefer to wait until the “winning conditions” are met rather than risk another defeat, as he has done in the past.
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For the moment, there is no debate on sovereignty per se. Last October, the presentation of the “year 1 budget” fueled the discussion for two or three days, after which we moved on to something else. The “blue book” planned for 2025 should make the project more concrete, but the PQ is clearly in no hurry to divert the spotlight from the government.
Spring 2025 will also be the time when the PLQ, which is currently largely absent, will finally find a new leader. Despite his efforts, Mr. Legault is not very convincing in the role of Captain Canada. The heart is not really in it. There is a void there that could bring good fortune to whoever fills it.
In 1976, the PQ’s coming to power created a sense of urgency among the Liberals, who had set their sights on Claude Ryan, counting on his intellectual stature to provide a response to the sovereignist camp.
Would this have been enough to ensure the No victory if the unexpected fall of Joe Clark’s minority government, barely nine months after being elected, had not allowed the return of Pierre Elliott Trudeau just in time for the referendum campaign?
The popularity of Mr. Trudeau and the 74 seats that he said he was “putting at stake” on his promise of change, while Mr. Clark had only elected two MPs in Quebec, had made it possible to compensate for the deficit in charisma Mr. Ryan’s column.
If ever there was another referendum and Pierre Poilievre was in charge in Ottawa, the leader of the PLQ would have a lot of weight on his shoulders. Denis Coderre volunteers, but it might be better to keep looking.
In 1995, the federalist camp found a solution to the problem posed by the unpopularity of Daniel Johnson, which was added to that of Jean Chrétien, by making Jean Charest the third member of the No triumvirate.
If it is true that History stutters, Canada may once again find a savior. There are various treatments or techniques to get rid of stuttering, but success is not guaranteed. Rather, it tends to reappear at the worst times.