In 1988, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic, was forced under the pressure of a vast international campaign led by the Iranian opposition, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), to accept a cease-fire. fire in his eight-year conflict with Iraq, a gesture he likened to “drinking the cup of poison.”
Previously, he had proclaimed that the route to Jerusalem passed through Karbala — a city in central Iraq considered holy by Shiite Muslims — and that the fight must continue to the final resting place of Tehran. It was a historic turning point. Engaged in a costly two-billion-dollar war that left millions dead and wounded without any tangible benefit, Khomeini found himself faced with an existential dilemma. Faced with more than 30,000 political prisoners — 90% of whom were members of the mujahideen — ready to overthrow his regime, he opted for their massacre in order to guarantee the survival of his government.
Today, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei faces a similar crisis for his regime. Aware that the management of his succession after his death promises to be impossible, especially with a participation rate of only 5% in the recent legislative elections, and faced with thousands of resistance units ready to provoke his overthrow, he knows that he must resolve this question during his lifetime.
The death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raïssi in a helicopter accident on May 19 represents an irreparable loss for him. Khamenei described his death as a “major tragedy for the country”, stressing that no previous figure had served the country with such dedication. Raisi, who had unfailingly obeyed Khomeini during the 1988 massacre and had been one of his loyal allies, had never disagreed with Khamenei and did not aspire to a change in governance, as does current presidential candidate Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.
With Raisi still alive, Khamenei could have advanced the succession of his son Mojtaba. But in its absence, it is more difficult to reach a consensus between the different clans of the regime.
Coming from a medieval ideology and embodying religious fascism, these factions differ from modern political parties by their lack of clear internal segmentation. Hostile to any form of democracy, they are constantly in conflict to increase their influence and their plundering.
Thus, they must agree on a successor for Khamenei. What we call “electoral engineering” within the regime consists of establishing or imposing such an agreement. The elections are thus only a pretext to establish the designated successor, otherwise the regime risks collapsing from within.
The first electoral debate focused on the economy without providing real solutions for a country where two thirds of the population live in poverty. According to the state news site Mostaghel Online, “the debate dissuaded a large part of the undecided from participating in the elections.”
The legitimacy of the regime, tested since its creation, was totally shaken by the uprising of 2022. Official statistics show that participation in the last legislative elections did not exceed 5%, thus reflecting the growing illegitimacy of the regime and the weight of the thousands of resistance actions carried out against its repressive apparatus by resistance units scattered across Iran.
Faced with these failures, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei persists in a strategy of increased repression to counter the uprisings, while continuing to develop the nuclear program in the hope of perpetuating the regime. He continues to favor a bellicose approach, ensuring that regional conflicts do not directly threaten his power, and he maintains intense repression, particularly against women.