You had to be called Zbigniew Brzezinski to envisage, from the end of the 1990s, that Ukraine would be the decisive issue at the start of the 21st century.and century on the Eurasian continent. In The big chessboard (1997), President Carter’s adviser from 1977 to 1981 indeed considered the independence of Ukraine (1991) as a “crucial test” for Russia. In what sense?
To measure the scale of the challenge represented by the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991—that “black hole at the center of the Eurasian continent”—it suffices to consider the consequence that Brzezinski draws from it: nothing less than a complete revision of the geopolitical approach of the United States. What had to be avoided at all costs, in this context, was, he specifies, the emergence of a dictatorship which would thus get its hands on one of the two largest nuclear arsenals in the world (we we are there!). The priority now was therefore to establish a vast Euro-Atlantic security system, if possible with a central core France-Germany-Poland-Ukraine, not against Russia, but with her, by opening the doors of Europe to her.
Dangerous coalition
Such a scenario made it possible to avoid what Brzezinski considered, in the longer term, to be the most dangerous for the United States: the constitution of a Russia-China coalition (with perhaps Iran ). We are not far from it. How not to see in this 1997 analysis by the American geopolitical scientist of Polish origin an eagle eye?
The desire to integrate Russia into Europe, to build, in the words of General de Gaulle, a Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals”, came up against, as Brzezinski had clearly seen, a formidable difficulty. Ukrainian independence meant, for Russia, not only the abandonment of the symbolic role of guardian of Pan-Slavic identity, but also the end of its imperial ambition in Eurasia. Ukraine thus became a “geopolitical pivot” on the great Eurasian chessboard: through its independence, it transformed the very nature of Russia, which then passed from an imperial destiny to a national destiny. The whole question was therefore whether Russia was going to opt for the choice of a modern democratic nation-state associated with the European economy – a choice favorable to its interests – or let itself be drawn into the imperial adventure by fighting against independence of former Soviet republics. It is in this sense that Ukraine was a crucial test.
The American strategy was clear: to encourage the democratization and Europeanization of Russia, and to discourage its imperial ambitions. It was in 1993, according to Brzezinski, that a “historic opportunity was missed”: Poland asked to join NATO and Yeltsin declared that there was nothing contrary to Russian interests there. The enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance could have been done in association with Russia. Key moment. But the Clinton administration prevaricated, and soon, the Russian authorities turned their backs on, then opposed the enlargements. Despite Ukraine’s declared hostility, Russia now sought political integration—under its rule—with what it now called its “near abroad”. Unlike Kemalist Turkey, which understood that it had to move from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish nation in order to modernize and liberate itself, post-Soviet Russia could not resist the imperial path. But, as Brzezinski points out, the “near abroad” option, far from being a solution for Russia, was a geopolitical illusion.
Ataturk vs Putin
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 is the latest act of this illusion. Russia needed a Kemal Ataturk, it had a Vladimir Putin. The imperial road, 30 years after Ukraine’s independence, is more than ever a geopolitical impasse. The brutal invasion of the Russian army strengthened the already well-established Ukrainian national feeling and transformed the “Russian brothers” into “enemy brothers” for several generations.
Brzezinski was not alone in seeing that by choosing imperial destiny over the democratic and prosperous nation-state, Russia would bring harm to itself and Ukraine. It’s in Kiev — in retrospect, what a symbol! — that Boris Yeltsin, in 1990, said: “In no way does Russia aspire to become the center of a new empire […]. This role is pernicious and having held it for a long time, Russia understands it better than anyone. What does she get out of it today? Has she become freer? Richer ? Happier ? It is most regrettable that Putin did not trade his historical rantings about Ukraine for a meditation on the words his predecessor spoke in the city that today shows Europeans the price of freedom.