The current conflict between the United States and Russia over Ukraine has been analyzed quite a bit from a geopolitical point of view. Fortunately, we are starting to see points of view appear that take into account Russia’s security interests, which breaks with a Manichean view of the conflict. We can easily imagine what the reaction of the United States would be if Canada or Mexico joined a military alliance directed against them … But I would rather draw attention to considerations relating to the political and socio-economic situation of the United States. Russia to shed light on another facet of this international crisis.
The appearance of things is often deceptive. This is the case with authoritarian regimes: they give off an image of strength with their clearly visible repressive apparatus, their political stability, the weakness of the opponents who want to stand up to them. And yet, behind a very thin shell hides a great fragility. We must first understand that the social order of post-Soviet Russia has hardly succeeded in establishing itself in the ideological sphere. For example, a poll carried out at the end of August 2021 by the Levada Center (independent from the state) reveals that the planned economy receives record support from 62% of respondents as “the fairest economic system” , against 24% for “the system based on private property and the market economy”. In the months following the fall of the Soviet regime, these figures stood at 29% and 48% respectively. The Soviet political system itself is considered to be the best by 49%, with the Putin regime and the Western liberal model sharing favor with the rest of the respondents. Nostalgia for the Soviet era is a major trend and says more about the present than about a past marked by dictatorship and shortages.
If the standard of living eventually caught up with that of the best years of the Soviet regime – and even exceeded it considerably -, the Russian economy has stagnated since 2014, while it was already not doing very well since the financial crisis of 2008. In 2019, and therefore before the COVID-19 crisis, Russia’s GDP, at constant prices, was lower than in 2014. This stagnation / recession has generated a decline in living standards, such as increases in wages fail to catch up with the level of inflation. From 2014 to today, real disposable household income has fallen by 10%.
The country is also facing a demographic crisis threatening as much for its economy as for its security and the occupation of the territory. This crisis is one of Putin’s main concerns. Currently at 146 million, Russia’s population is declining, and demographers predict a drop to 121 million by the year 2050. The COVID-19 crisis has amplified the problem. It would have caused the death of more than a million people to date, according to independent research, but three times less according to the very disputed official statistics. Life expectancy, which ended up exceeding 70 years, suffered a decline of more than three years, which erases the progress made over the past 10 years. However, the Russian government has pushed back the retirement age by five years, unchanged since 1932.
Declining popularity
In such a context, it should come as no surprise that Putin’s popularity tends to decline. Surveys conducted over the past year show a steady decline. Its support rate is currently around 49%. In the first decade of the 2000s, its popularity rested on at least four pillars. The first was its particularly brutal fight against “terrorism”, in particular the armed repression in Chechnya. It also enjoyed a period of exceptional growth between 1999 and 2008, when world oil prices soared, which improved the state budget and the general standard of living. A much more independent and assertive foreign policy than it was under his predecessor Yeltsin has fueled his popularity. Finally, he was able to cleverly resort to a nationalist rhetoric focused on reconciliation with the past (hence the regime’s hostility towards an organization like Memorial), without however seeking to return to it.
Having lost the pillars of counterterrorism and growth, its popularity depends more than ever on its foreign policy and nationalist rhetoric, the two of which are obviously inextricably linked. Putin was thus able to reach new heights in the esteem of the Russians with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, his support hovering around 80% for more than four years. But the symbolic effects of this very strong gesture began to wane. The president must compensate for the negative effects of the current socio-economic and health situation and of unpopular policies by overbidding foreign policy. According to polls, it is in this area that Putin is seen as particularly strong among the Russian population. Its apparent independence from the oligarchy leaves the impression that it really acts according to the interests of the country. In addition, between 70% and 80% of Russians consider that NATO member states seek to weaken or humiliate their country.
But the prospect of war between Russia and Ukraine hardly enchants Russian public opinion. A war would undoubtedly have the effect of plunging Putin’s popularity, in a context where the president must on the contrary maintain it or increase it to ensure the cohesion of a system of which he has become an indispensable element, in the same way as the authoritarian aspects of the regime. If skirmishes are still possible, a major war therefore seems unlikely. In 2020, Russia’s military spending was less than 8% of that of the United States. Putin finds himself caught in the crossfire: to show very clearly his intention not to give in on the question of the possible accession of his Ukrainian neighbor to NATO and to stand firm against the United States while avoiding a conflict at all costs. armed. In this way, he can keep his popularity at a certain level domestically. But for how long ?