Europe must “to become a more independent, more sovereign power”. Faced with the Russian invasion in Ukraine, Emmanuel Macron called for a relaunch of “defense European”during a speech delivered on Wednesday 2 March. The French president is far from the only one pushing for a real European Defense Union. It must be said that the unity and speed of the response of the Twenty-Seven in Moscow have revived hopes of seeing the file move forward. In a few days, unprecedented decisions were taken: sanctions targeting the Russian economy, welcoming refugees, but also sending arms and ammunition to Ukraine.
If observers see this as a historic turning point for the EU, questions remain: what are Brussels’ prerogatives in terms of defence? Why are the discussions around this subject so complex? How significant are the decisions made in response to the war in Ukraine? Franceinfo gives you some answers.
Why has this subject come back to the fore?
While coming “upset the balance of the world”the Russian invasion in Ukraine has revived the European defense file, explains to franceinfo Federico Santopinto, researcher of the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (Grip). “There was a violent realization, on the part of Europeans, that war had returned to the continent.” This resulted in the unanimous adoption of several sanctions plans targeting Russia, while the bloc hesitated for a time on the extent of the measures to be adopted against the regime of Vladimir Putin.
Two highlights occurred on Sunday February 27. First, the announcement of the EU’s decision to buy and supply arms and ammunition to Ukraine, for an amount of 450 million euros. The measurement, a first in history, is “remarkable”according to Adája Stoetman, researcher and specialist in the subject at the Institute of International Relations in Clingendael (Netherlands.)
“It shows that the EU is willing and able to act on defense issues, rather than talk. This has been lacking in recent years.”
Adája Stoetman, researcher at the Clingendael Institute of International Relationsat franceinfo
Another noteworthy announcement: that of the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, that his government was going to authorize the shipment of arms to Ukraine and raise the defense budget to 2% of GDP. “It really is a cultural revolutionsummarizes Delphine Deschaux-Dutard, lecturer in political science at the University of Grenoble-Alpes. Until then, Germany had a tradition linked to its history: very cautious from a military point of view, it favored diplomacy and refused to intervene outside its borders.“ This bend “180 degrees” therefore paves the way for a change in European doctrine on the subject.
What are the prerogatives of the EU in terms of defence?
European defense is organized around two main principles: unanimous decision-making and the primacy of the national level. “Defence remains a sovereign competence, exercised by the States”, recalls Delphine Deschaux-Dutard, contacted by franceinfo. “We don’t have a European army but 27 national armies“adds Ronja Kempin, researcher at the German think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, interviewed by franceinfo.
The prerogatives of the EU therefore relate mainly to cooperation between Member States. However, several tools have been put in place within the framework of the common security and defense policy, including: the Political and Security Committee, which deals with crisis management in Brussels, the Military Committee, in which each Member State member is represented by a military delegate, or else the EU military staff. This last “is not intergovernmental in nature, but does represent the interests of Europeans”shade Delphine Deschaux-Dutard. “He deals mainly with monitoring, strategy and planning, and coordinates joint military operations.”
Several financial instruments are also available to the EU: the European Defense Fund, intended to support military research, and the European Peace Facility, which is used in particular to finance the shipment of equipment to third countries. It is this provision which was used for Ukraine, allowing the purchase of 450 million euros of armament. Finally, Permanent Structured Cooperation, a novelty introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, allows “a concrete deepening of cooperation in the field of defence”, explains Adája Stoetman. Sign of “success” of the initiative, the latter was joined by 25 of the 27 Member States.
So the EU cannot intervene militarily?
The Union does not have its own army but it can decide to send missions under the European flag, made up of troops from the Member States. In total, the Twenty-Seven launched “nearly 30 missions, including ten civilian operations and six military missions still in progress”, says Adája Stoetman. For example, the EU is training Malian troops as part of a mission launched in 2013. Interventions are “always around conflicts”without getting involved, adds Ronja Kempin.
Is the idea of a Defense Europe new?
The desire to build a common defense policy dates back to the 1950s. “The first attempt is made with the European Defense Community, with the idea of creating a European armysays Delphine Deschaux-Dutard. But it is a failure, France having rejected the treaty.“It was not until the 1990s that the idea resurfaced, thanks to the Balkan crisis.
“The war in Bosnia was a trigger for France and Germany, because we realized that it was not possible to act without the Americans.”
Delphine Deschaux-Dutard, lecturer in political science at the University of Grenoble-Alpesat franceinfo
The question of stronger integration seemed to be advancing in 1998, when the United Kingdom accepted the principle of an autonomous European defense capability. But hopes are quickly dashed, underlines Delphine Deschaux-Dutard. “Basically, the problem is always the same, we can’t agree on the notion of autonomy: the British wanted NATO to give its approval for the creation of this force, while the French wanted to break away from NATO.
Why is it so complicated for Europeans to agree on this subject?
Firstly because the EU has 27 different armies, and therefore as many “military and strategic cultures”, emphasizes Delphine Deschaux-Dutard. “Not all states have the same traditions. Faced with terrorism, France has no problem deploying soldiers from the Sentinel force to patrol the streets. This is unthinkable in Germany.”
The question is also financial, some capitals being, like Berlin not long ago, less inclined to invest in defence. Another point of contention: the definition of the threats facing the EU. “The Baltic States or Poland, for example, will look much more to the East than France or Spain, and therefore their priorities diverge”notes the Dutch researcher Adája Stoetman.
Does a European defense risk weakening NATO?
Some member states see the French proposal for EU strategic autonomy as a way to go beyond the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Founded in 1949, this alliance aims to protect its members, who number 30, from external threats. For some countries, particularly in eastern Europe, membership of this organization is crucial to ensuring their defense against Russia.
“The Baltic States and Poland are afraid that a common defense policy will undermine NATO”, explains Adája Stoetman to franceinfo. A vision rejected by Federico Santopinto: “I don’t believe that European defense is incompatible with NATO. It’s a policy that fits into a larger integration process, which complements the missions of the alliance.”
Will the war in Ukraine give a boost to the European defense project?
This is the analysis shared by many experts. “I believe this is a defining moment.enthuses Ronja Kempin. All member states have understood that war is back in Europe, that the means we have are not enough to deal with the Russian threat.”
“This shock of Russian aggression is mobilizing efforts that have never been seen before.”
Ronja Kempin, researcher at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politikat franceinfo
Delphine Deschaux-Dutard remains cautious, however. “What is striking in European defense is that it works with crises, but that we come back each time to the limits that there were before.” Is it soon “the end of European adolescence” on the subject, as Ronja Kempin says? Beyond the shock of the war in Ukraine, the EU must soon give birth to its strategic compass. This tool should enable it, for the first time, to name the threats it faces. “A major step forward” and concrete, according to Adája Stoetman.
I was too lazy to read everything, can you give me a summary?
The issue of a common EU defense policy came back to the fore following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Thursday 24 February. The speed and unity of the European reaction to Moscow, and in particular the decision to supply arms to Kiev, leads many experts to believe that we are witnessing the birth of a real common policy among the Twenty-Seven.
Although the EU does not have its own army, it has put in place several tools and organizations that allow it to promote operational and financial cooperation between Member States on defense issues. It can also send missions to third countries, generally support missions, made up of troops from the Member States.
But the idea of a common defense policy, which first appeared in 1954, is struggling to go further. In particular, the inability of the Twenty-Seven to agree on the limits of such a project as well as the differences in military culture between each country. Several states, particularly in the east of the continent, also fear that the EU will turn away from NATO, considered crucial for their defence.
Brussels’ decision to buy and send arms to Ukraine, a first in its history, and Germany’s announcement of an increase in its defense budget nevertheless constitute a historic turning point for the Twenty-Seven. And could announce a new stage of European integration.