With each speech of Vladimir Putin, the same refrain. After announcing the mobilization in the country, the Russian president mentioned on Tuesday, September 27 a possible recourse to nuclear weapons, if “territorial integrity” of Russia was threatened. A warning addressed to the Ukrainian forces, while four occupied territories of Ukraine organize pseudo-referendums of annexation. What relaunch the hypothesis of a nuclear strike, described by some observers as “tactical”in order to regain the military initiative on the ground, as opposed to strikes “strategic”. It remains to be seen what these terms cover.
“There is no nuclear weapon with a ‘tactical’ label and this designation is above all an intellectual construction”, immediately corrects Stéphane Audrand, consultant specializing in armaments. The expression commonly refers, and rather vaguely, to the use of nuclear technology for operational purposes, in a theater of war. As for so-called “strategic” nuclear weapons, which are essentially long-range, they are considered by a State in the event of a threat to its superior interests, its territorial integrity or its survival.
“This distinction dates back to the early 1950s”, Jean-Louis Lozier, former head of the “nuclear forces” division of the French general staff, told franceinfo. In the 1970s, moreover, “France itself developed its so-called ‘tactical’ deterrent weapons – the Hades and Pluton missiles, which had a range of 120 kilometres”. This distinction has survived “until the day when the great powers realized that any use of nuclear power, in reality, had strategic implications”.
As a general rule, so-called tactical, or non-strategic, weapons differ “by their power, weapon systems and type of use”, summarizes Stéphane Audrand. But the outlines are quite blurry. “So-called ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons are designed to combat targets up to 300 kilometers away”specifies a NATO document (in English)but can also be engaged in missions “operational” and “strategic”.
The New Start bilateral treaty, signed in 2010 between the United States and Russia, caps the number of“deployed strategic warheads” by the two countries, according to a principle of parity, without mentioning the others. But in total, Russia has about 4,477 nuclear warheads “deployed” Where “stored”according to a count published in March in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (in English). Among them, 1,912 warheads “non-strategic and defensive” : surface-to-air missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, torpedoes, etc.
The “Iskander” and “Kalibr” missiles, widely used in Ukraine, can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. This is why we speak of “dual capability vectors”: conventional and nuclear. The announcement went relatively unnoticed, but last May the Russian Defense Ministry conducted electronic simulations of nuclear-capable Iskander fires in the Kaliningrad enclave. “Adapting these missiles requires, despite everything, significant logistics observed by Western intelligence services”says Jean-Louis Lozier.
Their power is evaluated between one and 100 kilotons (in equivalent of TNT), against 150, 200, 500, or even more for “strategic” weapons. To be compared, therefore, with the explosion of the port of Beirut, in Lebanon – 2 kilotons – or with the American bomb dropped in 1945 on Hiroshima, in Japan – 15 kilotons. Thereby, “differentiating these weapons by power is not necessarily very relevant”emphasizes Jean-Louis Lozier.
The idea of ”tactical” strikes, with an operational aim, comes up against the realities on the ground above all. “What’s the point for us to use nuclear weapons on Ukraine?” asks the Russian MP Andrei Gouroulev (link in Russian)reserve lieutenant general. “We already have all kinds of non-nuclear weapons to succeed and win there”. Without forgetting “that our people must live in Ukraine”he adds, referring to the material consequences of such a strike.
The potential military benefits are indeed limited. “The density of troops is very low in Ukraine, especially compared to the Second World Waremphasizes Stéphane Audrand, and I also have serious doubts about the Russian army’s ability to operate in a radiological zone.” Another hypothesis: a show of force as an ultimatum, writes the Union of Concerned Scientists (in English), a group of independent scientists. By detonating a nuclear weapon over the Black Sea, for example, if Ukrainian forces approach Crimea.
“To be effective, several ‘tactical’ strikes would have to be used, because the Ukrainian terrain is large. But anyway, any use would have strategic ends.”
Jean-Louis Lozier, Advisor to Ifriat franceinfo
Such armaments, moreover, could certainly destroy modern infrastructures, such as bridges or thermal power stations. But at what cost ? Such initiatives would break the “taboo” in force since 1945 and place Russia on the ban of nations. “I am not convinced that China would welcome the end of the nuclear taboo”adds Jean-Louis Lozier.
Unless, perhaps, other less rational factors are taken into account. “The use of nuclear weapons does not pose any practical, moral or strategic problem for Putin, on the contrary”supports in Le Figaro Julien Théron, co-author of Putin, the strategy of disorder. “Unlike Westerners, the Russians have retained the doctrinal approach [de la guerre froide]“abounds Stéphane Audrand. “Tactical nuclear weapons can help redress the situation in a theater of war.”
In question in particular, article 19 of the ukase on nuclear deterrence (PDF in Russian)dated 2020, which provides for the possibility of using these weapons in the following cases: data “reliable” on a ballistic missile attacking Russia or its allies; use of nuclear weapons by an adversary; attack on critical sites, threatening the possibility of a Russian nuclear response; aggression with conventional weapons threatening the existence of the state.
“Russia has the right to use nuclear weapons if necessary. In predetermined cases. In strict accordance with the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence policy.”
Dmitry Medvedev, former President of Russiaon his Telegram account
This last point, with its ambiguous formulation, has sparked debate among researchers. “It should (…) be noted that ‘the existence of Russia’ could have a fairly broad definition of Vladimir Putin’s point of view”underlines the political scientist Bruno Tertrais, in an article published by The Great Continent. “Additionally, some Western statements may have added to Moscow’s nervousness.” At this stage, however, nothing “does not seem to be able to justify the intentional use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine or, a fortiori, against NATO”says the Geneva Center for Security Policy (in English).
Washington, for its part, says it takes these threats seriously. Without observing, however, any element in this direction. “We have seen no reason to adjust our own nuclear posture at this time”a White House spokesman said on Sunday, quoted by the New York Times (in English). Already in May, the CIA had observed no “concrete evidence suggesting that Russia was planning the deployment or even the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons”in the words of its director William Burns, quoted by the FinancialTimes (in English).
“We are entering a phase of uncertainty, even if the probability of employment is very low.”
Stéphane Audrand, adviser specializing in armamentsat franceinfo
Shortly after the start of the war, Vladimir Putin had already “put on alert” the nuclear deterrent. Without this resulting in military movements. “The grammar of strategic dialogue worked”summarizes Stéphane Audrand, and at this stage, “there was no real break in the nuclear taboo”.
Vladimir Putin’s warning seems addressed primarily to kyiv, which is continuing its counter-offensive around Lyman. The Kremlin also repeated on Tuesday that the pseudo-referendums will have consequences for the security of the annexed regions. “Will the Ukrainians accept this aggressive sanctuarization by nuclear power”, asks Stéphane Audrand, where will they continue their efforts in the Donbass? Response after the announcement of the annexations, the results being a foregone conclusion.