Russian Disinformation Campaigns Aim at Federal Election Parties

Concerns are rising over potential foreign interference in upcoming federal elections, particularly from Russia, through a disinformation campaign known as the Russian Doppelgänger campaign. Fake accounts on social media promote Kremlin narratives, targeting various political parties while generating millions of views. The campaign highlights economic fears and critiques German leaders, with an emphasis on undermining the credibility of the CDU and SPD. Federal officials are pushing for stricter regulations to combat this interference ahead of the elections.

Foreign Interference in Federal Elections

Numerous officials are raising alarms about the potential for foreign interference in upcoming federal elections, with particular concern regarding actions from Russia. The ongoing Russian Doppelgänger campaign is gaining traction and inciting sentiments against various political parties.

Understanding the Russian Doppelgänger Campaign

One notable post on platform X features Alice Weidel, the leading candidate of the AfD, accompanied by a message that states, “The constant confrontation with Russia only harms us. It is time for a change in politics. ADG shows the way.” At first glance, this may seem ambiguous, but a deeper dive reveals that ADG is the Russian acronym for the Alternative for Germany (AfD), translating to ‘Alternativa Dlja Germanii’. An analysis by CeMAS, the Center for Monitoring, Analysis, and Strategy, suggests that this post is part of a broader Russian disinformation effort.

This post exemplifies the Russian Doppelgänger campaign, where fabricated accounts promote the Kremlin’s narratives under the guise of genuine user engagement. The Foreign Office has identified over 50,000 fake accounts on X, which collectively generated more than a million tweets in German language as of early 2024.

Within just one month, CeMAS documented 630 German-language posts associated with this Russian disinformation strategy from December 17, 2024, to January 14, 2025, amassing over 2.8 million views across the platform.

These Russian-controlled accounts disseminate content aligning with Kremlin interests, often accompanied by images or links to fabricated news sites that mimic reputable media outlets. These articles perpetuate pro-Russian narratives, particularly concerning the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

Many of these deceptive sites can be traced back to a Russian company, which has been publishing content on behalf of the Russian government.

Despite some initial progress in combatting this issue, it remains far from resolved.

According to Lea Frühwirth, a Senior Researcher for Disinformation at CeMAS, the posts from the Doppelgänger campaign are relatively straightforward for researchers to identify. They exhibit unconventional interaction patterns, showing high sharing rates despite receiving fewer likes and comments. “The metrics do not align. If a post is shared as frequently as those from the Doppelgänger campaign, it typically garners more likes and comments,” Frühwirth explains.

Additionally, these accounts generally have few followers and often contain only a single post, with posting times indicating significant coordination.

Content from these posts often echoes themes identified in previous studies, stirring fears and concerns about Germany’s economic state, including energy supply issues, while questioning support for Ukraine. For instance, one post reads: “Our own economic problems are not diminishing due to the ongoing support for Ukraine. We must also think of ourselves,” echoing sentiments of job insecurity.

Among the Bundestag parties, the Greens frequently receive negative mentions, held accountable for economic struggles, while Chancellor Olaf Scholz of the SPD faces criticism primarily regarding aid to Ukraine. Notably, the CDU and its candidate Friedrich Merz are increasingly portrayed negatively, contrasting previous investigations where they were less frequently highlighted.

Frühwirth observes, “Posts create the impression that the CDU lacks credibility.” One post states: “I do not trust the CDU. They watched for too long as our borders became porous. Now making election promises is too late.” Another asserts: “Friedrich Merz and the CDU will break their promises as soon as the election is over.”

While the AfD is not often mentioned, it is generally depicted in a positive light compared to its rivals.

Despite the federal election being only indirectly referenced in a small number of posts, Frühwirth emphasizes that many of their themes are relevant to the election landscape. “I believe these contents still hold significance for the election and can be utilized to influence public perception. They address topics that resonate with people and are associated, both positively and negatively, with specific parties.”

Furthermore, the prolonged nature of the Doppelgänger campaign has allowed for the consistent spread of pro-Russian narratives. “A constant drip wears away the stone,” Frühwirth states. The impact of disinformation does not always need to be drastic; it can merely sow seeds of doubt among the electorate.

Frühwirth stresses the importance of social networks like X taking decisive action against such campaigns. Although the platform has removed numerous accounts, this often occurs after significant delays, allowing these accounts ample time to disseminate harmful content.

In response to these challenges, Federal Interior Minister Nancy Faeser (SPD) has expressed her intention to engage with managers of all significant online platforms, stating, “The clear message will be: Everyone must adhere to laws and regulations.” The focus is on preventing unlawful interference in the federal election, particularly through Russian propaganda and disinformation.

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