Posted at 2:00 p.m.
In his most recent letter published in the Debates section1my colleague Martin Boyer wonders whether Quebec’s response to climate change is sufficient or not in view of Quebec’s low impact on the planet’s total emissions.
Although his observation concerning the minimal impact of Quebec’s greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction efforts on the global environmental impact is implacable, Professor Boyer shows intellectual shortcut by evoking Quebec’s relative poverty, demonstrates his ignorance of international relations when he talks about carbon pricing, and maintains a retrograde myth when he talks about the negative impact of environmental regulations on the competitiveness of states to explain why we should not do more on climate.
A not-so-poor Quebec
One of the arguments raised by Professor Boyer is the poverty of Quebec. According to the latter, “Quebec is poor; if Quebec were an American state, only the GDP per capita of Mississippi would be lower”. We are certainly less wealthy than many countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). However, to say that we are poor in Quebec is precisely to forget that we are part of the OECD countries. To say that we are poor in Quebec is to forget that the average income of a Quebecer is higher than that of more than 80% of the world’s population.
In relation to climate change, the rich-poor dichotomy is not only wrong, it is also misleading and counterproductive.
It is fallacious in the sense that it is the poor, the real ones, who will be the most affected by global warming while it is the rich, including us, who emit the most GHGs per capita. It is counterproductive insofar as GHG emissions not only have an impact on global warming, they also have an impact on air quality and, by extension, our health and life expectancy. Reducing our emissions is therefore not only a question of fighting global warming, it is also a question of improving our immediate environment.
A not-so-simple facility in international relations
A second argument raised by my colleague is that it is ridiculous for Quebec to adopt its own plan since a tonne of GHGs is a tonne of GHGs, regardless of its source. A policy for Quebec is the equivalent of “a toll on the Jacques-Cartier bridge, between 1 a.m. and 4 a.m., to reduce traffic congestion: it will have no impact”. He adds: “It would be so easy to create a global system of GHG emission rights…provided that this cost is the same for everyone on the planet, without exception, like for oil and gold. »
Why not a single pricing system? Because in terms of international relations, the negotiation and ratification of an agreement that has the support of all States is a perilous exercise that requires patience, compromise, diplomacy and above all time. A lot of time.
On this point, Professor Boyer demonstrates his ignorance of the complexity of international relations, and especially his ignorance of the history of climate negotiations.
Regarding the complexity of international relations, the establishment of an international agreement is based on the goodwill of States to adhere to, and then to comply with, this agreement. For an agreement to become effective, the States must first agree on a text deemed acceptable by all of the potential signatories. And once an agreement has been reached, this text must then be ratified by the signatory States. Thus, in this two-level political game, one can agree on a text, but never ratify it. Let us think of the Kyoto protocol (1997), duly signed by the United States, but never ratified by the latter. This creates a situation where everyone’s interests take precedence unless there is an alignment acceptable to all, and the very notion of acceptability can vary over time, according to moods and changes in government.
Regarding the history of climate negotiations, my colleague mentions the inequity of giving a free pass or a tariff that varies from one country to another. The problem lies in the fact that much of the wealth created by developed countries has been achieved precisely by taking advantage of fossil fuels. However, the emissions are cumulative and in this respect, the debt of the rich countries is enormous. How do you ask poor countries to price carbon when rich countries are not ready to do it themselves? This debate has existed for a good thirty years, since the very first international discussions for concerted action on the climate.
It took more than fifteen rounds of negotiations to reach a climate agreement with even a little ambition (Paris). All this for a problem that has been known for fifty years and that most stakeholders agree to qualify as important, even urgent. If international relations were simple, there would be no war in Ukraine.
Based on this observation, we can only control what is on our territory. And when it comes to global warming, any reduction counts, regardless of its origin. Expecting one-size-fits-all pricing is wishful thinking.
The myth of competitiveness
Finally, on the issue of impoverishment in connection with GHG reduction measures, one cannot imagine a more retrograde perspective. The reality is that by forcing companies to pay for their emissions, we create an incentive for them to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels. They are forced to innovate, to review their processes, and even to develop new solutions. In addition to opening the door to lower operating costs, it can even open up new markets, or even charge a premium for their products. What is seen today as a constraint could therefore become a source of advantage for companies, which will be able to adapt when other States adopt restrictive measures concerning GHG emissions since they will have a head start compared to competitors without these constraints.
Market forces are already in place to decarbonize our economies. A growing number of companies are committing to a process of massive reduction of their GHGs (Apple, Microsoft, etc.). This involves establishing strict criteria for their suppliers that go beyond the standards in force. In the absence of a federal carbon pricing system, US states such as California have taken it upon themselves to set up their own system and are fully committed to adopting strict environmental standards. Some States, such as the member countries of the European Union, see further and even mention the adoption of border adjustment measures to compensate for emissions produced outside their territory, but affecting goods and products sold there. this.
If my colleague’s observation on the minimal impact of GHG reductions on a planetary scale is implacable, he is completely wrong with regard to the impoverishment of Quebec. In the current context, not being ambitious in our objectives amounts precisely to impoverishment.