In the tenth month of a slow, relentless, inhuman and dangerous Russian-Ukrainian war, while listening to the Christmas greetings of Volodymyr Zelensky, their resistant president, Ukrainians can still vibrate with legitimate pride and say to themselves, like him: even in total darkness, we will find each other to hold each other tightly. And if there is no heat, we will hug each other tightly to keep warm. We will not expect miracles. We will create it ourselves!
Like Zelensky, we will not expect miracles from the Russian aggressor. We sincerely wish, however, the conversion of the hearts of millennial, eternal Russia, and we will remember with emotion the tears shed by Pope Francis, last December 8, during the prayer to the Immaculate Conception, in thought of the little children so hard hit by the devastating effects of the ongoing Ukrainian conflict, igniting the heart of geographical Europe.
How then can we stop such an unleashing of ethnopolitical passions, such a destructive madness, and promote, on the contrary, reconciliation and lasting peace between historic Russia, its authoritarian fellow travelers, and independent, martyred Ukraine, and its democratic allies? ?
As historians and political scientists, we know from experience that on the diplomatic level, peace remains indeed possible, despite the passage of time, the dead, the wounded, the violence of all kinds, the war crimes and the genocidal atrocities. ; it is a question of implementing it in a decided, strong, judicious and pertinent manner. Here, it is the settlement of the wars between the successor states of the former Yugoslavia and, in particular, the Dayton Accords (Ohio, United States) of 1995 that will serve as our guide towards this strategic goal.
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (also known as the Dayton Agreement or the Dayton Accords) was the peace accord reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton , November 21, 1995, and officially signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. These agreements put an end to the war in Bosnia (1992-1995); this took place in the context of the wars between the successor states of the former Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats, Bosnians). The warring parties thus arrived at a negotiated peace and the creation of a single sovereign state, Bosnia and Herzegovina, composed of two parts, the Republika Srpska, largely populated by Serbs, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, mainly populated by Croats and Bosnians.
Even if the Dayton Accords allowed the creation of an internal border in Bosnia and Herzegovina by legitimizing the existence of the Serbian Republic, they did not however allow the external borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be modified.
In other words, the fundamental rule of international law which states that the international community (the United Nations and other international organizations) does not accept the acquisition and annexation by force of territories of a State to another was fully respected by the Dayton Accords. This remains the main value of this peace treaty.
By reaffirming the centrality of the norm of international law uti possidetis juris (Latin expression derived from Roman law which means “according to your possession”), which has been adopted for the delimitation of the external borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, the signatories of the Dayton agreements have confirmed that this standard is and remains the fundamental pillar on which rest peace and international order.
Challenging the norm uti possidetis juriswhat the Serbs wanted to do by seeking to change the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia by force, meant introducing anarchy into the international system and risked causing a regression similar to the one that occurred in the 1930s, when the fascist powers in Europe and Japan in Asia carved out new empires at the expense of existing states.
In Dayton, Richard Holbrooke and American diplomacy limited themselves to ratifying a ceasefire that the belligerents had previously concluded and which put an end to the fighting.
We have said it and we will repeat it tirelessly: it is only the change in the balance of power against it on the battlefield that will oblige Russia to negotiate in good faith so that peace returns to Ukraine.
Because we must not delude ourselves: according to the Institute for the Study of War, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, would not have proposed to negotiate with Ukraine on December 25, contrary to certain information. During a television interview, Mr Putin did not explicitly state that Russia was ready to negotiate directly with Ukraine, but rather maintained his version of the conflict that Ukraine had violated the diplomatic efforts made by Russia before the invasion.
Putin’s discussions of negotiations have focused on putative talks with the West rather than Ukraine. The Russian president also said he believes Russia is “operating in the correct direction”, indicating that he has not set serious conditions for the negotiations and that he still wants to pursue his maximalist goals.
In the event (for the moment remote) of a future peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine, contrary to what the President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, told us, it is therefore not First, Russia, an expansionist aggressor state, which should receive the famous security guarantees; it is much more the attacked country, Ukraine, which will need guarantees from the West in order not to suffer an aggravated repetition of Russian aggression in the near future.