The author was political advisor to the Minister of International Trade in the Harper government from 2011 to 2015. He is now a consultant and lecturer at several universities on trade and international affairs.
A new strategy for the Indo-Pacific region is being developed in Canadian pharmacies. An advisory committee to make recommendations was formed in June. Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, once asked, “If I want to talk to Europe, who do I call? The joke could be transposed today to the Indo-Pacific region. Who to contact to agree on a unified foreign and defense policy to stand up to China?
To illustrate the rank occupied by Canada in this dialogue of nations, it would be necessary to rephrase Kissinger’s question squarely in the negative. To discuss the Indo-Pacific, no need to call Canada, right?
The alliances and the diplomatic game that take place within multilateral forums on the Indo-Pacific are currently being made without Canada. The Prime Minister’s mandarins for Asia, Dominic Barton among others, will put down their future strategy on paper, promise mountains and wonders, how can they hope to be heard if Canada is not even invited to the conversations?
Three major initiatives
President Biden was in Asia in May to announce a new initiative there. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) brings together 13 partners. Canada is absent. There was no room for a fourteenth seat, not even a folding seat, for the one who nevertheless presents himself as the dean of the G7.
This last example illustrates the extent to which Canada is no longer considered a Pacific nation, despite its geographical position. It is also necessary to underline the absence of Canada within the QUAD, the forum of quadrilateral dialogue for the security, which gathers the United States, India, Japan and Australia.
It is also excluded from an Indo-Pacific security alliance called “AUKUS”, signed in September 2021 by Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, to strengthen technology sharing, military cooperation and the supply of nuclear-powered submarines. The objective of the alliance is clear: to support Australia with a new defense pact to counter China’s expansion in the Pacific.
Small consolation, Canada is still part of the Five Eyes Group: the intelligence alliance with Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
However, it is legitimate to question the need for a new alliance, ie a reinforced security pact with the AUKUS, instead of favoring a strengthening of the Group of Five. Canada also needs to renew its submarines, bought used in 1999, and constantly being repaired. This would have been a valid argument to justify an association with the AUKUS, in addition to being a partner of NORAD.
Canada’s inability to invite itself to the table of the three major initiatives, namely IPEF, QUAD, and AUKUS, is striking. The problem is not only being ignored by the United States, but also that other countries in the region are not seeking our participation more.
Missed opportunities
How come Australia and Japan don’t even consider Canada’s usefulness anymore? It is no longer a bilateral issue with the United States: it is becoming a multilateral reality. This deficiency on the front of privileged relations in the Indo-Pacific is above all a diplomatic failure.
I participated in Canada’s efforts in 2012 to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Admittedly, President Biden’s IPEF is not a free trade agreement like the TPP, but the tactics of entry are the same: you have to assert your contribution and your relevance on the chessboard.
A colossal amount of work was then done by Canada vis-à-vis all the member countries, including Australia, in order to justify its presence there. It was also under the Harper government that an ambassador was appointed to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In 2013, it was Japan that requested Canada’s support to support its own application to join the TPP. Canada was already tied to Japan in the negotiation of a bilateral agreement before its entry into the TPP.
Australia banned Huawei in 2018 and canceled deals on China’s New Silk Road. Since then, Canberra has drawn the wrath of Beijing and paid a high price in terms of economic sanctions and military intimidation. This explains its position as the privileged interlocutor of the Americans.
Conversely, the Trudeau government was the latest to ban Huawei this spring after years of dithering. To this must be added seven years lost before confirming the purchase of the F-35 aircraft. It does not make a very strong balance sheet when you hesitate so long to say no to Huawei and use a fleet of 30-year-old aircraft. Even Australia was unimpressed despite Canada purchasing its old stockpile of used F-18s in 2017.
The Trudeau government continues to refuse to withdraw from the Beijing regime-controlled Asian Investment Bank. This would have been a strong argument with the Americans and the Japanese, these two countries having refused to finance the Chinese bank. It would also have been an opportunity to show off to them, in addition to standing out from the United Kingdom, which also funds it.
Canada had however succeeded in an important diplomatic action, in February 2021, when it received the support of more than 50 countries in a coalition to denounce the arbitrary detention of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in China.
After failing to secure a seat on the UN Security Council in 2020, the Trudeau government cannot further neglect its military contributions or continue to postpone national security decisions indefinitely if it is to regain a credible foreign policy. Five foreign ministers in six years, that hardly impresses. We should not be surprised today if the telephone stops ringing as it is currently happening in the Indo-Pacific.