With the eyes of the world rightly locked on Ukraine, the next chapter of the war may well be determined in Minsk rather than kyiv or Moscow. With its approximately 10 million inhabitants, Belarus is a small state, certainly, but whose geostrategic importance for Russia and its internal vulnerabilities, however crucial, seem forgotten in Western media and political discourse.
Let’s not forget that the hosting of Russian military bases and the launching of missiles from Belarusian territory confer a third front and major logistical and geographical advantages which, without this complicity from Minsk, would have considerably slowed down the advance of the Russian army. to Kyiv.
If the West claims to punish those responsible for the invasion, then shouldn’t the regime of Alexander Lukashenko be punished just as severely as Russia? Should the belligerent declarations of a regime that calls itself neutral go unpunished while its leader continues to support Putin’s adventurism unconditionally and to promise to mobilize his troops if necessary?
The West also seems to forget that sanctions regimes, their favored diplomatic weapon, would be much more effective against Belarus than against Russia. Short of a moral condemnation for flagrant violation of international law, the likelihood that the current sanctions will result in a downturn in the Kremlin’s foreign policy remains highly uncertain. However, Belarus is proving to be a much more fragile country due to its political and economic integration with Russia and its own national constraints.
If the West wanted to bring about major transformations in Russia, it is rather in Minsk that the first expected effects of the sanctions should theoretically be felt. Indeed, in addition to its trade dependence on Russia, Belarus is already facing considerable sanctions on its exports and its political class due to its suppression of the movement against the controversial re-election of Lukashenko in 2020.
It should also be remembered that he was recently sanctioned for having hijacked the plane of a political opponent and fabricated a migration crisis at the Polish border. Analysts then claimed that the regime’s survival was almost entirely attributable to the unwavering support of Moscow and the loyalty of the high circles of power. The consequences of this political rescue cannot be more evident than in today’s Belarus with the permanent presence of Russian troops and a symbolic sovereignty in the pay of the Kremlin.
Civil society opposed to war
Besides these sanctions, why would Belarus, which is historically more repressive than Putin’s Russia, then be more vulnerable? From the social movement of 2020, Belarus has indicators of fragility that Russia does not present at the moment: a mobilized civil society opposed to the war, a strongly unpopular president, an organized opposition in exile, as well as an army unmotivated and ill-equipped. Many battalions of Belarusian fighters, proudly displaying the republican flag of the opposition, are also present on Ukrainian soil in support of the Zelensky government.
Considering the recent rumors of Belarusian intervention in Ukraine, everything seems to indicate that the country’s leadership is currently reluctant to intervene militarily because of the risk of internal resistance, both from civil society and from young soldiers reluctant to to defend the unique interests of Moscow. Lukashenko’s contradictory statements testify to the tightrope on which he maneuvers: either he risks rekindling a pro-democracy movement and weakening his own regime by intervening militarily, or he risks stirring up the impatience of Moscow, which can replace him at any time.
These considerations support the idea that a coup or revolution is currently a much more real possibility in Belarus than in Russia. The politico-economic weaknesses to be expected from Moscow and its mired in Ukraine would considerably limit Russia’s ability to simultaneously pursue its Ukrainian campaign and its Belarusian occupation in the event of such a scenario.
Although it is difficult to assess with certainty what is going on behind the scenes, wouldn’t the West have an interest in taking advantage of this weak link while Russia is placed in front of its own setbacks? In the current circumstances, Russia does not have the luxury of losing the geostrategic advantage offered by Belarus, on the doorstep of Poland and the Baltic States.
If the West had shown itself sympathetic to the political demands of the Belarusian opposition during the spontaneous movement of 2020, it now seems to be losing sight of this struggle, the politico-military ramifications of which are intrinsically linked to the Ukrainian conflict. To forget the Belarusian factor is to omit a critical dimension from the analysis of this invasion.