The author is a historian, sociologist, writer, teacher at the University of Quebec at Chicoutimi in the history, sociology, anthropology, political science and international cooperation programs and holder of the Canada Research Chair on collective imaginations.
I am not the first to address this question, which has been at the heart of the debate on the Quiet Revolution. Several intellectuals of the 1950s and 1960s painted a very gloomy picture of the French-Canadian past: a docile population, a little folkloric, resistant to change, indifferent to democracy, submissive to power, turned towards the past and tradition. This picture was not entirely false, but the empirical research that would have helped to disentangle fiction and reality was largely lacking.
From the 1970s-1980s, a counter-thesis that largely revoked the old portrait took shape. Some representatives of the new current were content with rapid writings which formulated criticisms or hypotheses without proof. Other works offered rigorous empirical analyses, but their results did not penetrate much into the imagination of the general public.
An ambiguous portrait of “traditional” society
The severe criticism of French-Canadian society (pre-1960) was nourished by certain well-founded arguments. It showed a colonized society which, after the failure of the rebellions, did not fight very hard to free itself. It targeted the conservatism of the elites, the censorship and authoritarianism of the Church and, except among minority minds, a reluctance, if not an opposition to modernity. It also offered examples of the lag that this society had (generally behind English Canada) in terms of literacy, community facilities (for example, public libraries) and health (notably infant mortality).
But by going further—in fact, too far—she chastised working-class circles that she considered bent and withdrawn, bogged down in medieval traditions, on their knees before the clerics and rather content with their lot. Specialists depicted a homely rural society, closed in on itself, fearful of foreigners, captive to subsistence agriculture, fairly close even to tribal communities (“ folk societies “).
Likewise, there was talk of devout mothers flourishing in the many maternity wards, of well-behaved workers submissive to their boss, as well as a mentality too inclined to spirituality, hostile to the practice of business.
All this made up a stereotype which, propagated by literature, the media, school textbooks, foreign intellectuals, has had a hard life. It is not surprising that it inspired some Quebecers with embarrassment or even what has been called a “shameful memory”. But is this vision of our past faithful to reality?
What the scientific research says
I will limit myself here to commenting on the stereotype attached to popular circles, in the city as well as in the countryside.
Well-behaved workers? Solid studies have shown employees who are very concerned about their interests, critical of the employer relationship and frequently engaged in very tough conflicts. They also showed the difficult destiny of Catholic trade unionism, considered too complacent.
Homebody populations? Rural people, like city dwellers, demonstrated great mobility according to the needs of families. The most eloquent signs are the intense rural exodus towards the cities of Quebec and the current of emigration which led nearly a million of “ours” towards the United States between 1830 and 1930.
Hostility towards foreigners? Let us avoid confusing the widespread xenophobia and anti-Semitism among the elites with the often good-natured welcome that families reserved for visitors or immigrants.
A mentality resistant to business? In most regions of Quebec, we saw inventive and daring individuals, often from modest backgrounds, sometimes farmers, go into business and demonstrate a lively entrepreneurial spirit.
Indifference to democracy? This ignores the immense interest aroused by local politics and the fever that seized the population on the occasion of the elections. Once again, it was the most conservative elites and especially the higher clergy who feared popular suffrage.
On the other hand, to free themselves from Anglophone colonialism, the people had few means. He would have needed the help of the elites. He did not come.
The authoritarianism of the Church, the reaction of the faithful
Other features are inseparable from a power relationship that most of the time involves the Church. Illiteracy was mainly an effect of the policy of the higher clergy, enemies of compulsory education. The very high fertility was partly (I say well: partly) the fact of the constant threats (deprivation of the sacraments, excommunication, condemnation to hell) that the priests made weigh on the mothers. They nevertheless resorted to all kinds of forbidden means (often of their invention) and not very effective to limit births.
Injunctions aimed at imposing electoral choices on the faithful were regularly ignored, as was the pressing invitation to support the conscription of 1918 and the intense ruralist propaganda until the middle of the 20th century.e century. The clerics worked to purify popular (“vulgar”) culture, to eradicate so-called superstitious beliefs, bad customs, indecent clothing, disastrous leisure activities (dance, cinema, circus, etc.). In vain.
Conversely, citizen projects of free schools, “neutral” public libraries and secular charitable associations were often repressed.
A resistant population
Quebec historical studies on the action of the Church, on popular culture, mentalities and many other collective realities rarely bring in the dimension of power. The analysis is thereby impoverished and biased. We would need many monographs conducted in this spirit. A more accurate view of our ancestors would emerge.
Beyond the policies of the Church, it is necessary to take into account the strong resistance that was opposed to them. Here as elsewhere, let us beware of what the dominant voices say. One discourse can hide another.
Finally, if a “shameful memory” must be attached to our past, it has little to do with popular behavior, and a lot with the excesses of the authorities who have sometimes given in to what has already been called in France “a Catholicism without Christianity”.