Every Tuesday, The duty offers a space to the artisans of a periodical. This week, we offer you an abridged version of a text to appear in the journal Bulletin d’histoire politique, 2023, volume 30, no 3.
For some time now, in the media and in certain polemical works, there has been frequent use of the notion of “moral panic”. Presented as a “scientific” notion, it has notably been invoked against people who denounce censorship and cancellations in the academic and cultural world. However, it is surprising to note that its inventor, the sociologist of deviance Stanley Cohen, was rather aware of proposing not a “scientific” notion but a normative notion useful for the purposes of what he called his own ” cultural politics “.
In an enlightening autobiographical text, bearing the significant title Whose side were we on? The undeclared politics of moral panic theoryhe clearly affirmed that there are “good” and “bad” moral panics and that the proponents of his notion study above all the “bad moral panics”, that is to say those which they do not like. not, and must take sides in this normative struggle by placing themselves on the side of those they consider to be “dominated”, in one form or another.
Cohen was, however, reflective enough to admit that it is easier for sociologists of moral panics to identify with moral entrepreneurs who are close to them in terms of “social class, education and ideology”. Its notion having become fashionable, it is worth questioning more closely its rather vague epistemic status which contributes to its uncontrolled and increasingly empty use because, as Aristotle already said, a notion that applies to everything is empty of content.
Let us first note that the choice of the term “panic” evokes a strong and sudden reaction, tending towards the irrational; it therefore has a distinctly negative connotation. This choice alone ensures that its use can only be controversial and only function as an insult. Because who can say that he is happy to panic? The central idea that gives meaning to this notion is indeed that of the suddenness of the reaction. As there are several types of panics, it remains to be clarified the meaning that Cohen gives to “morality”.
Although central to his work on the question (Folk Devils and Moral Panics. The Creation of Mods and Rockers), Cohen elaborates very little and seems to take the term for granted, contenting himself with saying that moral panic threatens the “values and interests of society”. But the vagueness immediately appears with the addition of the notion of interests which does not come under the moral register in the usual sense of the term. More interestingly, Cohen places little emphasis on the temporal variable, namely the necessary suddenness associated with any non-metaphorical panic.
This mix between “values” and “interests”, the joint use of two symbolically strong words and, finally, the vagueness surrounding the temporality of actions have, in our opinion, strongly contributed to the popularity of this notion and especially to its extension. abusive to any unpleasant situation for someone who can then say that his adversaries are panicking. A recent text signed by a doctoral student in sociology even announced to us “A moral panic called ‘tipping'” (The dutyAugust 4, 2022)!
Unsurprisingly, the analyst identified as responsible for this alleged panic the “conservative columnists”, as if the simple fact of asking the question of the legitimacy of certain tips led to ipso facto conviction. Above all, we can deplore that instead of explaining phenomena, sociologists prefer to play moralists and pronounce judgments.
Who panics?
However, if we stick to a precise definition of moral panic, we arrive curiously at the conclusion that the panics observed in the university world for a few years have all been the result of a few students who have launched alerts, immediately followed by university directors who reacted (in a few hours or a few days) with press releases or even suspensions. These reactions correspond perfectly to the notion of moral panic. As for the reactions of most academics, they were mainly posed and argued and stretched over several months and even years, a temporality incompatible with the polemical notion of “panic” but specific to reflective thought.
In fact, another notion analyzed by Cohen and curiously ignored by aficionados of “moral panic” seems to us more useful for understanding the controversy over censorship in academia: that of denial (States of Denial. Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering). Cohen was indeed aware that while there are indeed moral panics, there are also strategies of denial. He identifies three kinds: literal denial (nothing happened), interpretive denial (something happened but it’s not what you believe) and implication denial (what happened is not not bad and doesn’t have the consequences you think).
These notions seem to us to be perfectly suited to explain why some people seem incapable of admitting a reality that is however obvious, that only an extreme form of willful blindness and denial can explain.
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