Yevgueni Prigojine’s abortive coup did not only result in losers: Alexander Lukashenko, President of Belarus since 1994, is emerging as one of the great beneficiaries of this crisis. The press conference he gave on June 27 reflects the new role he intends to play on the European political scene: a supporter of Vladimir Putin, a mediator between Russian decision-making circles, a protector for the rebels and, therefore, , a potential negotiator between Russia and its neighbors. But he’s not the only winner of this road movie policy.
Resurrection of a political zombie
The press conference held by Alexander Lukashenko on Tuesday evening devoted the political resurrection of the Belarusian president. Since 2020, he had been in a weak position vis-à-vis Russia and its president.
After rigging the presidential elections in August, after repressing the opposition for months and after suffering sanctions from the European Union, he had to give up his job as mediator. The Belarusian president could no longer take advantage of the role of intermediary he had played in 2014 to seal the Minsk agreements between Russia, Ukraine and the Europeans.
Since 2020, he had clearly been obligated and protected by the Russian president: hit by European embargoes, the Belarusian economy had become even more dependent on trade with Russia; Politically isolated in Europe, the Belarusian leader survived internationally only through his regular talks with Vladimir Putin; surrounded by his country’s membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union, he was forced to resume the project of union between Russia and Belarus; Cut off from Europeans, it was compromised in the invasion of Ukraine in many ways by its Russian neighbor: presence of troops on its territory, positioning of nuclear weapons in Belarusian sites, etc.
From his personal security to his country’s energy supply and from the survival of his regime to the international positioning of his state, Alexander Lukashenko was entirely dependent on his Russian neighbor. It was a significant break for this former Soviet socialist republic which had tried to position itself as a bridge between the European Union and the Russian Federation.
Thanks to the armed coup launched by the founder and leader of the mercenary company Wagner, Alexander Lukashenko imposed himself (or was imposed) as the one who benefited from the crisis and its resolution. In his June 27 press conference, he highlighted his multiple roles: chief adviser to the Russian president to dissuade him from “eliminating” the rebel Prigozhin, mediator between Vladimir Putin and his former protege, statesman capable of avert the risks of civil war in Russia, a tactician capable of regulating the internal clan struggle in Russia.
Clan War Winners
In the entourage of the Russian president too, we can count the winners – perhaps provisional. In the struggle between decision-making circles, the Prigojine clan has failed to stem the strengthening of the two leaders it has openly challenged for months, Defense Minister Sergei Choïgou and Chief of Staff Valéri Guerassimov.
The first had long been given as a potential successor to Vladimir Putin; the second was appointed in January to operational management of operations in Ukraine. Their successes are unmistakable: they will reintegrate Wagner’s mercenaries into the ranks of the regular army and they benefit from the exile of the warlord who defied them, arms in hand. In a word, they no longer have a competitor in the form of the Wagner company.
The Chechen President, Ramzan Kadyrov, has also achieved a double success: militarily, he mobilized his “guard” against the Wagner mercenaries and, politically, he presented himself as the chief bodyguard of the Russian president. Finally, former Russian President Dimitri Medvedev (2008-2021) once again distinguished himself in public communication to respond to Prigojine’s Telegram campaign. From chief spokesperson to dolphin, he hopes to take the plunge.
In the struggle between clans, these four figures reinforce their influence (and their pressure) on the Russian presidency, placed in a state of increased dependence on them.
And in the end, it’s Putin who wins?
Vladimir Putin’s media, political and strategic setbacks have been striking since his speech on the morning of June 23. But in Russian political history, the cruelty of the repression is often commensurate with the magnitude of the danger. Peter Ier, Catherine II, Lenin and Stalin have in common to have suffered attempts of armed coups. Each time, they violently repressed them. If the Russian president initiates a wave of internal repression and a new external war effort, he could well, in the long term, invite himself among the winners of the “Prigojine crisis”.