The Multinational Mission for Security Support (MMAS) is operating in Haiti in a context marked by gang control of nearly 80% of the territory of the metropolitan region and the rise of acts of banditry. The State seems to exist only in name with institutions that operate in slow motion according to the pace of gang operations.
As proof, the national palace has been abandoned by the authorities due to armed attacks; some ministries are unable to receive employees fleeing the insecurity; police stations have been abandoned by the police.
Faced with this chaotic situation in Haiti, on October 2, 2023, the United Nations (UN) Security Council authorized the establishment of the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti to assist the national police in security restoration tasks (resolution 2699).
However, it is essential to remember that this is not the first international intervention that Haiti has experienced, the objective of which is to help restore order and peace. Thus, one wonders why, even today, a new international mission is forced to set foot on the national territory.
Indeed, since the early 1990s, the UN has taken up the situation following the various troubles that Haiti has experienced, including the coup d’état against President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991 that plunged the country into an acute crisis, which claimed thousands of lives. Thus, in 1994, it authorized the deployment of a multinational force led by the Americans to restore democracy, which facilitated the return of President Aristide to power.
In 1995, it was replaced by a peacekeeping mission, UNMIH (United Nations Mission in Haiti), whose main objectives were to create a police force and strengthen political institutions. In concrete terms, the latter was able to achieve its objectives to the point that, as early as 1996, its staff was reduced and the UN even decided to set up another smaller mission to replace it, namely UNSMIH (United Nations Support Mission in Haiti), which would itself be followed by other smaller missions, including MITNUH (United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti), MIPONUH (United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti) and MICAH (International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti) until 2000.
However, contrary to what UN officials believed, in the early 2000s, Haiti experienced a serious crisis again, mainly due to irregularities in the electoral process exploited by the Fanmi Lavalas party and other factors such as the collapse of institutions such as the national police, the politicization of justice, and the rise of acts of violence against individuals.
Consequence: Haiti was plunged back into instability, which again prompted a UN intervention in 2004, first by authorizing the deployment of an interim multinational force to pacify the situation on the ground which lasted three months and then by a new peacekeeping operation, namely MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti).
The latter pursued the following objectives: establish a secure and stable environment, politically stabilize the country and strengthen democracy, develop and professionalize the national police. During its operationalization, it allowed Haiti to experience stability again: armed groups were neutralized; the organization of presidential, legislative and municipal elections; operationalization of the national police (staff increased to approximately 14,000 agents).
Following this progress, the UN turned the page on MINUSTAH in 2017 by setting up another smaller mission, MINUJUSTH (United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti) to support the government in matters of justice and the rule of law, which was subsequently replaced, since 2019, by a special political mission, BINUH (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti).
However, a few years after the departure of international forces, Haiti experienced an unprecedented crisis: control of the majority of the territory by armed gangs, assassinated president, absence of elected officials, generalized insecurity.
During the year 2023, the UN counted nearly 4,789 homicides and 2,490 kidnappings in Haiti, according to the Secretary-General’s report released in 2024. This prompted the Security Council to rule on the situation again, to the point of facilitating the deployment of Kenyan troops in Haiti on June 25 through the Multinational Security Support Mission (MMAS).
In this case, if the peace operations that the UN deployed in Haiti had succeeded in establishing lasting peace, a new international mission would not take place. Such a situation leads some observers to question the effectiveness of the UN peace missions in Haiti, because while some countries were able to benefit from their help to end long civil wars, in Haiti, their assistance seems to drag on without political remission.
The problem is that while in the short term the UN missions have produced results in Haiti, in the long term they have all failed, because the peace that has been established has not been sustainable.
However, while the deployment of this new mission is evidence of the failure of previous international interventions in Haiti, it also represents an opportunity for Haiti to turn the page on instability and move towards building lasting peace by adopting policies that can address the structural causes of violence.
Local actors must understand that the UN is limited in its possibilities of action; it is up to them to preserve peace in Haiti. But there is a catch: one of the main obstacles to a lasting resolution of the Haitian crisis is the corrupt elite taking advantage of the institutional weaknesses of the State to enrich themselves at the expense of the real needs of the population.