French soldiers had been present for nine years in Mali. “France and its partners engaged in counter-terrorism missions have taken the decision to withdraw their military presence in Mali”announced Emmanuel Macron, Thursday, February 17, during a press conference at the Elysee Palace.
>> Withdrawal from Mali: what to take away from Emmanuel Macron’s announcements
“Due to the multiple obstructions of the Malian transitional authorities, Canada and the European states operating alongside the operation Barkhane and within the Takuba ‘task force’ believe that the conditions are no longer met to effectively pursue their current military commitment (…) in Mali”, continued France’s allies in the Sahel in a joint statement.
Following this withdrawal, a French presence “from 2,500 to 3,000 men” will remain in the Sahel, according to the spokesman for the French general staff, Colonel Pascal Ianni, and this will be divided between Chad, Niger and Burkina Faso. France will also rely on forces prepositioned in Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon.
How to understand this decision? What could be the consequences of this withdrawal? Franceinfo interviewed Caroline Roussy, researcher at the Institute of International and Strategic Relations (Iris) and specialist in West Africa.
Franceinfo: Why does this announcement of the French withdrawal from Mali come now?
Caroline Roussy: We can clearly see that we were in a situation of political and diplomatic escalation, that there were no longer any channels for discussion. Each pushed the other to its limits. This escalation has gained momentum in recent weeks, with unfriendly exchanges on both sides, and the dismissal of Danish soldiers from Mali. For France, there is an alignment, after this dismissal of the Danish forces, with the European Union.
This redeployment of the Operation Barkhane system was on the agenda, it was announced on June 10 by Emmanuel Macron. A departure from Mali had perhaps not been envisaged, rather a much lighter device, with more visibility for Europeans. Why this announcement now? We are also thinking of the presidential calendar: this file can be invited into the debate.
Government spokesman Gabriel Attal recently explained that a status quo was not “not possible in a very degraded context in Mali”, with the seizure of power by the junta, or even the presence of the private Russian Wagner militia. The conditions on the ground were no longer met for a French presence?
I think it’s a bit more complex than that. The French forces are nevertheless more numerous than the militiamen of Wagner. There were people with whom it had become difficult to discuss, but who also ask for respect, which is audible. France participated in the rise of this verbal escalation.
“Populations feel more and more under occupation, because the device has lasted too long, with qualitative results that are not observable.”
Caroline Roussyat franceinfo
The conditions were no longer met for a partnership. However, on the military level, there has recently been good collaboration between the Malian armed forces and the European and French forces. Which shows this hiatus between the politico-diplomatic and the military.
How to explain the development of anti-French sentiment in the Sahel?
It is, already, badly balanced accounts of colonization. France is unable to get rid of this image of colonization and imperialism. The presence of French forces since 2013 also plays a role. We know the cyclicality of the acceptance of the intervention of a foreign power on sovereign soil – on average, it is three years maximum. Today, we are at nine years of French presence, it becomes inevitably difficult.
Operation Barkhane gave the image of a well-endowed army, with new technologies. Populations do not understand that we cannot put an end to the action of a few thousand jihadists. Jihadists are emulated by young people without opportunities… And Russian disinformation also plays its role.
Can we speak of a setback for France? What assessment can we make of the counter-terrorism operation in Mali since 2013?
The jihadist presence has spread to Burkina Faso, to Niger, it has reached certain countries in the Gulf of Guinea. Time and duration will allow us to better know this assessment of the operation. France, since 2019, has been using drones which have nevertheless made it possible to neutralize leaders of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) or of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Aqmi). This helped to put pressure on these networks.
“There were therefore tactical successes, which could not be transformed into strategic successes.”
Caroline Roussyat franceinfo
From a qualitative point of view, has the French presence improved people’s lives? No, in my opinion. One leader disappears, another appears. And look at the number of internally displaced people, the number of refugees… This also puts pressure on neighboring states. Finally, was the threat properly apprehended? To leave after nine years under these conditions, with all the questions that this withdrawal raises… We cannot say that it is positive.
Nevertheless, we must wait: the French are not driven out of the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea. We will have to see how France, with its Sahelian and European partners, with its West African partners, will now combine their efforts in this new geopolitical sequence which may prove to be delicate.
What could be the consequences of this withdrawal from Mali?
One of the hypotheses is that this leaves the field open to the jihadists. Cooperation seemed quite good between the Malian and French armed forces. It will be necessary to see if the training of the Malian soldiers will be sufficient. The army was very weak in 2012, and today we have figures according to which the number of Malian soldiers has increased three or even four times.
But many say it remains weak. And with the recent sanctions taken by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) [afin de sanctionner la junte au pouvoir], will the Malian State be able to pay its civil servants (in the army in particular)? And until when?
It is also likely to be very complicated for the Malians, because they lack military equipment. French support was particularly important in air terms, with more and more air operations to avoid improvised explosive devices and low-altitude planes aimed at scaring jihadists and signifying a presence.
How do you see the French and European presence in the region evolving after these announcements?
The redeployment of the device is extremely complex, it will require legal agreements. This cannot be declared overnight. A number of negotiations have been successful, particularly with Niger. The European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) and the mUnited Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission for Stabilization in Mali (Minusma) would remain, but many questions remain unanswered. There remains the question of the bases, which will have to be secured during this sequence. They will no longer be operational, how to protect them in this context? We have to wait for details regarding the redeployment of the device.
“The whole difficulty is the anti-French rejection. In countries where the French presence is not necessarily welcome, we will have to find the right balance so as not to find ourselves in the same situation. The populations have also desire for change.”
Caroline Roussyat franceinfo
At European level, all of this must be negotiated country by country, with the States of the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea. It may take time.