Twice a month, The duty challenges enthusiasts of philosophy and the history of ideas to decipher a topical issue based on the theses of a prominent thinker.
We can safely call the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine an unjust war. Although one can understand that Putin’s Russia resents its loss of greatness, the infiltration of NATO into its former satellite countries and the desire of many Ukrainians to join the European Union. One can also understand that the Kremlin wants to support separatist Russian-speaking Ukrainians, but the fact remains that Russia is ruthlessly waging a war of conquest. Once this quick observation has been established, it remains useful to specify in what lies this injustice.
American philosopher Michael Walzer’s reflections on war can help us see things more clearly. Just war theory already has a long tradition dating back to Saint Augustine (354-430), but Walzer offers a unique synthesis of it in his book Just and unjust warspublished in 1977.
As Walzer writes, “War is always judged twice, first by considering the reasons states have for waging war, then by considering the means they adopt.” To these two judgments concerning the entry into the war and its course, we must add a third: once the war is over, does the winner behave fairly towards the loser? Here we take up the three classic notions of the just war doctrine that measure the morality of war: Jus ad bellum (entering the war),juice in bello (during the war) and juice post bellum (post-war). These notions, taken up by Walzer, certainly date back to the Middle Ages, but they still offer an instructive analytical grid.
Jus ad bellum
Could Russia’s aggression be justified by the harm Ukraine was about to cause? Directly, the answer is no. Ukraine was not going to attack Russia. If that had been the case, then Russia could have proceeded with a so-called pre-emptive war, when there is clear evidence that the adversary is about to attack: armed troops gathered at the borders, a “clear intention to cause harm”.
This type of war is recognized by international law. However, if Ukraine armed itself, it was because Russia was threatening. It was she who would have been right to attack first the Russian troops who were assembling on her borders. As for a preventive war (for example, that of the United States against Iraq in 2003), it is not based on tangible evidence. It is therefore not justifiable and it is not recognized by international law.
The indirect damage that Ukraine causes to Putin’s Russia consists in asserting its autonomy and its Western openness. Is that reason enough to declare war on him? The answer is negative. Even if the histories of these two countries are closely linked, there is no justification for declaring war on Ukraine to bring it back into the fold of the Kremlin. If the goal was to maintain strong ties with Ukraine, it was necessary to negotiate.
It goes without saying that no State will admit the illegality of its entry into war. Russia has therefore tried to justify its “special military operation” with the noble aim of protecting the Russian-speaking populations of eastern Ukraine and at the same time “denazifying” this country. Wasn’t Russia responding to a request for help? Didn’t the populations of Crimea and Donbass mainly express themselves in referendums in favor of their independence and their attachment to Russia? There have certainly been referendums, but their validity is questionable. And then, we must not associate any demand for more autonomy of these regions with a desire to be annexed by Russia.
Juice in bello
“Armies at war have the right to attempt to win, but they do not have the right to do all that is necessary, or seems to them to be necessary, to that end. They are subject to a set of restrictions that are partly based on agreements between states, but which are also based on independent moral principles,” writes Walzer. This situation is even possible: entering a war unjustly, but adopting an ethically acceptable behavior during its course. The reverse also applies: being justified in defending oneself, but lacking ethics during the conflict. Thus we were able to read a UN report reporting on the ill-treatment that the Ukrainian army inflicted on Russian prisoners.
However, the war waged by the Kremlin is doubly unjust: both in its end and in its means. It includes so many immoral excesses that we cannot list them all here. Let us highlight a few notable examples. In the small village of Yahidne, Russian soldiers locked up around 350 villagers in the basement of a school for 26 days, without electricity or water. There were 17 dead. Those who tried to escape were shot and their corpses returned to the basement. The Russian army used these inhabitants as human shields. In Boutcha, the corpses of Ukrainian civilians were found in the middle of the street, several summarily executed, with their hands handcuffed. War crimes have been committed: killings, torture, mutilation. Fifty bodies were found in a mass grave. On March 17, 2022, the Mariupol theater, which housed a thousand civilians, was bombed by the Russian army, resulting in hundreds of deaths. The theater housed children, and the word “children” was even written on the floor in Russian in huge letters. What should we also think of these attacks directed against infrastructures serving the population with water and electricity, transport infrastructures, hospitals, a nuclear power plant? These actions fall within the scope of the terrorist attack, which consists in using fear “to destroy the morale of a nation or a class, to undermine its solidarity; the method, the arbitrary killing of innocent victims”.
That a Russian soldier kills a Ukrainian soldier, even if the former happens to defend an unjust cause, cannot make him a war criminal. “The war is not his,” recalls Walzer. This is no longer the case if he kills civilians, prisoners or wounded. Sometimes the situation of “double effect” arises: a goal is aimed (a military target), but it is accompanied by an undesirable effect (death of nearby civilians). The bad effects must be inferior in damage to the good effects sought. Echoing the distinctions established by the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe, Walzer distinguishes between civilians who participate directly in war efforts (they may be killed in munitions factories) and civilians who participate indirectly, for example by supplying food. The latter “do nothing particularly bellicose”. War or not, you always have to eat. These civilians are innocent. Fighting is in the realm of necessity; commit crimes, no.
Another war crime, if not a crime against humanity: it is estimated that 16,000 Ukrainian children were taken to Russia or to territories controlled by them. We would then try to “Russify” them. The pretext is seductive: to put these children to safety. But safe from whom, or what? Safe from a war provoked by the Russian government itself. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has even issued an arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin. After all, he’s the main culprit.
As for the possible use of nuclear weapons mentioned by Putin, Walzer is of the opinion that the fact of “uttering such threats is immoral”. No sane leader would want a nuclear war. “Nuclear weapons shatter just war theory. […] Better still, our familiar notions related to the juice in bello force us to condemn even the threat of using them. Even their use at limited range could only make things worse as their striking force is infinitely more powerful, and their effects on health are deleterious.
post bellum juice
The principles of post bellum juice relate to peace treaties, reparations and, where appropriate, the bringing to justice of war criminals. Since the war between Russia and Ukraine is not over, we can only speak very cautiously about the post-war period.
First, it would be amazing if Russia completely lost this war and was held to account for its crimes. Despite its setbacks in Ukraine, it remains one of the greatest military powers in the world. What authority or what coalition could force it to repair the broken pots? There is only one realistic way to end the war: negotiate. We must avoid a trauma to the Treaty of Versailles, a treaty which was so humiliating for Germany that it led to the Second World War. This agreement should not be seen by the Kremlin as a victory for NATO and the United States. Hoping to send Putin to prison remains an illusion. As for wanting to change the political regime, Walzer invites us to distinguish between the “criminal policy of a government” and the “policy of a criminal government”, the latter being similar, for example, to the Nazi regime, which is not the case of Russia, a Federal Republic. Only the Russian people themselves can decide their future.
War does not mean abandoning all moral judgement. If we think like this, nothing is condemnable and all the means used become acceptable. This is how we lose even more of our already wavering humanity on such unfortunate occasions.
Suggestions ? Write to Robert Dutrisac: [email protected]