The war in Ukraine is upsetting the global diplomatic and strategic chessboard, and forcing states to position themselves. In Asia, Japan, South Korea and Mongolia, three liberal democracies close to Western countries allied against Moscow, however, do not all clearly end up in the same camp. A question of strategic interests more than of values.
Posted yesterday at 1:00 p.m.
Japan’s U-turn
The Russian invasion caused a remarkable reversal of Japan’s position vis-à-vis Moscow. For nearly a decade, the government of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had bet on rapprochement with Vladimir Putin in the hope of recovering four islands that Russia had taken control of following World War II. world. This is why, in 2014, after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Japan was content to impose modest sanctions against the Putin regime, unlike the other members of the G7. Tokyo was afraid of alienating Moscow and seeing its already slim chances of coming to an agreement on these islands, which it calls the Northern Territories and its counterpart, the South Kuril Islands, dwindle. .
At the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the Japanese government, led by new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, abandoned its usual restraint. Not only did he join with Western powers to coordinate sanctions against Moscow, but he also added his unilateral sanctions targeting Russian individuals and organizations.
In late April, Tokyo raised its voice, calling the Russian presence in the Northern Territories “illegal occupation,” highly unusual language.
His activism extends to Southeast Asia. During a diplomatic tour of Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam in late April and early May, Kishida tried to convince his regional partners to abandon their neutrality towards Russia.
Beyond the country’s attachment to liberal values, Japan’s volte-face is explained by geopolitical considerations. In addition to tensions with Russia, Japan is grappling with a territorial dispute in the East China Sea, where Beijing claims sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu by Beijing). For Tokyo, it is therefore imperative to increase the costs imposed on Russia in order to dissuade China from setting in motion its irredentist tendencies.
South Korea in neutral?
The Western powers’ other key ally in the region, South Korea, has been criticized for its timidity since the start of the Russian invasion. Although incumbent President Moon Jae-In announced that the country would comply with European Union and United States sanctions, he initially refused to impose his own sanctions, before changing his mind and restricting some transactions with Russia. He has also been criticized for his half-hearted condemnation of Russian aggression.
The Moon administration cited growing bilateral trade with Russia to explain the difficulty of imposing independent sanctions. This argument does not pass for Western democracies, which cut trade ties with Moscow one by one.
North Korea is an equally important factor in Seoul’s decisions. Russia, which has been turning to Asia for several years, has a growing influence over the Kim Jong-un regime. Inflaming relations with Moscow could thus harm Seoul’s efforts to denuclearize its northern neighbor.
The entry into office of President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol, scheduled for May 10, could change the situation. The former conservative prosecutor promises a tougher foreign policy more aligned with that of the United States, which could make South Korea a more important partner in the fight back against Russia.
Mongolia, extreme tightrope walker
The war in Ukraine is straining the delicate diplomatic balance that Mongolia has been trying to maintain since it emerged from Soviet orbit three decades ago.
A modest democratic power sandwiched between the authoritarian giants of Russia and China, its only two neighbours, Ulaanbaatar has since sought to open up and maintain its independence by cultivating its relations with distant democracies such as the United States, the EU, Japan, South Korea and Canada (which was once the second largest investor in the country, mainly in mining projects). It even cooperates with NATO as a “global partner”. This is the so-called “third neighbor” policy.
However, it is difficult to escape its geography. Especially when its neighbors above and below are closing in, as Russia and China have been doing since late February. The already huge economic and energy dependence of the country of Genghis Khan on Moscow and Beijing is becoming stronger and stronger, especially with the construction on its territory, confirmed on February 28, of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, which should supply 50 billion meters cubic per year of Russian gas to China.
Concretely, maintaining the diplomatic balance between its near and distant “neighbors”, in the most polarized positions, led Mongolia to abstain in the UN vote condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, alongside 33 countries. . Japan recently urged her to condemn Russia, and the response was…diplomatic.
Closer than you think
The war in Ukraine will certainly make the development of Canada’s long-awaited strategy in the Indo-Pacific region more complex. The Trudeau government’s attention has turned to Russia and Europe since February, but the Indo-Pacific region remains the scene of a great game of world powers, in particular with Russia which turns to Asia and approaches China.