International | The indissoluble dilemma of the defense of Europe

Without a real common defense policy and without an autonomous military force, the European Union must bet on NATO to ensure its security, a situation which brings its share of difficulties on the geopolitical level.

Luca Solai
PhD student and lecturer in the departments of history, and world literature and languages, Université de Montréal

At the last NATO summit, US President Joe Biden forcefully reaffirmed that “the alliance is more united than ever”, and declared that member countries are ready to strengthen sanctions. Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, one of the recurring questions has been whether this united front could dissolve into the application of sanctions. European countries are indeed more affected by this than their North American allies.

For now, the front seems to be holding up, surprisingly enough. But this cohesion will not necessarily last indefinitely, because European geopolitical and economic interests are not fully reflected in those of North America.

The European Union and its defense policy

This debate highlights all the contradictions of a common policy of the countries of the European Union (EU), particularly in terms of security.

Since 1992, the EU has dramatically accelerated its integration process. Today, the Union not only shares common values, but also exerts much more real constraints on the member countries. A common market and the possibility for people and goods to circulate freely are associated, for example, with constraints on the states’ power to spend. It is the result of a remarkable process of integration which has been accompanied by a partial cession of national sovereignty by the member countries in favor of the European institutions. It is a course without equal in history.

However, the EU, which adopted a common defense and security policy from the outset, never succeeded in setting up a common and autonomous military force which could guarantee the security of the Member States outside of the NATO umbrella.

The evolution of NATO

This was undoubtedly a mistake, especially since the Atlantic Alliance changed vocation after the Cold War: it is no longer limited to defence; it gradually became an intervention force outside its area of ​​origin. This was perceived by Russia, rightly or wrongly, as a threat to its security.

By delaying its military integration, the EU has thus reduced its capacity for negotiation and deterrence. Being under the NATO umbrella meant that European states regularly reduced their defense investments, relying on the protection of the United States.

This may come as a surprise, given that Europe was counting on the development of a common security policy, taking into account the instability in certain European areas, such as the Balkans, after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Indeed, the change of vocation of NATO results not only from the American choices, but also from the incapacity of the European countries to play a role of mediator in the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia. In the years that followed, all attempts to establish a common defense force either failed (as in 1998, due to UK opposition) or involved a close military association with NATO.

Russia’s fears

We therefore find ourselves faced with an incongruity: an EU Member State like Finland has no guarantee of protection in the event of a military attack, because the EU’s military defense is based on NATO, whose Finland is not included.

The EU’s delay in this file has certainly had an effect on the rising tensions with Russia. Moscow has repeatedly stressed its concern that the EU has made NATO its mainstay of defense. According to the Kremlin, too close relations between the United States and Europe have resulted in the EU conforming too much to Washington’s positions.

To some extent, the debate about the usefulness of a common European armed force has come back to the fore in recent years, especially with the rise of tensions between Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, revived this idea in 2019 without questioning the military links with NATO.

The consequences of war

The current crisis raises a paradox: it reminds us how a real common European defense policy would have been essential, while making it impossible. Because European countries will continue to rely on existing military structures. We can already see this with the recent decisions of Italy and Germany to increase their spending in the military field: the two countries will do so individually and not within a collective European framework.

For Russia too, the situation raises a paradox: if it perceived NATO as a threat on its flanks, and the link between Europe and the United States as dangerous, the decision to go to war with Ukraine will further aggravate this threat. The presence of NATO troops in Eastern Europe will be reinforced and any common EU military defense plans will be postponed. The American presence is likely to last and Washington will thus remain the most influential player in the European landscape.