International | Security in a World Divided by Strategic Competition

“The world does not organize itself,” said Secretary of State Antony Blinken at the start of Joe Biden’s presidency to justify the renewal of American leadership internationally.

Vincent Boucher
PhD candidate in political science at UQAM and researcher in residence at the Observatory on the United States of the Raoul-Dandurand Chair

Recent history, however, shows that it is no longer the actions of the United States on the international scene, but rather the strategic competition between great powers that represents the true structuring principle of today’s world.

The Sino-American rivalry in the Indo-Pacific space and Russia’s territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe, culminating recently with the invasion of Ukraine, are unquestionably the major international security issues of the day. . They will be at the heart of the exchanges of the 7^and edition of our St-Laurent Forum on international security, from May 9 to 13¹.

Biden and the clash with China

Joe Biden is convinced that his country is engaged in “extreme competition” with China in the strategic, diplomatic, commercial and technological fields. This competition is now the guiding star of the entire US national security apparatus. Still, Biden wants to give cooperation with Beijing a chance on transnational issues of common importance, such as climate change, nuclear proliferation and global public health.

But how can you collaborate on such issues when the Democratic president no longer hesitates to portray the rivalry with China as an ideological struggle between two irreconcilable political and economic models, namely liberal democracy and authoritarian capitalism?

The Biden administration claims competition with China is not a new Cold War. Nevertheless, his rhetoric sometimes recalls that of the ideological showdown between Washington and Moscow.

Such remarks may help Biden retain the sympathy of some lawmakers and voters in a country still as polarized as the 2022 midterm elections approach. On the other hand, they contribute to increasing intransigence towards China and exacerbate the risks of escalation between the two nuclear powers.

The Indo-Pacific region: space for strategic competition

It is therefore not surprising to see observers such as the High Representative of the European Union, Josep Borrell, assert that the Indo-Pacific region is “becoming the center of gravity of the world both in geoeconomic and geopolitical terms”.^⁠2.

By building on their partnerships – the Quad – and their alliances, the most recent of which was forged with Australia and the United Kingdom, the United States has so far focused its efforts in this geopolitical space on strategic and diplomatic competition with China. If certain issues polarize the respective partners and allies of Washington and Beijing, such as the status of Taiwan, competition in the economic and commercial fields demonstrates that the logic of the bloc does not apply to the Sino-American rivalry. The consequent level of interdependence that we always observe makes such a zero-sum game unattractive and counterproductive.

As proof, the exclusion of the United States from the two main free trade agreements in the region – the CPTPP (from which the Trump administration withdrew) and the RCEP (of which China is a member) – reminds us that a good part of the rules and economic initiatives are written there on the margins of competition between great powers.

The recent decision by many countries (France, United Kingdom, United States) to adopt an Indo-Pacific strategy illustrates at the very least the importance that governments attach to this region. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, however, upset international priorities. Barely a week and a half after releasing its Indo-Pacific strategy, the White House had to face the facts: the strategic future of the United States will depend not only on the relationship with China, but also on unpredictable behavior of a second major nuclear power.

European security architecture put to the test by Moscow

The invasion of Ukraine represents the first major interstate conflict on the continent since World War II.

As historian Stephen Kotkin points out, for Putin, this war is part of this impossible quest to make Russia a great power equal to the West. The response of the NATO countries was rapid and concerted: common front against the Kremlin, new sanctions against Russia, military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Countries like the United States are even talking about permanent troop deployments in the former Soviet republics and satellites that are members of the alliance.

In the space of a few weeks, Putin will therefore have accelerated the unification of NATO, whereas he had spent the last two decades trying to destabilize it.

Even Finland and Sweden are preparing to apply for membership.

Will this unity last if the conflict gets bogged down in eastern and southern Ukraine in the coming months? Will the desire for strategic autonomy of certain European countries lead to a gradual erosion of the common front against Moscow? How would NATO countries react if Putin followed through on his threat to break the nuclear taboo by ordering a tactical strike in Ukraine? Already undermined by this world divided by strategic competition, international security would then be fundamentally compromised.