International | Chinese influence in Canada

A voluminous report on Chinese influence operations recently published by two researchers from the Strategic Research Institute of the Military School (IRSEM), in France, devotes a chapter to the Canadian case. This article presents the main conclusions.

Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer
Director of the Strategic Research Institute of the Military School (IRSEM), Paris, and member of the Observatory of multidimensional conflicts of the Raoul-Dandurand Chair

Why is Canada interested in China? First and foremost for its Chinese diaspora, which is home to a large number of real and suspected dissidents. Then for its proximity, from all points of view, with the great American rival; its membership in military (NATO) and intelligence (Five Eyes) alliances of great interest to Beijing; the fact that it is an arctic nation, an area of ​​growing interest to China; its image of an exemplary liberal democracy, which makes it a symbolic target; and the fact that it is a medium power, minimizing the potential consequences. Beijing also believes it is in a strong position due to Canada’s dependence on the Chinese market – and that of Canadian universities on Chinese students – particularly in British Columbia.

It is therefore understandable why Canada was described as China’s “second priority” after the United States in matters of espionage by defector Chen Yonglin. During his visit to Ottawa and Montreal in 2007, he said that no less than “a thousand Chinese spies, officials or informal and occasional informants” were active in the territory.

The Diaspora

One of the priority objectives of Chinese operations in Canada is to stifle the voices of dissidents. Cases of harassment and intimidation of citizens and residents seen by Beijing as threats are numerous and well documented.

Beijing organizes (mostly through WeChat) aggressive counter-demonstrations, carries out campaigns of harassment and intimidation targeting targeted individuals, sometimes using fake accounts and “photoshopped” images, uses the remaining relatives in China as a lever, constantly monitors certain communities, especially ethnic minorities (including Uyghurs), conducts cyberattacks against dissident groups or individuals, practices identity theft (for example the attackers sent insulting emails to ministers and parliamentarians by posing as members of Falun Gong in order to discredit them) and travel restrictions (Canadian activists have been denied visas to China, arrested, detained and intimidated at Chinese airports , and were forced to leave Chinese territory).

Either way, the goal is the same: to stifle the voice of dissidents. Beijing’s representatives abroad, in this case the ambassador and consuls in Canada, are directly involved in certain intimidation campaigns.

Politics

Beijing is also seeking to influence Canadian politics, by polling and co-opting certain politicians (deputies and ministers at the federal level, but also, and even above all, local politicians, particularly in British Columbia and Ontario, where the most established are large communities of Chinese origin). There are also a few cases of electoral interference: the Chinese consulate in Toronto has sent Chinese students to Chinese-speaking homes to say who to vote for and the one in Vancouver is regularly accused of supporting candidates of Chinese origin in the constituency of Richmond. , where a Chinese organization notably urged voters, through WeChat, to vote for certain candidates for money.

Media

The influence is also aimed at the media: almost all Chinese-speaking media in Canada are controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which practices the carrot (encouraging newspapers to censor themselves in exchange for commercial advantages) like the stick ( intimidate, threaten, harass, put pressure on relatives in China, dismiss journalists who resist this pressure, or end programs deemed to be dissident). There are also cases of information manipulation, in particular translation falsification.

Education

Education is not to be outdone: first in universities, some of which, like in Australia (but to a lesser extent), are relatively dependent on Chinese students. We must distinguish two types of problems: on the one hand, the fact that Beijing uses Canadian universities in science and technology to spy on and steal technologies. This can be done clandestinely or openly, through collaborations: Canadian academics have many joint research projects with Chinese colleagues, some of whom are in reality undercover soldiers, or work in Chinese universities closely linked to the People’s Liberation Army. On the other hand, the fact that Beijing uses Canadian universities in general for political purposes, to control what is said about China and to monitor dissidents who speak there. Organized in associations with an almost military discipline, sometimes raising the Chinese flag and singing the national anthem of their country on Canadian campuses, Chinese students do not hide their nationalism. There is a number of proofs of the involvement of the Chinese authorities (embassy and consulates) in these activities on Canadian campuses, in particular through the student associations (CSSA).

Then, secondary education is not spared, especially because most of the Confucius Institutes in Canada are located there. There have been reports of restrictions on the freedom of expression of schoolchildren on subjects related to China, for example teachers forbidding talking about the Tian’anmen massacre and presenting maps of China including Taiwan.

First Nations

Beijing is also engaged in a strategy of seduction of the First Nations which can potentially serve to divide Canadian society (with the story that “the two peoples must support each other in the face of marginalization and racism”). The case of the Musqueam, an indigenous population in the Vancouver area, is particularly interesting since some of them have Chinese ancestors. Beijing’s efforts towards them are therefore significant, but they are not the only targets.