The Ukrainian crisis conveys several received ideas based on an interpretation of history that deserves to be nuanced, in particular three assertions that distort the judgment on the Ukrainian issue. If we must not unduly exaggerate the threat posed by this one, we must not sink into an angelic attitude either.
If only NATO hadn’t expanded
Some blame much of the blame and origin of this crisis on NATO. If since the mid-1990s the enlargement policy had not been implemented, we would not be here, according to them, because Russia would have felt reassured and not betrayed. It is a myth, however, that invalidates the reading of the archives. These show that Russia had then taken note of the fact that enlargement was inevitable and represented the choice of the countries of Eastern Europe. Until Putin rewrote history, the famous “not an inch to the east” promise, expressed during Germany’s reunification process in 1990, had nothing to do with guaranteeing never include one day the dozen countries that have since been added. At the time, there was no question of isolating Russia.
First Yeltsin, then Putin, occasionally expressed their interest in joining the Organization, each time ending up rejecting this possibility. They nevertheless agreed to participate in common mechanisms, such as the NATO-Russia council created in 1997 to oversee cooperation. Putin, on the other hand, has gradually focused on dismantling the gains of the end of the Cold War, fearing the spread of democracy far more than that of Western security in Eurasia. This attitude explains its interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (since 2014). These countries come under Moscow’s wrath because Putin wishes to preserve Russia’s sphere of influence — in fact, his authoritarian and colonialist vision — over his “near abroad”.
Nevertheless, membership in NATO is not only a matter of free choice for these countries, whose populations strongly support inclusion, but it is also Brussels which in 2008 extended a pole to Kiev and in Tbilisi, worried about Russia’s desire for revenge. Going back on the decision to enlarge would be a serious mistake and would grant Putin the right of veto which he ardently seeks (as in Soviet times). Not to mention his outlandish demands on the withdrawal of NATO forces and bases from certain Eastern countries.
If only the United States didn’t panic
Many believe that the American (and Canadian) reaction is exaggerated and gives way to panic. Would NATO have become the aggressor and Russia the victim of this militarism? Panic is certainly a bad adviser. But is it really a panic? Or rather of the fear of losing all credibility regarding the threats of reprisals in the face of the military pressure that Putin exerts? After the invasions of Georgia and Crimea, who can indeed exclude the scenario of an incursion into Ukrainian territory? Deterrence is therefore essential to increase, for the Russian leader, the exorbitant cost of military action and prevent him from repeating the scenarios of 2008 and 2014 in Ukraine. We can reverse the perspective: it may be he who is trapped, having underestimated the reaction of the Biden government. The panic may not be where you think it is.
Moreover, the Anglo-Saxon disinformation on the Russian crowd on the Ukrainian border has absolutely nothing to do with that on the presumed weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in 2003: the Russian deployments are visible by all the satellites. As for President Biden, in the wake of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, he could not remain silent in the face of the prospect of a Russian invasion. Pundits would quickly call American diplomacy inept. The leadership of the United States is essential to manage the crisis, because the messages sent by Biden’s decisions will have a decisive impact on the reputation of the United States when other events occur, such as a Chinese threat against Taiwan, for example. . In short, where some perceive a panic attack on the part of Washington, we can rather estimate that it is a real awareness of the gravity of the crisis and its consequences.
If only Ukraine were neutral
What ways out of the crisis are available to us? The diplomatic solution remains optimal, provided that American responses satisfy Russian demands, an unlikely outcome. A moratorium on Ukrainian membership of NATO is possible, if it is accompanied by a demilitarization of the Donbass region (14,000 dead since 2014). Discreet Chinese or Hungarian mediation also seems conceivable, as well as a suspension of hostilities and postponing the resolution of the conflict. On the other hand, the solution sometimes put forward that Kiev declare the neutrality of Ukraine, as in the case of Austria in 1955, is far-fetched for two reasons.
On the one hand, the context is completely different today. If the Austrians saw their neutrality imposed by the great powers of the time, the Ukrainians would refuse such a status. We are no longer in the era of the Cold War, when the big powers decided the fate of the small ones without the latter having a voice in the matter.
On the other hand, Ukraine was in fact “neutral” between 1992 and 2008, and it cannot be concluded that this status served its quest for security. Recall that Kiev agreed in 1994 to hand over its nuclear weapons to Moscow in exchange for security guarantees from the Russian government. This one had to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine (if he had been able to guess the continuation, Kiev would perhaps have preserved them, these weapons). Finally, it is ironic to note that neutrality is now being questioned by countries as peaceful as Sweden and Finland, which have practiced it for decades and which are also considering applying for NATO membership.
Imagine the analysis that experts would have made if Donald Trump’s United States had massed some 100,000 soldiers along the eastern Canadian border, threatening to make a military incursion into Quebec or Ontario soil in order to acquire a portion of territory that they would have considered historically theirs! It’s a safe bet that we would have panicked trying by all means to dissuade Washington (help, Paris, London, Beijing, NATO, the UN?) and that we would have convinced absolutely no one of the merit of neutrality in the face of such a threat.