Requested for almost a year, the commission of inquiry into foreign interference took so long to finally be launched that it now seems doomed to disappoint – the unjustified delays having not helped – as expectations are so high probably become unappeasable given the scope of the influence denounced. Especially since allegations of attempted interference continue to multiply not only in the Canadian electoral process, but also within the industrial and scientific communities. The mandate of Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue suddenly seems very limited.
Even before the public hearings on the substance of the issue begin in two weeks, the trust placed in the commission is already being undermined. An act of faith that is nevertheless essential to the exercise.
The Uighur and Hong Kong diasporas, among the first victims of Beijing’s interference, withdrew from the work and will not offer their essential testimony, worried about seeing the participation of two politicians suspected of being too close to the communist regime. Chinese who coordinates this intimidation on Canadian soil. The Conservative Party, for its part, protests that it was not granted full participant status, even though its MP, Michael Chong, was entitled to it. The commission has also just confirmed that part of the evidence and information provided by the federal government, since it is classified, will have to be examined behind closed doors. There is reason to worry that at the end of this long-awaited commission of inquiry, the electorate will not be more reassured.
Especially since these attempts at influence continue 19 months, at most, from the next election. A candidate for the Conservative nomination in an Ontario riding, Kaveh Shahrooz, abandoned his campaign last month, saying he was the victim of “unprecedented” interference by Iran. The outcome of the 2019 and 2021 elections is not in doubt, but for these maneuvers by foreign regimes to be able to influence even a single constituency would already be one too many for the integrity of the democratic process. .
Two Chinese community centers in the Montreal region continue their activities with impunity, while the Royal Canadian Mounted Police suspects them of hosting “police stations” responsible for intimidating nationals on orders from Beijing. The two organizations even went so far as to file a $5 million lawsuit against the federal police, who are continuing their investigation.
In addition to this unacceptable foreign intimidation on Canadian soil, the multiple allegations of economic, scientific and industrial espionage are also alarming. That a couple of Canadian citizens of Chinese origin worked for years in a Winnipeg laboratory housing the most dangerous pathogens on the planet while maintaining “clandestine” ties with Chinese military authorities is disturbing. That they “intentionally transferred scientific knowledge and materials” to China is alarming. Equally important is the fact that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service has qualified them as a “credible threat” or a “serious danger” to Canada’s economic security.
Especially since the behavior of the two researchers was not above suspicion in the years preceding their expulsion from the laboratory in 2019. Justin Trudeau’s government speaks of “lax respect for security protocols”. Its allies will perhaps see it as negligence or naivety on the part of the Canadian authorities which will do nothing to reassure them. Which could explain why they stubbornly refused for years to share these classified documents.
Canada has also failed to protect university research for too long. THE Globe and Mailto whom we owe a good part of the disconcerting revelations of the last year, has thus identified numerous research works – notably on cutting-edge technologies aimed at perfecting drones – carried out jointly with Chinese colleagues affiliated with the army from Beijing or even to Iranian universities.
The Minister of Innovation, François-Philippe Champagne, fortunately announced at the start of the year the ban on any future technology research subsidies deemed sensitive to national security. However, the entire industrial sector remains vulnerable, as evidenced by the arrest of a Hydro-Québec employee accused of economic espionage for the good of China.
Canada should hurry to harness the expertise in the battery sector, which it is trying to develop to the covetousness of foreign regimes. Its major reform of national security laws, which has been under study for too long, must also be successful, in particular to create a register of foreign agents acting in Canada on behalf of another state.
The Hogue commission on electoral interference does not absolve the Trudeau government from getting rid of its inertia and protecting all spheres of society against the sprawling network of foreign interference.