From Syria to Ukraine, the similarities of Russia’s wars

Since a hill near Idliba refugee camp in Lebanon or a demonstration in Paris, many Syrians expressed their emotion and gave their support to the Ukrainians, while the Russian army has been pursuing its offensive in Ukraine for more than a month. In the images of bombed cities and affected civilians, they say they see an echo of what they suffered when Vladimir Putin intervened in Syria to help Bashar Al-Assad defeat the rebels, from 2015. Franceinfo interviewed experts on these similarities, which allow a better understanding of the Russian methods employed in Ukraine.

For Dimitri Minic, a researcher at the French Institute for International Relations (Ifri), the way Russia asphyxiates Mariupol, in particular, is the illustration “of a classic brutality in Russian military history, which we had seen in Aleppo as in Grozny”the capital of Chechnya, besieged and bombed twice in the 1990s. Like him, all the experts interviewed by franceinfo reserve comparisons with Syria to this port in south-eastern Ukraine, strategic because it is located in a corridor linking Crimea to the pro-Russian separatist republics of Donbass.

“Marioupol is Homs or Aleppo in a week rather than three months.”

Emile Hokayem, analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies

at franceinfo

Since the beginning of March, the incessant bombardments have killed at least 5,000 people there, without distinguishing between civilians and soldiers, according to an adviser to the Ukrainian presidency. Over the entire Syrian conflict, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, nearly 8,700 civilians have been killed by Russian bombardments, and 2,500 by strikes attributable to both Russia and Bashar’s regime. Al-Assad.

As in Syria, the Russian army resorts to bombardments and artillery fire rather than ground operations. It is also suspected of using cluster bombs, prohibited by international law, or white phosphorus incendiary weapons, prohibited against civilians, but not against military targets.

For Isabelle Facon, Deputy Director of the Foundation for Strategic Research, the Mariupol headquarters, like that of Aleppo, comes under the same “mode of operation”. “We encircle a city and bombard it until it capitulates”depriving its inhabitants of water, food and hope of survival, in order to “to erode support for the armed forces and cause the departure of civilian populations”. In Syria, eleven years of civil war, including more than six years of Russian intervention, have forced 6.6 million Syrians to flee the country and left as many internally displaced. In Ukraine, Mariupol has lost about two-thirds of its population, according to its mayor, Vadim Boitchenko.

Killing civilians is not the goal in itself of Vladimir Putin’s troops, however, believes Dimitri Minic, a specialist in Russian strategic thought, but a consequence considered secondary to the objective sought. “If they are targeting a military infrastructure, and a residential building is in the axis of the strike, they are likely to judge the target too important and ignore the presence of the civilian building”explains the expert. Especially since the Russian army uses few precision weapons and has to rely more on its artillery and less on its air force than in Syria, because “the weather and the terrain are less favourable”and Ukrainian air defenses “tougher than expected”.

“I don’t think the intent is to kill hundreds of thousands of civilians. But it’s to terrorize people.”

Emile Hokayem, analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies

at franceinfo

Vladimir Putin’s army is therefore ready to inflict great suffering on civilians if it serves its purposes. In Syria, the priority of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime and its Russian ally was to “depopulate” rebel-held areas, and they were prepared to achieve this “by massacring the inhabitants or forcing them to leave”, observes the Middle East specialist at the IISS. This strategy included the destruction of medical structures. Nearly 600 were targeted between 2011 and 2021, largely by Russian aircraft.

In Ukraine, the WHO recorded 64 attacks against medical facilities in a month of invasion, according to its latest report. “We have never seen so many attacks on the health system anywhere in the world”, denounced its head of emergencies Michael Ryan on March 16. In Mariupol, the Russian army notably struck a maternity hospital on March 9 and a theater which served as a shelter on March 16. The siege and strikes on infrastructure have placed the remaining inhabitants in a critical situation. The rare testimonies evoke streets strewn with bodies, mass graves, and survivors deprived of electricity, food and water, forced to melt the snow to drink and wash themselves.

“The humanitarian disaster is not just a consequence of Russian strategy, it is one of its elements.”

Emile Hokayem, analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies

at franceinfo

Other organizations qualify the comparison, however. “Buildings like schools and hospitals are badly affected. But we cannot establish that it was deliberate, unlike what we have documented in Syria” for the moment, explained Joanne Mariner, an official of the NGO Amnesty International, in The cross (paid item)March 22.

Ukraine and the international community quickly called for the opening of humanitarian corridors, recalling another lesson from the war in Syria. There, civilians using these corridors have sometimes come under fire. Some of the roads opened were in the direction of territories controlled by the regime and its Russian ally, demoralizing the populations. “It was a constant blackmail to put civilians in impossible situations, where their salvation depended only on the decisions of the Russians”explains Emile Hokayem.

This scenario is repeated today. Ukraine has repeatedly denounced the presence of mines on the evacuation routes or the non-respect of the ceasefire, in particular in Mariupol. On March 7, Moscow even proposed the opening of corridors to Russia or Belarus, arousing the indignation of Ukraine and France. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians managed to flee Mariupol, “but by their own means, on foot or by car, in extremely dangerous conditions for their lives”notes Lucile Marbeau, a spokesperson for the International Committee of the Red Cross, interviewed by Release (paid item). “For now, in Mariupol, the security of the corridors has never been guaranteed.”

“We are unfortunately still in the same Russian logic”regretted Jean-Yves Le Drian, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in The Parisianon March 16, the head of French diplomacy denouncing “indiscriminate bombardments, so-called humanitarian ‘corridors’ designed to then accuse the adversary of not respecting them and talks with no other objective than to pretend to negotiate”. In Syria as in Ukraine, Moscow has displayed an openness to talks which, according to Emile Hokayem, are mainly intended to “paralyze” its adversaries, dissuaded from toughening sanctions or military aid so as not to miss this opportunity.

“Every time Russians and Ukrainians talk, we say to ourselves: ‘There may be a prospect of an agreement, be careful not to escalate’.”

Emile Hokayem, analyst for the International Institute for Strategic Studies

at franceinfo

This strategy also allows the Russian army to buy time and reconstitute its forces. Moscow is indeed encountering unexpected difficulties in Ukraine, which illustrate certain differences with Syria. “At first, I think they wanted to wage a quick war, hitting strategic military infrastructure to undermine the will of the Ukrainian government”, analyzes Isabelle Facon, who notes the rapid failure of this strategy. A month-long siege in Mariupol was not necessarily the original plan.

The attitude of the international community also changes the situation. In Ukraine, the Russian army is attacking a sovereign state, led by a democratically elected president, a neighbor of NATO and the European Union. These organizations immediately reacted and shared weapons and military intelligence with the Ukrainians. In Syria, the presence of terrorist groups fighting Bashar Al-Assad enabled Russia to intervene with “a form of assent of the Western powers”less careful about its methods, adds Dimitri Minic.

“Obama’s famous red line on the use of chemical weapons was crossed without consequence” by Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, also recalls Isabelle Facon.

“What lesson did Russia learn in Syria? That chemical weapons can be used with impunity.”

Emile Hokayem, analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies

at franceinfo

Paradoxically, this Syrian precedent can help explain Vladimir Putin’s miscalculation in Ukraine. “It is possible that he was galvanized by what is perceived as an operational success in Syria, and the image of military power that this intervention sent back”analyzes Isabelle Falcon. “And that he was blinded” about his chances of success in Ukraine.


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