Émilie Nicolas’ column: better understand the Ukrainian question

I will not pretend here to be a long-time expert on Ukraine. However, when I am presented with a current international issue such as a conflict between the good guys and the bad guys, I take that information with a grain of salt and get curious. Here are some background elements that help me better understand the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine (and NATO, and the European Union, and the United States).

1. Ukraine has only existed as an independent country since 1991. Large parts of present-day Ukraine were part of the Kingdom of Poland before becoming part of Imperial Russia. Other regions escaped Russian control for centuries: the south was long ruled by the Ottoman Empire, while the west fell under the control of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the 18th century.and century. After the end of the First World War and the creation of the USSR, the entire territory came under Soviet control.

2. In the 19thand century, Ukrainian intellectuals began to think about nationalism, like everywhere else in Europe. Those who did not already live in the Austro-Hungarian part of the country were forced into exile there, as the Russia of the tsars had little tolerance for such ideas. Even today, the Ukrainians who feel most attached to Europe and to the Ukrainian language are mainly present in the west of the country, while a good part of the population in the east and south supports a more Russophile political option, in addition to being Russian-speaking herself.

3. The Holodomor is certainly one of the greatest traumas in the history of Ukraine. When Stalin imposed land collectivization in the early 1930s, many Ukrainians wanted to resist. Political repression was severe. The term “Holodomor” refers to the ensuing Great Famine, which claimed at least four million lives between 1932 and 1933. In 2006, Ukraine’s “pro-Western” government recognized the famine as a genocide, as did Canada — a term of course contested by Russia. One can imagine the level of emotion of much of the population as the Russian army advances, remembering the political violence of which the Russian authorities are capable.

4. The alternation between “pro-Western” and “pro-Russian” in the Ukrainian presidency is not without tension. In 2004, the “pro-Western” Yushchenko succeeded the pro-Russian Kuchma, but only after large demonstrations against electoral fraud in the streets of Kiev forced the resumption of the ballot. In the winter of 2014, after pro-Russian President Yanukovych, in power since 2010, refused to join the European Union, the “pro-Westerns” revolted again in Kiev. Following the police repression orchestrated by the government, which left dozens dead, the president was deposed and the “pro-Westerns” regained power. The demonstrators and militiamen killed in 2014 are given the status of national martyrs.

5. It was after this crisis that Crimea organized a referendum on its annexation to the Russian Federation. The referendum, which takes place under Russian military occupation, is immediately declared illegal by the United States and the European Union. In the spring of 2014, pro-Russian secessionists also declared the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to the east, without there being any international recognition either. It was in these regions that Putin asked the Russian army to enter earlier this week. Both in the south and in the east, the president plays on the vagueness between the Russophile Ukrainians and his own political puppets to justify his military incursions.

6. Ukrainian public opinion is not set in stone. Ukrainians who have long been sympathetic to Russia may have been chilled by Putin’s aspirations and the political violence of recent years. Others may evolve politically because economic ties between Ukraine and Russia are less exclusive than before, with the “pro-Westerns” in power since 2014.

7. NATO, the military alliance which played a preponderant role during the Cold War, welcomed several former members of the USSR into its ranks during the 1990s and 2000s. In this context, Ukraine, which “ officially aspires to join NATO as it shares a direct border with Russia, is of crucial strategic importance. This expansion is one of the issues (or pretexts) put forward by Putin in the diplomatic negotiations of recent months.

8. The United States has certainly not yet recovered from the monumental failure of its mission in Afghanistan. It might be tempting for a Vladimir Putin to “test” Joe Biden’s appetite for an aggressive foreign policy.

9. 1.36 million Canadians reported Ukrainian origins in the 2016 census, and this is a particularly politically active diaspora. Since it is mainly present in the Prairies, it is easy to underestimate, in Quebec, the pressure put on the Canadian government to act in Ukraine.

10. The major European NATO powers have more commercial ties with Russia and have more to lose in the event of open conflict on the continent than the United States or Canada. If Putin sticks to a partial occupation of Ukrainian territory, he could divide NATO members on the response to advocate.

What is unfolding before our eyes has the potential to turn into a great human tragedy. It is also a very complex geopolitical issue. Before deciding on the next move to play in this game of chess, one should at least try to understand each piece.

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