US-China relations have evolved significantly since 1979, when the U.S. shifted recognition from Taiwan to Beijing, a move deemed realistic given China’s governance. While initial optimism surrounded China’s reforms, current tensions under Xi Jinping reflect a more isolationist stance. The 2008 financial crisis marked a pivotal moment, showcasing China’s growing influence. Personal experiences during the Tiananmen Square protests illustrated the regime’s oppressive nature, leading to a complex relationship that, while less perilous than during the Cold War, remains fraught with challenges.
The Evolution of US-China Relations
In 1979, the United States made a pivotal decision to sever diplomatic ties with Taipei and establish relations with Beijing. Fast forward to today, and the American Department of Defense characterizes China as a “significant challenge” and a considerable threat. In hindsight, was the recognition of Beijing a misstep?
Absolutely not. The decision was grounded in realism. It became clear that the vast majority of China was governed by Beijing, making it impractical to continue recognizing a government in exile in Taiwan. This shift was part of a broader strategy initiated by Henry Kissinger’s groundbreaking trip to China in 1971, which culminated in President Nixon’s visit in 1972. During the Cold War, China was viewed as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union, making this move both tactically and strategically sound.
At the time, the Taipei government was only notified shortly before the diplomatic shift, leading to longstanding sentiments of distrust in Taiwan regarding American reliability.
The situation could have been managed more smoothly. When Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Taipei shortly after the decision, he faced intense protests. This backlash was quite severe, and lingering resentments, particularly among the Kuomintang party, still echo today.
Reflections on China’s Transformation
Your first visit to mainland China was in early 1978. What striking differences do you observe between that China and the one we see today?
Back then, China was an impoverished nation. The populace was primarily dressed in blue, gray, or green, and the streets lacked vehicles. However, just a year later, in 1979, Deng Xiaoping’s policies of reform and modernization ignited a wave of optimism. In stark contrast, today’s China, under Xi Jinping, exhibits a climate of isolation, skepticism towards private enterprises, and a renewed focus on state-owned businesses. Ironically, the China of Deng Xiaoping was more aligned with Western ideologies than the current regime.
Could you have predicted, during your initial visit, that China would evolve into a global powerhouse?
If asked back then, my response would likely have been a hesitant “no.” However, the Chinese people are incredibly capable; their society values education, hard work, and diligence, which are essential for such growth. So, in hindsight, the trajectory of development is not surprising.
Over the 55 years you have engaged with China, was there a moment that made you realize, “China will pose a challenge for the USA”?
The turning point for me was during the 2008/09 financial crisis, often referred to as “China’s Year of Arrogance.” At that time, China thrived while the West grappled with economic turmoil, and Beijing began to extend its influence over neighboring countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, even before Xi Jinping assumed power.
Were you taken aback by this shift?
Not entirely. Signs had been visible earlier. In 2003, while serving as the US ambassador in Hanoi, I recall the Vietnamese expressing their desire to strengthen ties with America due to Chinese pressures in the South China Sea. They were particularly concerned about China’s attempts to sway Laos and Cambodia—regions they considered part of their sphere of influence. As Xi Jinping took office, China’s assertiveness intensified.
During the summer of 1989, while you were stationed at the American embassy in Beijing, the People’s Liberation Army suppressed protests around Tiananmen Square. What was your experience during that time?
The events left an indelible mark on me. I witnessed from my hotel balcony as troops opened fire on civilians. Changan Avenue, located right in front of the hotel, became the scene of both military and tank movements. In the weeks leading up to the crackdown, I had interacted with many demonstrators on the streets.
Did you have freedom of movement as a foreign diplomat?
Yes, diplomats could freely visit Tiananmen Square and engage with protesters. Interestingly, it later became evident that the government may not have needed to resort to violence to quell the protests, as participation was already dwindling. Students were returning to their universities, and workers were resuming their jobs. However, the leadership wanted to send a clear message.
What was that message?
It was an unequivocal statement that such demonstrations would not be tolerated.
Did you anticipate a violent outcome?
Yes, intelligence reports indicated military intervention was imminent, and we were cautioned that the diplomatic area could be shelled—a warning that proved accurate days later.
Why were diplomats targeted during this crisis?
The party leadership was unhappy about foreign media documenting the crackdown and arrests. They likely assumed that bombarding the embassies would lead to their evacuation, following the Chinese adage: “Close the door before you hit the dog,” which implies avoiding exposure during a crisis.
What impact did these events have on you?
To say the least, it was profoundly disheartening. It starkly illustrated the nature of the regime we were dealing with. Many of us who were in China at the time doubted the notion that economic liberalization would lead to political freedoms.
After the Tiananmen massacre, Western nations responded with sanctions, limiting engagement with the Chinese government. Yet, trade resumed relatively quickly…
Indeed, the Western arms embargo against China remains in effect, but prior to that, military equipment like radar systems and anti-ship missiles were sold without hesitation. Nonetheless, there was a strong desire to re-engage economically with China. Deng Xiaoping’s famous southern tour in 1992 signaled that reforms would persist. Just a month post-massacre, President George H. W. Bush dispatched a secret mission to Beijing to prevent complete diplomatic isolation. This was about preserving our interests and ongoing programs.
Can you elaborate on that?
The “project” referred to covert observation posts in western China, used for monitoring Soviet military actions, while the “program” pertained to supporting the Afghan resistance against Soviet encroachment, which was facilitated through China.
Some argue that the current US-China relations are more perilous than the Cold War dynamics with the Soviet Union. Having experienced that era, what’s your perspective?
No, I disagree with that assessment. The Cuban Missile Crisis was truly alarming. We are not on the brink of catastrophe as we were back then, nor have we been in recent years. However, this does not imply that the current situation is favorable; in fact, it is quite the opposite.