The extent of the Russian losses in Ukraine – even if the figures remain unverifiable – obviously reached considerable proportions, symbolized by a phenomenon observed from the first days of the conflict: the death of many generals and senior officers.
On Friday, Ukraine claimed to have killed the commander of the 49and Russian Southern District Army, General Yakov Rezantsev, which she says is the seventh officer of this rank since the start of the war.
The death of Andrei Paliy, deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet, was also confirmed in fighting around Mariupol by the governor of Crimea (annexed by the Russians), Mikhail Razvozhayev.
The adviser to the Ukrainian President Mykhailo Podoliak described last week the “extraordinary” death rate of Russian officers, seeing it as a sign of the “total unpreparedness” of the Moscow army. “Dozens of mid-ranking officers [lieutenants, capitaines] were killed,” he said.
The media, citing Russian communications intercepted by the Ukrainians, even mentioned the assassination of a Russian officer by his own exasperated soldiers.
Doubts are possible: the Ukrainians evoke the death of General Magomed Tushaev, a Chechen, near kyiv on February 26. But Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov says he attended a meeting on March 23 and released a video of him speaking on March 13.
Moscow, for its part, admitted the death of only one general. Some sources mention 15. Independent verifications are, at this stage, impossible. “I look at these numbers with great caution,” Colin Clarke, research director of the Soufan Center, a New York-based think tank, told AFP. “But whether we are talking about 5 or 15, the very fact that they are losing generals shows that the Russian chain of command and control is extremely weak. »
Aim for heads
Western analysts and military experts are unanimous in describing a first phase of the war that the Russians failed on the whole.
The former Red Army, though preceded by a flattering reputation, showed great weaknesses in the quality of its intelligence, its logistics, its tactical wanderings. They “force the leaders to go very far forward on the lines of contact”, notes a senior French military official.
He advances hypotheses: “Orders are misunderstood or poorly received, units do not obey, or there is a major morale problem that forces the generals to go ahead”. And it confirms a probable Ukrainian strategy. “It’s quite fine. When you want to disrupt a chain of command, you aim for heads. »
The task seems all the more accessible since the Russian army uses communication tools that are easily intercepted. Moscow units “do not pay attention to computer security procedures and can easily be intercepted”, assures AFP Alexander Grinberg, analyst at the Jerusalem Institute for Security and Strategy (JISS).
In the field, the commander’s vehicle is recognizable by its “antennas and other vehicles that protect it. So you identify the tactical command post,” he explains. The Ukrainians can then “target it with an anti-tank missile or, even better, with an attack drone”.
” Headache “
Western observers point out that the Kremlin does not seem very attentive to human losses and that Russian military culture, still marked by Soviet heritage, relies on its quantitative power. “Loss is not a brake. Attrition doesn’t stop Putin,” recalls a Western diplomat. But the chain of command poses another problem. Because Russian generals are not infinitely interchangeable.
“Numbers matter, especially for senior officers,” says Colin Clarke. “That Putin is sacrificing conscripts and mercenaries as cannon fodder is one thing, but if the information is accurate” about these very high profile losses, “the information will reach public opinion and cause headaches for the public.” ‘Russian elite,’ he said.
Moscow does not comment on these issues. The fact that no denial is published is considered by some sources as confirmation de facto.