Prime Minister Legault may exalt the “pride” of Quebecers and make them dangle greater autonomy, but the reality is that they are more and more resigned to put up with Canada as it is.
Since 1992, the Public Opinion Research Group (GROP) has provided the sovereignist camp with analyzes on various issues. He has just published his final report, entitled The national question 30 years later: where are we?, which is accompanied by a survey carried out by the firm Léger last February.
In particular, it measures support for the various constitutional options offered to Quebecers over the years: independence, sovereignty-association, special status and the status quo.
Today as yesterday, the first choice of Francophones is a hybrid formula, whether sovereignty-association (60%) or special status (68%), that is to say a variant of this mythical “third way” which periodically resurfaces – and to which we can associate the new project for the Quebec nationalists of the CAQ.
Despite their reluctance to cut ties with Canada, they have long preferred independence to the status quo. In 1992, the year of the referendum on the Charlottetown Accord, this was the case for 46% of Francophones, while only 18% opted for the status quo.
In 1995, when 49.4% of Quebecers said yes to the “sovereignty-partnership” proposed by the Parizeau government, support for independence as such rose to 54% among Francophones; the status quo, 22%.
Over the following years, the gap between the two gradually narrowed, until it reached the tipping point. Today, 49% of Francophones say they are in favor of independence, but support for the status quo also garners 58%.
This reversal undoubtedly results less from a recognition of Canada’s merits than from a depoliticization of the feeling of belonging to Quebec that the younger generations still feel. But it nonetheless has serious consequences for the balance of power that Quebec has — or no longer has — vis-à-vis Ottawa and the rest of the country.
In Robert Bourassa’s eyes, independence was an “insurance policy” that he could use to force English Canada to negotiate a new constitutional arrangement, be it the Meech Lake Accord or the Charlottetown Accord. One may be of the opinion that he played his cards wrong, but that is another story.
Even when sovereignist fervor reached a paroxysm, the majority of Quebecers did not want to leave Canada, but simply to be shown a minimum of consideration. The massive support given to the Meech Lake accord attested to how little they demanded.
Despite everything, Ottawa remained haunted for a long time by the fear that a stroke of blood would cause them to slam the door. Even after the No of 1995, we pulled out the heavy artillery with the Clarity Act and we begged Jean Charest to come to Quebec to prevent Lucien Bouchard from triggering another referendum.
Of course, the Trudeau government also has its polls. The bluff is over! He now knows that despite rebuffs and Quebec bashing, Quebecers have resigned themselves to living in Canada as it is rather than taking the risk of secession. Therefore, he no longer has any reason to give in to the demands of Prime Minister Legault, who also takes great care not to brandish any threat.
Tuesday, at the National Assembly, the parliamentary leader of the PQ, Joël Arsenault, reminded Mr. Legault that Justin Trudeau had told him dryly that he had “nothing to wax” about his immigration requests and asked him how he intended to “deal with such humiliation”.
Since the majority of Quebecers are opposed to independence, but would agree to Quebec having authority over family reunification, the Prime Minister concluded that his government’s strategy was preferable to that of the PQ.
Mr. Legault can multiply pirouettes during question period, but that does not solve the problem. He knows it very well. But when Ottawa says no and the population prefers to live with this no rather than rebel, what can it do?
It is difficult to say to what extent the disaffection with the PQ is the result or the cause of the growing favor of the constitutional status quo. For 50 years, the threat he posed was undoubtedly the most effective argument that supporters of an in-depth reform of federalism could put forward. They may regret it as much as they hated it.